An Evaluation of the Support for Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security

Bogotá and Medellín

November 2010

OVE/TDP-02/10
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An Evaluation of the Support for Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security: Bogotá and Medellin

Emmanuel Abuelafia*

This version: November 2010

Abstract

In the 1990s Colombia implemented a series of programs for violence prevention and citizen security. Three of these—the Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security programs—were implemented in Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali. This is the evaluation of the case of Bogotá and Medellín. In both cases the data show a dramatic reduction in violence during the program period. The comparison of treated and non-treated groups cannot identify the impact on violence levels, but it can shed some light on crime attitudes. Namely, in the case of Bogotá the parameter estimates suggest that the program was able to change attitudes toward crime (social culture) and increased the utilization of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. In the case of Medellín, it also was successful at changing attitudes.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Crime and violence remain top critical issues for Colombia. While the homicide rate has been decreasing during the past decades, from 80 to 37 homicides per 100,000 habitants (from 1990 to 2007). In the particular case of Bogotá, the homicide rate increased from 20 hphh in 1985 to values around 80 homicides in 1993. After that date, the rate decreased sustainably to values similar to 1985. There is a wide dispersion in the number of homicides in the different municipalities, 3 main municipalities (Bogotá, Cali and Medellín) accounted for 23% of the total homicides in Colombia in 2007. Moreover, there is a disconnection\(^1\) between crimes against property and crimes against individuals. The cities where crime against property is high are not the ones with high rates of homicide.

As part of a national initiative and with the objective to reduce levels of violence and insecurity in several Colombian cities, the IADB approved the project of Support for Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security in Bogotá in 1998. The project included a wide range of initiatives but was mostly preventive. This report seeks to evaluate whether or not the preventive initiatives proposed by the project reduced the probability of individuals becoming a victim or committing a violent act or crime. In order to assess this question, we mainly undertook a literature review of reports constructed specifically for the project and all the general literature that might be useful in assessing the impact of the interventions financed by the project. To structure the evaluation, we formulated a series of evaluative questions: Did the project reach the most vulnerable communities in terms of violence and determinants of violent behavior? Were the interventions effective in achieving the expected development outcomes? Were the interventions effective in reducing social risk factors? Were there gender-specific outcomes?

The paper is organized as follows: section one briefly describes the intervention and the results framework of the project; section two analyzes its relevance and evaluates its diagnostic; section three analyzes the results, impacts, sustainability and execution problems; and section four includes the conclusion and the policy recommendations.

\(^1\) As reported by Rubio (1999).
II. IADB INTERVENTION

A. Objectives and components

The Bogotá project is part of a national project that provides support to various activities at the national government level and in the municipalities of Bogotá, Cali and Medellin. The interventions the IADB has financed since late 1990s are a combination of approaches whose objectives are:

- At the general level to reduce levels of violence and insecurity in several Colombian cities by strengthening efforts to prevent, counteract and control factors associated with criminal acts and violence.

- At the specific level:
  
  i. To provide the tools required at the national level to develop an awareness of and to evaluate the many forms of crime in Colombian cities, and to establish a consensus concerning which causes should be tackled by policies.

  ii. To help the national authorities establish national policies and programs.

  iii. To support activities at the municipal level to promote peaceful coexistence and prevent and control urban and domestic violence.

  iv. To help cities monitor and evaluate projects on peaceful coexistence and security and encourage their development by providing loans and technical assistance.

  v. To encourage the exchange of successful experience among cities.

The Bogotá project was organized into different activities that included: i) the establishment and strengthening of the local crime reporting program (17% of total budget); ii) programs for youth at risk, youthful offenders and at-risk youth (34%); iii) programs to make the judicial system more accessible (17%); iv) citizen education (6%); and v) strengthening of the police (12%). Also, the project included resources for institutional strengthening.

In regard to monitoring and evaluation, the Loan Document established that the monitoring meeting would be held semiannually during the execution of the project. The Loan Document established that the IADB and the National Technical Committee would determine whether periodic impact studies should be conducted (Para 3.28). The Government and the IADB agreed to not conduct a final review of the projects.

A. Initial Evaluability Assessment

As a first step toward evaluating the project, we reviewed the project results framework, constructing it from the information provided in the Loan Document.
The objective was to assess whether the project was proposing to collect the necessary information so that it could be evaluated as to the achievement of its goals and purposes. This requires the availability of complete indicators for each project purpose (a measurable indicator with a baseline, milestones and a target). The evaluability of a project depends on the availability of complete indicators for all proposed purposes. In the absence of this information, the project is not evaluable and to form a judgment regarding the effectiveness of the project would require an alternative evaluation strategy.

The following table summarizes the objectives, purposes and indicators proposed. It shows that, at the stage of project approval, none of the purposes has a single complete indicator. The problems with the indicators proposed are, first of all, that they are not measurable. Second, all the indicators lack baselines, milestones and targets. Third, the adequacy of the indicators is disputable: some are related to policies that were already in place and others are outcome indicators. This situation does not improve even after considering the changes introduced during the execution of the project, which are reflected in the PPMRs.

The project has low evaluability. First of all, none of the purposes has complete indicators. Even after the modifications introduced by the PPMRs, there were no complete indicators. Second, the feasibility and the effort level involved in the project are not clear as there were no targets. Third, the adequacy of the indicators is disputable given the activities and the time frame for the project.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Loan Document</th>
<th>PPMR 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Metric form</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Milestone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful coexistence</td>
<td>Increased access to alternative mechanisms for the administration of justice: cases handled and settled</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful coexistence</td>
<td>Reduced impunity with respect to criminal incidents affecting community harmony and citizen security</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful coexistence</td>
<td>Improvement in coverage and quality in the judicial and alternative conflict resolution mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful coexistence</td>
<td>Youth and children improved their capabilities for peaceful coexistence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Urban Violence</td>
<td>Reduced levels of violence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Urban Violence</td>
<td>Decrease in violent behavior of the citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. RELEVANCE AND DIAGNOSTIC

A. Relevance

The Loan Document lists the activities that the national government was implementing at the formulation stage but it does not include a description of the national government’s citizen security public policy, despite the fact that several activities to be conducted at the municipal level were part of this broader public policy supported by the National government. Among the reforms undertaken during that period, the national government introduced changes to legislation such as creating alternative conflict resolution mechanisms and creating specific institutions focusing on children and families and the Casas de Justicia.

Also, at that time, there was an ongoing reform process in the National Police. First, as a result of the changes introduced by the 1991 Constitution, the civilian authorities begun adopting a more prominent role in the activities and resources of the police, as the mayors became the chiefs of the security forces in their jurisdictions. Second, the modernization process of the National Polices included a purge to reduce its corruption level (Dupuy et al 2004).

At the municipal level, there were several ongoing activities at the time this project had been formulated and approved. These activities were carried out, at the beginning, without federal funding. As mentioned in the Loan Document, although the IADB did not have previous experience in this topic, the project based an important proportion of its initiatives on already ongoing projects and initiatives, which received at least some institutional support from the national government.

The history of the citizen security initiatives in Bogotá can be traced back to the first Mockus administration (1995-1997). Under his government, a structural plan was designed and implemented in order to improve the worrisome crime and violence situation observed in Bogotá. Its objective was to subsanar el divorcio existente entre la ley, la moral y la cultura. He tried to “change the behavior of
the citizens, introducing forms of individual and collective regulation through education and communications” (Llorente XXX). One of its main characteristics was its multi institutional and interdisciplinary approaches used to address the violence and crime in Bogotá.

The activities included in the Mockus’ plan had two focuses: improving the citizen security and enhancing the coexistence among Bogotá’s citizens. By comparing the activities included in Mockus’ development plan and the activities financed by the Bank, it is relatively easy to assess the concurrence among the IADB’s and the Municipal interventions as almost all the areas included in the plan had a corresponding activity included in the IADB project.

After the first Mockus administration, Peñaloza became mayor in 1998. His approach was slightly different from that above described. The main intervention of the Peñaloza administration in citizen security was the “Mision Bogotá” program. It included the improvement and regeneration of highly deteriorated areas of the city as well as improving the public transport system. This approach toward reducing crime and violence was closer to the “broken windows” and “zero tolerance” approaches.

Two characteristics highlighted by the literature of this period were, as mentioned before, that there was an increasing involvement of the civilian authorities in the provision and supervision of security services. Also the Mayors, even though they had different perceptions of the optimal kind of interventions to be financed, acknowledged the relevance of the gathering and dissemination of reliable information, the strengthening of the police, higher involvement of the citizenry in this issue, and the importance of working with the at-risk population.

The IADB strategy for Colombia focused on macroeconomic stability, the decentralization process, improving the wellbeing of the citizens, economic growth, and improving governability through citizen security and coexistence. This program was useful in strengthening the relationship between the IADB and the sub national government. The project was designed based on prior experience both at national and municipal levels; IADB resources were key to strengthening and expanding them.

In budgetary terms, the relevance of the project is fairly small. It represents less than 0.2% of the total government expenditure and 1.25% of public spending on security and defense. The actual number of direct beneficiaries was relatively small for the set of activities for which the direct beneficiaries might be identified. In any case, the budgetary support provided by the project was useful in strengthening, among others, the crime observatory and the Houses of Justice.

There is not enough information in the loan document about the specific activities to be executed with IADB financing, and as was highlighted in the PPMR, it caused delays in the execution and increased the workload in the country office. Also, this document mentions that, as they were not included in the loan document, they were subject to changes due to political turnover. The approach adopted to assess the relevance of the interventions was to compare the literature (that was not vast at the formulation stage of the project) with the set of
interventions proposed. Almost all the initiatives financed by the project are defined as promising by the WHO (2004). Only the activities focused on social development training and educational incentives for at-risk, disadvantaged high-school students are considered effective in reducing violence or risk factors for violence. The initiatives that were proven to be inefficient were the guns buy-back projects and providing information on drug abuse to adolescents.

The relevance of the project is not disputable as violence is a relevant issue in Colombia. The initiatives financed by the project coincided with the national policies as well as were based on already ongoing initiatives of the sub national governments. The specific activities financed by the project were defined as promising by the WHO (2004), but as the Loan Document acknowledges the Bank did not have any experience in this kind of project.

B. Diagnostic

1. Loan Document’s diagnostic

The diagnostic included in the loan document is synthetic and does not provide empirical evidence regarding determinants of crime and violent behavior. It identifies different forms of violence in Colombia: guerrilla violence, drug trafficking, and organized crime and breakdown in community relations. Based on the literature, the loan document identifies the major risk factors for violence: the sporadic excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages, easy access to weapons, impunity, and the emergence of marginalized shady towns in the cities (paragraph 1.17). The document devotes a large amount of effort to quantify the cost of violence in Colombia. Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence that justifies adopting the proposed intervention’s model. Even, the loan document recognizes that the IADB did not have previous experience in the issue. The loan document also acknowledges that the lack of “reliable socioeconomic data makes difficult to establish priorities for the allocation of public funds to prevent and control violence” (Para 1.6).

The Loan Document includes a description of the different initiatives identified and undertaken by the Colombian government (both national and municipal) in order “to restore peace in the country.” Surprisingly, there is no mention of any initiative focused on guerrillas and drug trafficking issues; even the national government introduced new policies at that time to combat those issues. In the case of Bogotá, the Loan Document highlights the different activities undertaken by the Municipal government since 1995.

2. Literature review

There are primarily two distinct approaches in the literature to explaining violence in Colombia. The first sees violence as a result of a process where the main factors are poverty, social exclusion, lack of State involvement, poor provision of social services and a high degree of inequality. The second approach denies that violence is related to cultural factors of Colombia and sees violence as the result of the high levels of impunity and the breakdown of the judicial system (see
Sanchez y Nunez (2001). In regard to empirical evidence, Sarmiento (1999) found that violence is associated with education, inequality and the involvement of the State. With the second approach, studies found that the rise in violence in the 80s and 90s depended upon the proportion of felonies to captures and punishment as well as police corruption. Gaviria (2000) and others highlight the relevance of drug trafficking in the rise in violence as there exists a spill-over effect between this illegal activity and delinquency. This is accomplished by the introduction of new technology and opportunities to learn how to break the law and undermine the social capital of the society. Rubio (2000) maintains that it is difficult to attribute greater violence to inequality and poverty since the higher rates are observed in Colombia in the wealthier regions.

Sanchez and Nuñez (2001) analyze the determinants of the homicide rates at the municipal level in Colombia. They found that the homicide rate is linked to both socioeconomic variables such as poverty, inequality and political exclusion and to the presence of “actors armados”, drug trafficking and efficiency of the judiciary. Between 3% and 13% of the difference in the homicide rates between the most and the least violent municipalities could be explained by differences in socioeconomic variables and some other variables (political exclusion, lack to access to education). The remaining 90% could be explained by the presence of “actors armados” (guerrilla and paramilitares) as well as the inefficiency of the judicial system, the incidence of drug trafficking, and the interaction between “actors armados” and drug trafficking.

Puente Burgos (2003) lists potential causes of the high levels of crime and violence observed at the time when the IADB project was in its design phase. Among them, we can highlight: i) the use of private methods for conflict resolution, partially explained by a lack of well established peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms; ii) the mistrust in the public institutions; iii) the lack of information and research on crime and violence; iv) low social values and culture; and v) high levels of drug and alcohol consumptions.

3. Assessment of Project’s Diagnostic

The project’s initiatives did not follow exclusively one of the two approaches mentioned above, even when it recognizes in paragraph 1.17 that violence is higher in cities were the erosion of the traditional social values and standards underpinning Colombian society are higher. On the one hand, the project included initiatives consistent with the hypothesis that violence is the result of poverty, exclusion and lack of government intervention, such as the initiatives focused on youth. On the other hand, the project included activities related to the second approach, which maintains that violence is a “cultural” phenomenon, the break down of the judicial system such as the HoJ, and the communication strategies.

In order to validate some of the diagnostics included in the loan document, the 2003 victimization survey provides very useful information. The empirical strategy adopted was to construct different measures of actual victimization, fear of crime, and the provision of security services by the public sector\(^2\) that, in

\(^2\) See Mendoca (2007) for more details.
addition to certain socioeconomic information, allowed the assessment of various statements. First of all, violence affects the poor disproportionately, and the poor feel more insecure than the rich. Second, the public provision of security services has an impact on violence, and this is higher than the impact associated with poverty. Third, poverty and the marginal provision of public services affect not only actual insecurity but the fear of violence as well. Fourth, the inferior provision of security services affects the poor more than the rich, as the rich can afford private provision of security services.

The main shortfall of the diagnostic included in the Loan Document is that it does not use all the available information in order to construct a more detailed and accurate diagnostic. There was a victimization survey conducted in 1996 that might potentially be used to construct a better diagnostic. The other problem, which was highlighted by Llorente et al (xxxx), is that the project followed the hypothesis formulated by the government and expressed as the risk factors.

Llorente et al (2003) states that all the policies adopted by the municipal government lack empirical evidence to corroborate the accuracy of the underlying diagnostic, such as that “violence caused by generalized violence problems, above all by citizens’ intolerance exacerbated by risk factors such as alcohol consumption, the indiscriminate possession of firearms, intra family violence and child abuse”3 The diagnostic was based on the epidemiological approach that was adopted at that time. Using this approach, the main conclusions – identical to those of the municipal government at that time – oriented the interventions toward gun and alcohol consumption control, as the majority of the homicides in Bogotá happened over night and on weekends, and more than half of the transit accident fatalities implied high consumption of alcohol. Also one third of the victims of “armed” homicides showed high levels of alcohol in their blood, and more than 70% of the homicides were committed with firearms. The authors show evidence (produced after the interventions) contrary to the above-mentioned hypothesis.

In regard to the risk factors identified in the diagnostic, Llorente et al (2002) found that the instrumental violence (the one executed for a goal) is more preponderant that the impulsive violence (result of the day to day violence caused by intolerance among citizens) in Bogotá. They found that homicides are highly concentrated: 20% of the homicides in 21 sections accounts for 5% of the population. This, with the fact that instrumental and impulsive violence occurs in the same geographical areas, contradicts the hypothesis that violence is a cultural issue, because in that case it would spread all over the city instead of being located only in certain areas. Also, another interesting result obtained is that the homicides are more frequent in better established neighborhoods, contrary to the idea of shady towns as focal points of violence.

The lack of detail in the diagnostic and the lack of justification for the intervention model might be partially explained by the fact that this project can be considered four different projects put together into a single Loan Document. This situation not only affected the diagnostic but also the degree of detail in the

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definition of the activities to be undertaken by the project, that was mentioned as one of the problems faced during execution.

To summarize, the diagnostic in the Loan document followed the literature and ideas available at the time that the project was formulated. It did not include a detailed diagnostic of the determining factors of violence, and there is no evidence to justify adopting the intervention model. Our analysis does validate some parts of the diagnostic included in the loan document. Also, the diagnostic did not include all the available information at the design stage, such as the victimization survey available. It is partially explained by the fact that this project can be considered four different projects put together into a single Loan Document.

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**The Municipal Experience**

One point that is widely highlighted in the literature is the fact that there was continuity in the policy. As was mentioned before, the Citizen Security activities were started under the Mokus’ administration, and some of them continued under Peñaloza’s administration. This section tries to characterize the different initiatives that were carried on from one administration to the other, that by the end made the citizen security policy in Bogotá sustainable.

Both Mayors devoted attention and resources to the at-risk population. They offered different services for youth at-risk, their families, and victims of sexual crimes as well as youth in conflict with the law and school dropers. They included artistic activities, job-oriented training as well as educational activities. The objective was to reduce some of the social risk factors associated with violence and crime that affects youngsters particularly, such as unemployment, lack of legitimate income generation strategies, and use of the free time. They included as well some activities that encouraged the involvement of the youth in the community and the promotion of peaceful coexistence in schools through changes in the curricula.

Other activities beside the ones oriented towards increasing the citizen participation and the prevention of social risk factors were implemented during this period in Bogotá. The most relevant, at least in monetary terms, is the improvement of the police infrastructure and logistics that implied better control capabilities by the Police of various types of crime (Rivas Gamboa 2004) as well as some activities that tried to increase the presence of the police in the communities.

In regard to the prison system, there was some sort of continuity in the policies adopted by the two mayors. As mentioned by Puentes Burgos (2003), Mockus included in his plan some activities related to the prison system, and Peñalosa invested more that US$ 11 million in refurbishing the District Jail and building Permanent Justice Units (detention houses for minor criminals who can stay for a maximum of 48 hours until their judicial situations are solved), as informed by Llorente et al (xxxx). Under the second Mockus’ administration, resources were devoted to the criminal investigation units of the police department.
As informed in Llorente et al, more than 13,000 police officers received training in different areas ranking from human rights to judicial police and concepts and strategies for citizen security. The training was designed for new agents and for agents already in the police force and included not only the executive level police but also lower levels.

The Community Policing program was introduced in 1999 and was promoted by the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce based on the Spanish experience. As mentioned by Llorente et al (xxxx), it faced restrictions in its development. They were related to limited staffing and the low coordination with other police services. This initiative was also affected by high staff turnover.

Both administrations devoted resources and effort to prevent child abuse and domestic violence. The efforts were mainly channeled through the Comisarias de Familia (Family Police Stations) and media campaigns. They invested US$ 4 million between 1996 and 2001 into this initiative, increasing the number of Comisarias from 5 to 20. The staff in the Police Stations increasingly received training.

Media and consciousness-raising campaigns were widely used during this period. One of the methods used for transit accident prevention campaigns included the use of “mimeos” as well as other art expressions in order to raise awareness about the traffic laws and the consequences for non-compliance. There were also media campaigns on topics such as domestic violence, alternative conflict resolution, and alcohol and drug use.

Another public policy followed by the different governments is strengthening alternative conflict resolution mechanisms. During the 1995 to 2002 period, the Municipalidad de Bogotá invested US$ 15 million into three institutions that constituted the key elements in the strategy to improve conflict resolution in Bogotá: the mediation and conciliation units, the “Comisarias de Familia” and the police inspections (Llorente et al xxxx).

IV. RESULTS AND IMPACT

Assessing the effectiveness of the project is based on two analyses. First, we followed up the loan document’s indicators, in spite of the fact that the evaluability of the program is low. Second, we reviewed various studies that evaluated some aspects of the program, some designed and financed by it; others are related to but not specifically designed for the evaluation. Also, we analyzed the execution problems that might have affected the effectiveness of the program and the sustainability of the different initiatives.

A. Follow up Loan document Indicators

As mentioned before, the project has low evaluability, there are no complete indicators, and the new indicators introduced did not solve the existing problem. In this section we attempt to do a follow up of the original indicators or some transformation of them that might illustrate the evolution of the variables.
1. **Reduce Violence**

In regard to the original indicators, there is an improvement in the incidence of violence, measured by the homicides rate as well as the traffic accident fatalities in Colombia as a whole and in Bogotá in particular. The decrease in the homicide rate is higher in Bogotá (52%) than in the whole country (33%) but lower than the changes observed in Medellin (78%) for the same indicator between 1999 and 2007. In the case of deaths related to traffic accidents, the rate in 2007 is almost half what it was in 2000. There was no improvement in robberies but, as was mentioned before, this is partially due to changes in registering methodology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Homicide rate per 100,000 habitants</th>
<th>Traffic accidents fatalities rate per 100,000 habitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>Cali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Instituto de Medicina Legal

Rubio (1999) states that the reported crimes against property figures were different in the 1990s from the perception of crime, the evolution of homicides or the observed behavior of other crime that can be tracked more accurately. The total number of robberies of persons had increased substantially in Bogotá in the last 6 years from 7,567 in 2000 to 12,698 in 2006. This increase is explained, at least partially, by the introduction of changes in the threshold to be included in the police’s statistics as robberies. Before the change, the trend was decreasing.

Other important changes observed are in house break-ins. In this case, the number of crimes reported increased 36% between 2000 and 2006. As stated by Observatorio de la Seguridad en Bogotá (2007), the remarkable increase between 2000 and 2001 is explained by the introduction of the new Penal Law in Colombia that changed the typologies of crime.

2. **Peaceful coexistence**

The table below shows the number of cases at the UMC in Bogotá in the 1999-2002 period. Also, there is information for the 2006-2007 period but, as it comes from a different source, it is not comparable. In any case, there was a remarkable increase, especially between 1999 and 2001 in the cases at the UMCs. The figures for 2006 and 2007 also show an increasing trend.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

12
As for the proportion of cases settled and the fulfillment of the conditionalities, UMC staff follows up on the beneficiaries to assess the fulfillment of the agreements reached in the instance of the UMC. It is not a systematic activity nor was there a clear procedure to follow, but from the 930 cases which had been followed up between 2006 and 2007, 76% did fulfill the agreement. This high percentage is partially explained by the kind of problems because they are, by a majority, landlord-tenant problems and might be solved by establishing that the tenant should move out. Unfortunately, there is no detailed information.

Also the number of Houses of Justice increased from 2 to 4 between 2002 and 2007 and the number of inquiries rose from 79,493 in 2002 to 92,320 in 2007. Both measures show that the availability of alternative conflict resolution mechanism increased in the area between 2002 and 2006.

### 3. Monitor and evaluate and encourage their development

The impact of the SUIVD is hard to quantify but there are some examples that might illustrate the use of the information generated by this entity. First, XXX mentions that the information generated by the SUIVD was used by the Mayor for his presentations in the Consejo de Seguirad (Security Council established by the Constitution). Second, the authors mention that the information generated by the SUIVD was used as input for the creation of the “zonas seguras” that were different neighborhoods where specific infrastructure was constructed and police personnel were assigned.

To summarize, the project was successful in attaining some of the development objectives. First, homicides decreased in Bogotá more than in the whole country; traffic accident fatalities also decreased during the period under analysis. Second, the increase in the use of mediation and conciliation and the House of Justice services can be used as a proxy of the improvement in the peaceful coexistence in the city. Last, the information generated by the SUIVD was used in the policy decision-making process.

### B. Impact of the interventions

In regard to assessing the impact of the interventions, it is important to highlight the resources and effort devoted by the Municipal government to evaluate the effectiveness of the interventions. It financed a wide variety of evaluations of the specific activities of the project, and there are evaluations of the broader policies implemented such as the effectiveness of the Hora Zanahoria and the Comisarias.
de Familia. Rivas Gamboa (2004) highlights that the Bogotá interventions were more extensively evaluated than the initiatives in the other municipalities.

Staring from the more general policies, Sanchez et al (2003) analyze the impact of different measures focused on decreasing the incidence of crime in Bogotá during the 1993-2002 period. In order to assess the impact of these interventions, the authors classify the various interventions as sticks, carrots, sticks & carrots and broken windows approaches. The first ones are related to deterrence and incapacitation of criminals, the second to variables related to the mitigating changes in economic environment, the third relates to policies focused on modifying social risk factors, and the fourth relates to improving situational factors. The authors found the “stick” the most effective in reducing homicides and robberies, accounting (using the detention rate) for 53% and 76% of the decrease observed in those variables between 1993 and 2003. The so called carrot policies had a moderate impact on the crime variable and account for 9% and 2% of the decrease in homicides and robberies, respectively. On the other hand, results obtained for the “broken windows” policies are not as expected as higher investment in situational factors such as investment in improving public areas implied higher incidence of robberies. However, these policies had a negative impact on homicides. Last, the carrot-stick policies explain 11% and 12% the decrease in the incidence of the two typologies of crime analyzed. The authors stress these results as the variables are trying to capture the impact of the “social culture” component that characterized the interventions in Bogotá. Additionally, the authors found a moderate persistence over time of crime and that there is a contagious effect among neighboring communities.

The Hora Zanahoria policy “reduced homicides in the city, at best, 8% in the case of control of alcohol sales and by 14% in the case of gun possession restrictions” (see Llorente, Nunez y Rubio 2000). Also, the author points out that the decrease in the homicide rate could not be explained by these initiatives as they started a year later than the change in the homicides trend observed in 1994. This point is also stressed by Dupuy et al (2004) as they analyze the different polices adopted in Bogotá over the period under analysis.

In the case of more particular interventions, Alviar et al (2003) assess the effectiveness of the “Comisarias de Familia” initiative on domestic violence. The authors conducted interviews and reviewed records of the cases where the Comisarias de Familia were involved. The observational units were cases that ended with protective measures and conciliation and commitment processes. The conclusions reached were that: i) conciliations were not effective in stopping domestic violence; ii) conciliations were widely used in violent incidents, and there were a high number of repeated offenders; iii) protective measures did have an impact in decreasing aggressive behavior in the household; and iv) there was some sort of non fulfillment in the restrictions imposed in almost all the reviewed cases. The explanation proposed by the authors is that “the police was not always willing to intervene and enforce the eviction measures”.

Related to the same intervention, Rubiano et al (2003) considered families that experienced domestic violence and that used the services from the Comisaria de
Familia and other institutions. They found that a higher percentage of the families who used the CdF services found them useful in comparison with other entities. However, the domestic problems seem not to improve because of the CdF interventions as 45% of the interviewees reported that the situation remains the same and 21% reported that the violence situation even worsened.

Strengthening the Mediation and Conciliation Units (UMC in Spanish) was an important part of the activities that focused on alternative mechanisms of peaceful conflict resolution. Cendex performed a study that analyzed the use and effectiveness of these institutions. The evaluation included collecting primary data from inhabitants of the communities where the project had been executed as well as reviewing administrative information from the UMCs. The results obtained were:

a. The persons who went lived in the surrounding area of the UMCs, belong to the 2º and 3º SISBEN’s strata.

b. In regard to the cases handled, 46% of the cases went to a conciliation or mediation meeting, 83% of the cases that went to these meetings reached an agreement, with higher proportion for the conciliation services than for the mediation (given the type of commitment involved). 22.5% of the cases that went to a meeting are fulfilling all the commitments and 27.5% are partially fulfilling the commitments.

c. The coverage of the UMC is limited as only 20% of those who had a conflict went to the UMC. 9% of the total surveyed population had reported a conflict in the past. 42% were related to family issues, 34% to conflicts with neighbors and 10% to landlord-tenant relationship. For those who had a conflict, 73% managed them directly through dialogue with the counterpart (50% of the cases), verbal aggression (21%) and physical violence (11%). 20% of those who look to institutions and persons for help go to the UMC, 16% to the Comisarias de Familia and 16% to the Police.

d. The UMCs received mostly cases related to landlord-tenant conflicts. The UMCs received 75% of the cases related to landlord-tenant relationships, and only 15% of the cases of intrafamiliar conflicts and 17% of the cases of conflicts with neighbors in the case that the person decided to look for help at an institution. The landlord-tenant cases accounted for 48% of the total cases treated at the UMCs; 24% were cases of conflicts with family and 20% with neighbors.

e. The UMCs received mostly cases related to contract non fulfillment (57%), which is relatively different from the norm, where only 21% of the conflicts surveyed fell into this category.

f. The impact on the beneficiary, measured as the awareness about alternative conflict resolution mechanisms and accessibility to justice, is mixed. On one hand, a higher proportion of UMC beneficiaries thought that it was easier to access judicial services than persons who went to other institutions, and the whole sample and the proportion of respondents who think that are aware of
alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution is higher for the UMC beneficiaries than for the other institutions’ beneficiaries. On the other hand, the proportion of surveyed individuals who reported that the alternative mechanism for conflict resolution improves the relationship among people is higher for the beneficiaries of other institutions than for UMC beneficiaries. Actually, the beneficiaries from other institutions reported that they had learned more about coexistence norms than the beneficiaries of UMC services.

In regard to police training, the evaluation team did not find any evaluation of the activities, but there was information about the challenges faced during its implementation that might serve as a proxy of its impact. The initiative faced the opposition of the Consejo Distrital as the training was supposed to be paid with Municipal resources, and the Police was not a municipal institution. The community as well opposed this training as it might decrease the police’s presence in the streets. Last, the private universities designated as executors had reservations about the impact of the police “walking around their buildings”. The IADB partially financed these trainings. However, later in the execution of the project both the police and the municipal government were partly dissatisfied. The issues were that the training did not reflect the needs and situation of the individuals, and the teachers did not have the incentives to commit the required time to these courses. Also, the training program did not received the appropriate attention from the police, as reported by field visits, as there was no selection process, the training was perceived as punishment, and there was too much turnover and drop out because of retirement and relocations. The IADB intervention represented less than 10% of the total police trained.

The available evaluations were conducted by CENDEX, and they were included in an extensive but rather confusing document. For the majority of the initiatives, the evaluation was mainly qualitative based on focus groups and interviews with relevant actors. Three exceptions were the evaluations of the Jovenes Trapecistas, Tejedores de Sociedad and Capacitacion para el empleo (job training activities). An important caveat is that there is not enough information in the above-mentioned report about the sampling method, the selection of observations, and the constructions of the treatment and control groups so the validity of the results is not completely clear for the evaluation team.

g. The beneficiaries of the initiatives stated that the activities boosted their self esteem, improved their values related to coexistence, increased their awareness of the youth’s role as social actors, and improved the use of their free time.

h. From the quantitative evaluation of the “Jovenes Trapecistas”, CENDEX found that the beneficiary group had a better attitude toward violence but not better conflict management skills than the control. The beneficiary group have a higher self esteem and thought that the way to success was through educational attainment in comparison with the control group. In regard to the benefits of the initiative, the beneficiaries stated that it contributed to their
employability (70%), strengthened their social networks (39%), and helped to obtain a “good” job (19%).

i. In the case of the “Tejedores de Sociedad,” the contribution of the activities was to boost their community involvement and entrepreneurial attitude of the beneficiary as well as the improvement in the use of their free time through artistic activities.

j. In regard to the contributions of job training activities, the evaluation states that the project improved the entrepreneurial attitude of the beneficiaries as well as their awareness of the importance of peaceful coexistence. The salaries reported by the treatment group were higher than the reported by the controls.

The communication strategy which focused on increasing the awareness of the importance of peaceful coexistence was evaluated both by CENDEX and by CISALVA. The first evaluation was based on focus groups, and they concluded that the impact was small; the important point was that the activities increased the awareness of this issue, such as the Guías Ciudadanos and the school-based radios that also reduced the conflict levels. On the other hand, the focus groups concluded that the interventions should focus on families and communities as well, and that there was no retrofitting of activities. The CISALVA evaluation was based on two waves of a survey conducted to citizens in Bogotá (as well as in Medellín and Cali) and covered different variables regarding violence and coexistence. The results obtained were that the project did help to decrease the use of physical punishment against children and instill values and attitudes against the use of this kind punishment. Also, the evaluation identified an improvement in the conflict resolution skills of the citizens in issues related to persons who are not members of their families as well as with issues with their intimate partners.

To summarize, we found various empirical evidence that is encouraging regarding the interventions’ effectiveness and others that are not. First we found empirical evidence that shows that the “social culture” activities that the project supported had an impact in reducing the incidence of crime in Bogotá. Second, the evidence shows that the use of the alternative mechanism for dispute resolution increased during the period under analysis. Other authors found that the interventions focused on youth were effective on improving youth’s self-esteem, their attitude against violence and conflict resolution skills. On the other hand, some authors found that the services provided by the “Comisarias de Familia” were not effective in reducing domestic violence, and that the services provided by the UMCs were mainly focused on landlord-tenant relationships. Also, the Police’s training component did not receive the appropriate attention from the police.

As for the gender differential impact, the Loan Document identifies certain activities that might potentially improve the well being of Colombian women. These activities were: i) family support centers; ii) houses of justice; and iii) conciliation mechanisms and family commissioner’s offices.
C. **Execution of the project**

In regard to the risks and mitigating strategies, in this case one of the main risks identified, the loss of support, did not happen as the citizen security and coexistence issues were well established as public policies, regardless who was the mayor of the city. Nevertheless, there were changes in the approach that each mayor imposed to these issues although they are still in the public agenda.

An issue that arises from analyzing the execution risk is the low participation of the national government in implementing the different initiatives. It can be inferred from the analysis that the municipal governments took the lead in the issues of citizen security and coexistence. Nevertheless, the national government was an important actor at the beginning of the process as it introduced some of the reforms that were needed for the success of the sub national citizen security policies, such as empowering the mayors with respect to the police management.

The loan document did not identify the risk associated with the lack of significant impact of the interventions. First of all, there is an issue in attributing the decrease in crime and violence observed in Bogotá to the IADB interventions. As was mentioned by different authors, the downward trend in homicides was already observed before the Mockus plan was implemented. Second, the scale of the different interventions was relatively small, so the possibility of attributing the decrease in crimes to the interventions is, at a minimum, disputable. Nevertheless, the interventions made their contribution to the changes observed in Bogotá during the last decade.

In summary, the risks anticipated in the loan document did not occur. One issue that arose during execution was the low participation of the national government, that introduced the reforms necessary to allow implementation of this project but was not involved to the degree expected in executing the project. Another issue was the lack of significant impact of the interventions as the reduction in crime had started before the project and the scale of the interventions was relatively small.

D. **Sustainability**

In the viability analysis of the project, the Loan Document identifies among its strengths that, although the IADB did not have previous experience, the project included pre-existing activities. Unfortunately, there was no empirical evidence showing the effectiveness of the activities to be financed at the time that the project was designed and approved. Another issue identified as a strength is the fact that different agencies had experience implementing citizen security and coexistence projects. It is not clear from the document that these institutions were selected to execute the financed projects.

The sustainability of the project is also analyzed in the Loan document, and it established that it is “partially assured” by the fact that the activities were ongoing at the approval stage. The IADB recognizes that “the principal added value and
Bank participation lies in its capacity to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities” (par 4.6)

It is important to highlight the continuity of particular projects during the two Mockus and the Peñalosa administrations that were supported by the project. One example is the “civic guides” initiative, as mentioned by Llorente et al (XXXX), that consisted of young citizens trained and hired to work in activities related to traffic control, coexistence, and community organization, among others. This program was introduced by Peñalosa, was continued in the second Mockus administration and was even expanded to other areas. Dupuy et al (2004) identify these activities as the “serious version” of the “mimeos” used under the first Mockus mandate.

Another policy that continued over the different administrations is the generation and dissemination of information about crime and violence in the city. In 1995 the Violence and Delinquency Observatory (now called SUIVD – Sistema Unico de Informacion de Violencia y Delinquencia) was established during the first Mockus administration. It was part of the Mayor’s initiative for a closer follow up of crimes in the city as well as to formulate more accurate preventive measures.

The sustainability of the activities financed by the project is difficult to assess given their wide variety. First of all, it is important to highlight that, as mentioned before, some activities were already ongoing and others were proposed and supported by national policies. Among the activities supported by the National Government, the Houses of Justice and the Comisarias de Familia are still working as well as the Mediation and Conciliation Units financed by municipal resources. In regard to the community components, the local security committees (Frentes de Seguridad) are still working, and even the present government (as expressed on their web page) identifies the strengthening of the Frentes de Seguridad as one of the activities to be conducted under the scope of the Subsecretaria de Seguridad y Convivencia.

As for the activities focused on youth at risk, the sustainability was guaranteed by resources from the municipal government as well as some contributions from the national government. The actual government includes among its activities the project “Jovenes Conviven,” whose objective is to foster youth participation, coexistence, and democratic values of the youngsters of Bogotá. The Tejedores de Sociedad project particularly is one of the activities performed by the Secretaria Distrital de Cultura, Recreacion y Deportes de Bogotá and it is mainly an informal art training project. The activities related to “Jovenes Trapecistas” project are still ongoing under the institutional purview of the IDIPRON. There is also a gun buy-out project and activities to decrease the violence among “barras bravas” of the soccer teams.

In regard to institutional coordination, several authors highlight the evolution observed in the institutions related to the management and implementation of the citizen security projects. First, the Security and Coexistence Council was created in 1995 and was later transferred to the under Secretary of Citizen Security and Coexistence, who was responsible for development of the plans and programs
(Llorente et al). An important point is that the same person, Hugo Acero, remained as head of this newly created institution from 1998 to 2003, during almost the whole execution of the project in Bogotá. Another important point, highlighted by Rivas Gamboa, is that several programs and “oficinas consultoras” were created for implementing different initiatives, but in all cases the under Secretary managed to supervise their activities.

The sustainability of the initiatives financed by the project is relatively high. Several projects did continue from one administration to the other, such as the youth initiatives, and they are still included in the municipal development plan. Also, there were projects that were being executed before the program and are still being executed, such as the House of Justice and Comisarias de Familia. Last, the institutional coordination evolved positively during the project and managed to coordinate the variety of interventions that were financed.

V. Medellin

This project is part of the tandem of projects that was approved under the CO0213 operation in 1998. Its objective was to reduce levels of violence and insecurity in several Colombian cities.

This report seeks to evaluate whether or not the preventive initiatives proposed by the project reduced the probability of individuals becoming a victim or committing a violent act or crime. We mainly undertook a review of the reports constructed specifically for the project. To structure the evaluation, we formulated a series of evaluative questions: Did the project reach the most vulnerable communities in terms of violence and its determinants? Were the interventions effective in achieving the expected development outcomes? Were the interventions effective in reduction social risk factors? Were there gender-specific outcomes?

Both the Bogota and the Cali reports provide in depth analysis of the violence and crime situation as well as an extensive literature review of the determinants of crime in general and for Colombia in particular.

A. IADB Intervention

The Medellin project, as are the Cali and Bogota, are parte or a national project that provide support to activities at the national and municipal levels. The IADB and GOC agreed to finance interventions whose objective are:

a. At the general level to reduce levels of violence and insecurity in several Colombian cities by strengthening efforts to prevent, counteract and control factors associates with criminal acts and violence.

b. At the specific level:
i. To provide the tools required at the national level to develop an awareness of and to evaluate the many forms of crime in Colombian cities, and to establish a consensus concerning which causes should be tackled by policies.

ii. To help the national authorities establish national policies and programs.

iii. To support activities at the municipal level to promote peaceful coexistence and prevent and control urban and domestic violence.

iv. To help cities monitor and evaluate projects on peaceful coexistence and security and encourage their development by providing loans and technical assistance.

v. To encourage the exchange of successful experience among cities.

The Medellin project was organized into different activities that include: i) crime information system, ii) promotion of coexistence among children and youth, iii) communication strategy, iv) institutional strengthening, v) access to justice and vi) domestic violence. As mentioned in the others report, the IADB and the GOC agree to not conduct a final review of the projects.

As mentioned in the reports for Bogota and Cali, the evaluability of the project is low. None of the purposes has complete indicators. Even after the modifications introduced by the PPMRs, there were no complete indicators. Second, the feasibility and the effort level involved in the project are not clear as there were no targets. Third, the adequacy of the indicators is disputable given the activities and the time frame of the project.

A. Results

To assess the effectiveness of the project, we followed first the loan document’s indicators. Second, we reviewed the various studies that evaluate some of the components of the project.

a) Reduce Violence

There was a remarkable improvement in the homicides rate, as well as the traffic accident fatalities in Medellin. Actually, the homicide rate in Medellin decreased more than in the other two main cities in Colombia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Homicide rate per 100,000 habitants</th>
<th>Traffic accidents fatalities rate per 100,000 habitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>Cali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Instituto de Medicina Legal

One partial explanation of the sharp decrease in the homicide rate is provided by Ramirez (2007). The author sustains that there is a correlation between the urban armed conflict (“conflicto armado”) and homicide rate. He shows that there decrease observed in the homicide rate between 2000 and 2005 is partially due to the deployment of two armed forces (“autodefensas”). The empirical evidence used is the proportion of decrease in crime in each community compared with the decrease in the number of homicides in the community.

b) Peaceful coexistence

The project included among its activities the strengthening of the alternative conflict resolution mechanism as a way to improve the peaceful coexistence among the citizens. Both the Houses of Justice (HoJ) and the Mediation and Conciliation Units (UMC) received support from the project. During the 2002-2006 period, the number of Units doubled in Medellín and the number of visits increased from 1557 a year in 2002 to 7528 visits in 2006. Two HoJ are working in Medellin now, one inaugurated in 2006. The total number of visits in 2007 is 500% higher than the total visits in 2002.

c) Monitor and evaluate and encourage their development

In comparison with Bogota, there is less information available and it is harder to access. In any case, there is update information on homicides and other crimes in Medellín by geographical area and other characteristics. It is worth noting the effort devoted to the generation of robust evaluations of the project’s interventions. It financed the impact evaluation, regardless the fact that it was not included in the original loan document, of several components of the project.

d) Impact of the interventions

There were different interventions that were evaluated. No baseline data was collected so the strategy adopted by the evaluators was to construct the counterfactual using propensity score matching between the actual beneficiaries and a control group that was constructed for the evaluations.

The project financed job training for youth between 16 and 29 years old that lived in high violence areas. The evaluation shows that the beneficiaries were not the poorest in comparison with the controls. On the other hand, the beneficiaries showed to be more violent than the controls. The control was constituted by others that applied for admission but were rejected. The estimated results were
that the beneficiaries of the interventions had better attitudes and values about themselves and against violence. They also showed a better attitude toward change.

The School Band initiative had been working since 1996 and the project strengthened its scope. It is worth noting that it is not a massive intervention, required an admission exam and interview. It is highly time intensive and also requires a contribution from the families to solvent its operating costs. The objective was to improve the use of free time of the children as well as fostering their creativity. In regard to the results of the interventions, the researcher found that there is a statistically significant change in the attitudes, perceptions and values of the children about themselves and also increased their trust. The interventions have a differential impact on girls.

The City Guide project was focused on unemployed youngsters between 18 and 29 years old from poor neighborhoods of Medellin with high incidence of social risk factors. The project offered training and employment as City Guides for 10 months. The objective of the City Guides was to promote coexistence and city culture of the habitants of the city. The evidence shows that there is no statistically significant impact of the interventions on attitudes, behavior or values of the participants. There is no difference in the conflict resolution and anger management skills of the treatment and controls.

The Sport’s School (Escuelas del Deporte) contemplated activities for children between 6 to 18 years old. It was, at the beginning, focused just exclusively in developing sport attitudes but a component focused on peaceful coexistence and violence was included later on. The evaluation shows that the beneficiaries were more vulnerable in terms of social risk factors of violence. The evaluation measured the changes in values, attitudes and behavior of the beneficiary of the project. There were no measurable impacts on the variables selected for the evaluation. There were changes in the use of the free time, as expected. On the other hand, the evaluation found that the beneficiaries had a more violent attitude than the controls.

The last component that was evaluated is the family service component. It objective was to provide guidance to the families in order to prevent domestic violence. The interventions were trainings, workshops and the provision of legal assistance. The impact of the intervention was that the beneficiaries were more aware about the available services. Also, the evaluation found that the beneficiaries have better conflict resolution and anger management skills than the controls.

To summarize, some interventions were effective in modifying attitudes, values and to improve social skills of the beneficiaries. The job training had a positive impact on the attitudes and values of the youngsters that attended. The School Band initiative was also effective in modifying the values and perceptions of the children as well as it increased their trust. The sport’s school had an impact on the free time of the children attending. Lastly, the family service component had a
positive impact on the awareness of the available services and the conflict and anger management skills in the beneficiary households.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Bogotá project has low evaluability. First of all, none of the purposes has complete indicators. Even after the modifications introduced by the PPMRs, there were no complete indicators. Second, the feasibility and the effort level involved in the project are not clear as there were no targets. Third, the adequacy of the indicators is disputable given the activities and the time frame for the project.

The relevance of the project is not disputable as violence is a relevant issue in Colombia. The initiatives financed by the project coincided with the national policies and were based on ongoing initiatives of the sub national governments. The specific activities financed by the project were defined as promising by the WHO (2004), but as the Loan Document acknowledges, the Bank did not have any experience in this kind of project.

The diagnostic in the Loan document followed the literature and ideas available at the time that the project was formulated. It did not include a detailed diagnostic of the determining factors of violence, and there is no evidence to justify the adoption of the intervention model. Our analysis does validate some parts of the diagnostic included in the loan document. Also, the diagnostic did not include all the available information at the design stage such as the victimization survey available. This is partially explained by the fact that the project can be considered four different projects assembled in a single Loan Document.

In regard to its development objectives, the project was successful in attaining some of them. First, homicides decreased in Bogotá more than in the whole country; traffic accident fatalities also decreased during the period under analysis. Second, the increase in the use of mediation and conciliation and the House of Justice services can be used as a proxy for improvement in peaceful coexistence in the city. Last, the information generated by the SUIVD was used in the policy decision-making process.

As for the particular interventions, we found encouraging empirical evidence about the effectiveness of the interventions and other evidence that was not. First we found empirical evidence that show that the “social culture” activities that the project supported had an impact in reducing the incidence of crime in Bogotá. Second, the evidence shows that the use of alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution increased during the period under analysis. Other authors found that the interventions focused on youth were effective on improving youths’ self-esteem, their attitude against violence and conflict resolution skills. On the other hand, some authors found that the services provided by the “Comisarias de Familia”
were not effective in reducing domestic violence and that the services provided by
the UMCs mainly focused on landlord-tenant relationships. Also, the Police’s
training component did not receive the appropriate attention from the police.

The risks anticipated in the loan document did not occur. One issue that arose
during execution was the low participation of the national government, which
introduced the necessary reforms to allow implementation of this project but was
not involved as extensively as expected in project execution. Another issue was
the lack of significant impact of the interventions, as the reduction in crime had
started before the project and the scale of the interventions was relatively small.

The sustainability of the initiatives financed by the project is relatively high.
Several projects did continue from one administration to the other, such as the
youth initiatives, and they are still included in the municipal development plan.
Also, there were projects in execution before the program that are still being
executed, such as the House of Justice and Comisarias de Familia. Last, the
institutional coordination evolved positively during the project and managed to
coordinate the variety of interventions that were financed.
### Table 1: Mockus’ plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Violence and Crime</th>
<th>Coexistence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional strengthening</td>
<td>- Restructuring of the “Secretaria de Gobierno”</td>
<td>- Integral approach to security and coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strengthening of metropolitan police</td>
<td>- Trained Police and adequately equipped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Training of police’s agents</td>
<td>- C&amp;V information available for the community and government to improve accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Creation C&amp;V information system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention and reduction of</td>
<td>- Gun control by police</td>
<td>- Disarmament programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homicides</td>
<td>- Decreasing alcoholic consumption</td>
<td>- Hora Zanahoria (restrictions on alcohol’s sales)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Increasing police control</td>
<td>- Campaigns against drunken driving and youth alcohol consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accident prevention</td>
<td>- New transit police body</td>
<td>- Campaigns against drunken driving and youth alcohol consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Project’s name</td>
<td>Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice closer to the citizens</td>
<td>Sistema distrital de atencion</td>
<td>- Equipment acquisition for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **integral al infranctor** | **the “talleres”**  
- Supplies acquisition for the “talleres”  
- Consulting services to develop pedagogical methodology  
- Consulting services | **Support of Judiciary Police**  
- Technological strengthening of the judicial police thorough the acquisition of computers and software for crime analysis |
| **Mediation and Conciliation Units** | **Training of the relevant staff** |
| **Comisarias de Familia** | **Equipment acquisition** |
| **Improving social skills of inmates** | **Improvement of the prison and detention facilities infrastructure in Bogotá**  
- Infrastructure works  
- Security and general equipment acquisition |
| **Revision y Ajuste de normas – Law revision and adjustment** | **Reforms of the Laws related to citizen security and coexistence**  
- Media campaign to prevent and reduce pedestrian’s fatalities |
| **Crime Observatory** | **Implementation of the Violence and Delinquency Information System**  
- Computer equipment and software acquisition  
- Personnel training  
- Research & dissemination |
| **Comunicacion para la conviviencia** | **Implementation of the communication strategy focused on coexistence**  
- TV program production and broadcasting  
- La ciudad de los Niños Project  
- Media campaigns to |
promote coexistence values
- Mision Bogotá
- Alternative communication strategies
- “Responsabilidad de la rumba” campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth at risks and in conflicto with the law</th>
<th>Youth at risk programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Los jovenes conviven por Bogotá</td>
<td>- Gestion empresarial Juvenil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Job training for 14 a 26 y.o.a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investment</th>
<th>Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime and Violence Observatory</td>
<td>Implementing the SUIVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice closer to the citizen</td>
<td>Support of judicial police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation and strengthening of Comisarias de Familia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation and strengthening of the mediation and conciliation units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan police</td>
<td>Infrastructure to improve police’s presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth at risk and institutionalized</td>
<td>Infrastructure and equipment for IDIPRON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of multi purpose centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jovenes trapecistas (young gang members)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation of basic behavior and values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improvement of school performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Mitigating strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of support for the program as the tenure of municipal government that participated in the design left at the approval stage</td>
<td>The project is supporting activities that were already underway and the national government was planning to carry out activities to assist the cities in strengthening the execution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of experience on the part of the DNP</td>
<td>The program included a proposal to establish several coordinating bodies as well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External impacts on the program</td>
<td>The fact that unemployment increased and homicides rates decreased in the main cities indicates that cities are less vulnerable to shocks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low coverage level</td>
<td>The activities had very low coverage, so the impacts of the initiatives were heavily limited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>