IDB

Board of Executive Directors
For information

GN-2535
6 October 2009
Original: Spanish

To: The Board of Executive Directors

From: The Secretary

Subject: Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety

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Remarks: The attached document exceeds the page limit established in document CS-3528-2 "New guidelines on documents for Board consideration". Nevertheless, Management deemed it necessary to authorize distribution of the document due to its special nature.

Reference: CP-2190-2(2/02), GN-2217(7/02)

VICE PRESIDENCY FOR SECTORS AND KNOWLEDGE
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND FINANCE SECTOR
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF THE STATE DIVISION

OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR PROGRAM DESIGN AND EXECUTION IN THE AREA OF CIVIC COEXISTENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY

JULY 2009

CONTENTS

ANNEXES

ABBREVIATIONS

DFID	Department for International Development (of the United Kingdom)
GCI	Global Competitiveness Index
OPG-CCPS	Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety
ICF/ICS	Institutional Capacity of the State Division (of the IDB)
ILANUD	Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (of the United Nations)
INTRA-TC	Intraregional technical cooperation
KNL	Knowledge and Learning Sector (of the IDB)
NGOs	Nongovernmental organizations
OAS	Organization of American States
RES	Research Department (of the IDB)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Crime levels in Latin America and the Caribbean are among the highest in the world, making fear for personal safety one of the main obstacles the economic and social development of its inhabitants. Violence threatens people's well-being in many ways—especially the poorest—in addition to hindering investment, trade and productive activity. As a result, violence prevention and public safety has become a priority on the agendas of national and local governments, the private sector, and civil society.

These Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety (OPG-CCPS) are intended to guide and inform Bank staff with respect to the criteria, factors, corporate conceptual definition, and overall operational approach that must be considered and analyzed in the design, evaluation, and execution of civic coexistence and public safety programs financed, in whole or in part, by the Inter-American Development Bank ("the Bank"). These OPG-CCPS will be updated as necessary in light of lessons learned, and they supersede the guidelines contained in documents CP-2190-2 and GN-2217. These guidelines supplement the policies and procedures applicable to Bank-financed lending operations.

These OPG-CCPS have been prepared with a view to:

    a. Offering the countries of the region a framework for the Bank's work in a dynamic and multidisciplinary sector whose features stem from many different causes, calling for actions by different public agencies as well as the active involvement of civil society.

    b. Updating and superseding the "Preliminary guidelines for the design of violence reduction projects" (hereinafter "the Guidelines"),[1] which have guided Bank assistance in this area until now. The OPG-CCPS provide an update of empirical evidence and a response to Senior Management with respect to target areas that merit special consideration for future Bank operations.

    c. Strengthening the Bank's leadership as the multilateral institution with the most experience in this area, innovating and enhancing its ability to assist the countries of the region.

In order to consolidate, organize, and develop synergies for the Bank's offerings in this sector, the OPG-CCPS identify three priority target areas (called components) in which the Bank will need to pursue work with a view to developing activities where it can contribute substantive value added.

These target areas are: (i) public policy planning; (ii) violence prevention; and (iii) certain select activities relating to control, criminal justice, and rehabilitation. For these last

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[1] "Preliminary guidelines for the design of violence reduction projects" (document CP-2190-9), prepared by SDS and approved by the Bank's former Programming Committee of Management on 6 February 2002.

activities, which are considered sensitive areas for Bank intervention, the proposal is to establish intervention criteria and mechanisms for mitigating potential risks.[2]

In every violence prevention operation, the Bank must address the challenges of: (i) addressing the specific circumstances of each country by adapting the comparatively most promising practices while at the same time promoting a regional platform of cooperation suited to the broader features of the violence phenomenon; and (ii) offering an integrated package that addresses the violence phenomenon from an interagency and multisector perspective with appropriate levels of institutional strengthening and territorial focus, catalyzing input from a wide range of disciplines (public health policies, education, urban infrastructure, new information technologies, violence prevention activities, and others).

These OPG-CCPS were prepared on the basis of: (i) an analysis of the Bank's 2002 "Preliminary guidelines for the design of violence reduction projects," which have until now served as the benchmark for designing operations, and are formulated so as to be updated and adapted to new demands; (ii) the lessons learned over more than 10 years of Bank work in the sector;[3] (iii) the evaluation of specific interventions and programs within and beyond the region, as well as an analysis of available studies and research in this area; (iv) empirical evidence that reveals promising interventions for replication; (v) dialogue with civil society, the socially responsible private sector, and public authorities;[4] (vi) analysis of the presentations, discussions, and conclusions of the five knowledge update workshops held by the Bank's group of citizen security specialists in the past two years;[5] and (vii) input from regional experts brought together specifically to discuss this document.[6]

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[2]   This is particularly true for support activities in areas related to the penitentiary system and the police, which could pose potential risks for human rights, civil rights, and interference in countries' domestic political affairs. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter II of this document.

[3]   The Bank's portfolio in this sector is relatively new. It began in 1996 with a technical cooperation project on domestic violence and continued with two loans in 1998 (in Colombia and Uruguay). To date, it comprises $227 million in 11 loans and 25 technical cooperation operations.

[4]   There has been a long series of initiatives since the first Bank-sponsored public dialogue ("Hacia un enfoque integrado de desarrollo: ética, violencia y seguridad ciudadana" [Toward an integrated approach to development: ethics, violence and citizen security], Washington, D.C., 1996). Noteworthy among them have been the Inter-American Forums on Citizen Security and Violence Prevention sponsored by the IDB with senior authorities and experts from the region in Medellín (2005), Lima (2007) and Jamaica (2009). This document also incorporates the main conclusions from the recent First Meeting of Public Security Ministers of the Americas convened by the Organization of American States (OAS) in Mexico City in October 2008.

[5]   With support from the Bank's Knowledge and Learning Sector (KNL), the group held intensive sessions to update knowledge in the areas of: juvenile crime prevention, promising practices for rehabilitating prisoners, police reform, citizen participation, diagnostic documentation of security policies, information system organization, and case-by-case analysis of promising practices.

[6]   A special workshop was held in March 2008, with participation by ICF management and the following experts: Carlos Basombrío, Lucía Damnert, Hugo Frühling, José Miguel Cruz, and Rodrigo Guerrero.

Box 1

Value Added by the Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety
With these Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety (OPG-CCPS), the Bank establishes a framework for its support to the sector that includes not only integrated multisector investment and technical cooperation operations, but initiatives to foster knowledge creation, innovation and the adoption of lessons learned. More specifically:

- It takes a proactive role, reaffirming its commitment to help countries improve civic coexistence and public safety, so as to contribute to human welfare, economic growth and social development.

- It adapts the Bank's support to the specific conditions of each country, working with it to develop a comprehensive analysis of the sector, to identify actions to improve civic coexistence and public safety, while ensuring respect for human and civil rights and promoting transparency in the sector.

- It provides nonreimbursable resources for the structuring and design of projects through funds it administers (such as those of Japan, Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development).

- It adjusts new technical assistance mechanisms and instruments, adapting them to meet sector and country needs (Intra-TC, forums, seminars, research, roster of subject-area experts).

- It promotes the documentation of knowledge and successes by supporting the establishment of citizen security laboratories in the region.

- It targets the Bank's work to the various spheres of human relationships, including the home and other private domains, as well as public spaces.

- It innovates and promotes research to improve understanding of the citizen security sector.

- It helps to build or consolidate consensus and strategic partnerships with civil society, the private sector and the general public for the design of government policies.

- It facilitates coordination of activities at both the inter- and intrainstitutional levels (government/national agencies, government/subnational entities and civil society: community and NGOs) and can have a catalytic effect in targeting funds to civic coexistence and public safety activities to support and make them sustainable in the long term.

- It promotes community partnership and participation, to ensure that citizen security policies will be transparent, effective and sustainable.

- It promotes participation by civil society, the donor community and the academic world so that they can pool their efforts and work in partnership on risk mitigation mechanisms.

- It coordinates interventions with other public policies (health, education, urban development, technological innovation, etc.) that will contribute to an integrated policy for violence prevention.

- It seeks to stabilize and consolidate cooperation partnerships with other international agencies and NGOs, as well as with nontraditional donors such as local and international philanthropic organizations, to enhance and pool technical and financial support to the sector in the countries.

I. OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR PROGRAM DESIGN AND EXECUTION IN THE AREA OF CIVIC COEXISTENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY

A. Background

1.1 *Magnitude of the problem.* Crime levels in Latin America are currently among the highest in the world,[7] threatening the well-being of citizens, especially the poorest population groups. Violence is an obstacle to development in many dimensions: it raises economic costs for individuals, increases costs for businesses, inhibits a favorable business climate and undermines peaceful coexistence in a democratic society,[8] destroys virtuous social capital, and sometimes creates parallel economies based on organized crime, eroding trust in institutions, especially those responsible for securing individual rights and obligations.[9] All these factors of violence make the region less competitive and increase its social vulnerability.[10]

1.2 *Manifestations of the phenomenon.* Violence in Latin America is the expression of social, economic and political problems (social exclusion, inequality, discrimination and informality), and in turn intensifies those problems. Institutional informality produces an "authority vacuum" that undermines respect for the law, as is clear in the inequity between those who respect laws and civic standards and those who do not, and fosters unlawful activities (such as commercial piracy, the illegal sale of auto parts, informal security forces, and major offenses related to organized crime). This authority vacuum is promptly filled by criminal organizations. The inefficiency and corruption of the police forces and entities responsible for the administration of justice also reinforce the negative perception of these institutions and the view that the rule of law does not exist. Lastly, the lack of security affects the most disadvantaged population groups, those who are least protected and have the fewest means to protect themselves, their work and their possessions.

1.3 *Institutional capital.* The Bank was the first multilateral development institution to provide technical assistance and financing to countries in the region for violence prevention and citizen security projects. Its support has produced a portfolio of

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[7] In 2005, the homicide rate in the region stood at 25.6 per 100,000 inhabitants, nearly 3 times the world average in that year. See Annex I.

[8] In 1998 the IDB made an important contribution to measuring the cost and magnitude of violence in the region, which has been estimated at between 5% and 25% of GDP (using a wide variety of measurement methodologies and national and local contexts). Nearly 60% of people in Latin America and the Caribbean feel unsafe walking alone at night in their neighborhoods. No other region of the world experience such conditions (Lora, Eduardo, *Beyond Facts: Understanding Quality of Life*, IDB, "Development in the Americas" series, Washington, D.C., 2009). See Annex I.

[9] Survey results show that between 30% and 50% of the region's citizens have no confidence in the justice system or the police (*Latinobarómetro* and Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2008). See Annex I.

[10] The 2008-2009 *Global Competitiveness Report* of the World Economic Forum, which ranks countries against various factors including costs of crime and violence (global competitiveness index, GCI), shows how they affect the GCI average. For example, over the last year the GCI for Colombia was 74, for Mexico 60, and for Brazil 64; these averages were affected by the violence and crime cost index, which was 129, 127, and 116, respectively, for that year. See Annex I.

investments and a great many contributions in terms of knowledge management, high-level discussion forums, seminars, conferences, lectures and training activities, research, national, local and sector diagnostic assessments, case studies of best practices, etc. Currently, with growing concern over the rise both in objective crime figures and in the subjective perceptions of the crime problem in the region, governments and society as a whole are demanding effective policies to improve the situation. For the Bank, as the principal multilateral development partner of Latin America and the Caribbean, this swelling outcry[11] poses the challenge of involving itself in the citizen security and public safety sector in broader ways that are more effective, strategic and innovative.

Box 2

Ten Lessons Learned from the Bank's Citizen Security and Violence Prevention Programs and Projects
(i) **There is no single intervention formula**. Because violence has many causes, Bank action must recognize and adapt to the institutional, social, political, economic and cultural realities of each country. Even within the same country, interventions in different regions or cities may vary.
(ii) **Reliable information systems are key to successful policy formulation**. Reliable statistics are lacking, both for measuring the magnitude of the phenomenon and for documenting the economic and social cost of interventions. Such information is essential as the basis for effective policies, and should be regarded as a public good.
(iii) **Leadership and interagency coordination are essential**. Given the complexity of the violence phenomenon and the diversity of feasible solutions, it is imperative to ensure both vertical coordination (between national and subnational governments) and horizontal coordination (between public agencies). The leadership factor is also strategic, and it is good practice to have an organization as highly placed as possible that can articulate, coordinate and sustain public policies.
(iv) **A standing professional civil service for citizen security**. The capacities of the human resources responsible for implementing prevention policies (in addition to military and police functions) are a strategic element for ensuring sustainable programs.
(v) **Problems should be prioritized for targeting action**. To avoid scattering programs too thinly and attempting too many uncoordinated interventions, there needs to be a scale of priorities for ranking the critical risk factors to be addressed. Without adequate coordination and a strategic focus, programs are likely to fail.
(vi) **Early victories are necessary**. Although citizen security programs must address the underlying causes of violence in society, they should begin with the identification of low-cost activities that could produce short-term results, in order to inspire confidence and the will to undertake reforms and activities of greater scope and duration.
(vii) **Local governments are key players**. Regional experience demonstrates the key role of local and municipal governments in combating violence. The Bank has been a pioneer in strengthening this level of government, which, with proper support from the national level, has several comparative advantages, such as the ability to pinpoint sources of violence and to work closely with key stakeholders so as to coordinate action among the different levels of government.
(viii) **There should be comprehensive institutional diagnostic assessments of security institutions**. One of the main problems in the sector is the perception that security institutions are weak and untrustworthy. Hence the importance of studies that will analyze interests, capacities, partnerships, risks, coordination

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[11] The latest *Latinobarómetro* survey from 2008 found that crime and public safety was the biggest worry of people in the region, ahead of unemployment.

Ten Lessons Learned from the Bank's Citizen Security and Violence Prevention Programs and Projects
and political influence, as input to the design of mechanisms to enhance their image and their capacity to respond and execute programs.
(ix) **Active community involvement and associations are essential to ensure transparency**. Civil society can play an important role in investing citizen security policies with social capital. This requires an institutional framework in which the community can express itself, one through which the government can provide information, and one that includes watchdog or audit mechanisms over critical areas of security policies, particularly for combating corruption.
(x) **Implementation of mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating actions must continue**. Beyond the technical and administrative management programs, it is essential to have clear baselines, realistic logical frameworks, control groups as benchmarks, victimization surveys for comparing perceptions of violence against data on complaints and measuring impacts, and other mechanisms, in order to derive the empirical evidence for promising practices.

B. The need to update the 2002 guidelines (document CP-2190-9)

1.4 These Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety (OPG-CCPS) order, update and supersede the "Preliminary Guidelines for the Design of Violence Reduction Projects" of 2002, which have guided Bank action in the sector. The Preliminary Guidelines themselves foresaw such an update: "These guidelines are a work in progress; they must evolve and incorporate more best practices and lessons learned specific to the Bank and the region, as the Bank progressively gains more experience in this area." The updates to the previous guidelines are grouped in three main areas:

1.5 First, this document presents the conceptual definitions (Annex I) that must be taken into account in approaching the issue of civic coexistence and public safety, and it also examines how the paradigm for combating violence has changed, shifting from the concept of State security[12] to that of civic coexistence and public safety, which involves a set of actions adopted by the State to guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens, to dispense justice and to see individual and collective social life proceeds peacefully in conditions of trust.

1.6 Moreover, the OPG-CCPS identify three priority areas for Bank intervention, based on the region's current needs and challenges, the broad empirical evidence available, and the lessons learned from Bank activities in the sector. This approach recognizes the need to understand that violence prevention demands the forging of a value chain that incorporates primary, secondary and tertiary prevention stages and puts mechanisms into place for coordination among local institutions (such as schools, hospitals, the police, prosecutors, judges, urban planning and various social services). The priority target areas proposed are:[13] (i) public policy planning; (ii) violence prevention; and (iii) certain select activities relating to control, criminal justice, and rehabilitation.

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[12] Which helped support certain authoritarian approaches that focus more on the needs of the public sector and the police forces than on those of the citizenry as a whole.

[13] See Section D of this chapter.

1.7   Lastly, with respect to Bank-financed programs in sensitive areas such as policing and penitentiary systems, the document establishes the importance of defining the limitations of the Bank's involvement, identifying and evaluating the main risks and, if necessary, establishing and agreeing on the evaluation criteria and the mechanisms for mitigating the risks associated with its involvement.

1.8   Annexes II, III and IV to this document contain: (i) a summary of the main statistics on crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, and comparative indicators on the perception of this phenomenon; (ii) the Bank's experience operating in the sector; and (iii) selected empirical evidence supporting the proposed priority target areas (components).

C.   Objectives of the OPG-CCPS

1.9   The objectives of the OPG-CCPS are: (i) to offer the countries of the region a framework for the Bank's work in a dynamic and multidisciplinary sector whose features stem from many different causes, calling for actions by different public agencies as well as the active involvement of civil society; (ii) to reorder, update and supersede the "Preliminary guidelines for the design of violence reduction projects," which have guided Bank assistance in this area until now. The OPG-CCPS provide staff with the corporate conceptual definition and the overall operating approach to the civic coexistence and public safety sector. They also provide an update of empirical evidence and a response to Senior Management with respect to target areas that merit special consideration for future Bank operations; and (iii) to strengthen the Bank's leadership as the multilateral institution with the most experience in this area, innovating and enhancing its ability to assist the countries of the region.

1.10   In addition to the foregoing objectives, the OPG-CCPS strengthen the Bank's contribution to building the capacity of governments and civil society to address violence, with greater emphasis on prevention and control of the factors underlying violence and insecurity. The substantive elements of that contribution include: (i) the protection and development of human rights within a framework of respect for the constitution and the law; (ii) the creation of conditions suitable to the peaceful coexistence of individuals; (iii) moving beyond the realm of policing to insist on the coordinated participation of other agencies and institutions, both of government and of civil society, with integrated and multisector activities at the national or local levels; (iv) analysis of gender-specific factors that differentiate the risk of violence facing men and women as groups that are vulnerable, at risk, or in conflict with the law; (v) targeting prevention policies at vulnerable and at-risk groups and at programs for inclusion and reintegration, without criminalizing or marginalizing specific sectors or groups; (vi) promoting institutional changes that will facilitate a preventive response through significant reforms to the police and the justice system; and (vii) highlighting the role of the local authorities and civil society organizations in prevention and rehabilitation work.

D.   Priority target areas: components

1.11   The components and activities detailed below were identified in light of: (i) the region's needs and challenges in this sector; (ii) lessons learned by the Bank in its operational experience; and (iii) the knowledge gained through international expercience or scientific research both within the region and beyond.

Component 1. Public policy planning

1.12   *Government policies*. Under this subcomponent, the Bank would assist countries in formulating, monitoring and evaluating their national and local policies for civic coexistence and public safety, through a process of consensus building and interagency participation at the national and subnational levels, and the involvement of civil society in general. Special attention will be paid to the essential role of local communities in policymaking, by helping to identify and prioritize problems and to design and execute the agreed solutions. This subcomponent is indispensable for the success of sector programs and the consolidation of government policies, which require leadership to coordinate and unite efforts, assign responsibilities, align them with strategic priorities, ensure financing of activities, and ensure the monitoring and evaluation of outcomes.

1.13   *Comprehensive analysis of citizen security*. Under this subcomponent, the Bank would support diagnostic assessments of the sector at the national and local levels, studies of the magnitude and cost of violence, victimization and attitude surveys, the logistics for coordinating roundtables and working groups, technical assistance and sharing of experience, and training sessions and seminars to disseminate policies and interventions. It would also support the design and implementation of mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation of interventions, projects and policies, using outcome and impact indicators with baselines.

1.14   *Institutional capacity building*. Under this subcomponent, the Bank would support the strengthening of national and local institutions in the sector[14] in their management and decision-making capacities relating to civic coexistence and public safety. This measure includes specific support through technical assistance and investment in strategic planning, execution, monitoring and evaluation of violence prevention efforts, personnel training, equipment and logistical support. It must be recognized that citizen security is a new discipline for the civil service in most countries, and it is therefore essential to build up human and professional resources capable of bringing excellence and sustainability to policy implementation.

1.15   *Strategic knowledge for decision-making*. In order to strengthen knowledge management, the Bank would use this subcomponent to support the establishment of good governance laboratories for security at the national and local levels. These

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[14]   Ministries of the interior, justice and public safety, prosecutors and public defenders, penitentiary policies and systems, as well as institutions involved in violence prevention (education, health, culture and sports, youth, family, women, children, municipal and provincial governments, etc.).

laboratories would collect data on crime and violence from various entities for use in formulating and managing policies and evaluating activities. They would thus constitute an analytical complement to the crime and violence observatories that the Bank has been supporting throughout the region. While the latter are supposed to generate information systems for collecting and processing statistics on crime and violence, the laboratories would support analytical work through qualitative field studies, specific sector research, documentation and dissemination of promising models and lessons learned, and the exchange and cross-referencing of information with academic sources and policymakers. The Bank would provide financing for infrastructure, technical equipment and training in the processing, analysis and use of statistical information.

Component 2. Prevention activities

1.16 *Multidimensional focus*. Prevention (at the primary, secondary or tertiary level) is a supplemental response to that of the criminal justice system, one that seeks to counter the factors that increase the risks of crime and victimization. This component recognizes the multidimensional nature of violence and the need for comprehensive strategies to address the different risk factors. This subcomponent would provide technical assistance, training, logistical support, materials, equipment and infrastructure in support of programs of prevention, protection, integration, employment and social rehabilitation of vulnerable or at-risk groups, in particular women and juveniles (primary and secondary). It would also promote public participation strategies through the media, engaging them for example in promoting public policies, prevention awareness campaigns, and responsible reporting of crimes.

1.17 Eligible activities for financing under this component can be grouped as follows: (i) efforts targeted at juveniles; (ii) prevention of family violence, sexual violence, and gender violence; (iii) activities targeted at the community; (iv) situational prevention activities; and (v) activities for preventing organized crime. Each group of activities can be addressed from either a national or a local perspective. In each case it will be important to determine at which level of government (or in which geographic area) the proposed activity or intervention will be most effective (the subsidiarity principle). Implementing activities in specific territories will require proper coordination between subnational and national bodies, in order to avoid duplication and to encourage complementarity between programs at the different levels of government.

1.18 *Activities targeted specifically to vulnerable and at-risk minors and youth*. These activities include programs for: (i) conflict resolution and prevention of school violence; (ii) school leveling and/or retention; (iii) awareness raising with parents, pupils and teachers about ethical values and civic coexistence, including teaching materials; (iv) early detection of abuse and risks associated with drug and alcohol use and other addictions; (v) occupational education and training and support for productive activities as a means of social reintegration; (vi) peaceful coexistence in the local setting through extracurricular activities (personal, recreational and

cultural development of various kinds); (vii) alternative disciplinary techniques, improved social and cognitive capacities; (viii) integration and participation in the community; (ix) sporting, social and cultural facilities and programs; (x) programs with the business sector; and (xi) control over the sale of alcohol and the carrying of weapons.

1.19   *Prevention of domestic violence, sexual violence, and gender violence*. These activities include programs and initiatives for: (i) promoting education in gender equality; (ii) raising awareness about the risks and impact of family and sexual violence and trafficking; (iii) improved prevention, detection, investigation and management of cases by the police, justice, social assistance and health systems; (iv) support for initiatives and services offered by civil society; (v) improved case recording systems; (vi) institutional strengthening for agencies that provide services for victims, including better coordination of their services; (vii) improved infrastructure for care services, including the creation of "hotlines" and shelters; (viii) strengthening the system for enforcing protection measures; (ix) comprehensive care for victims (e.g. legal, medical, psychological, educational and job training); (x) counseling and rehabilitation for offenders; (xi) data gathering and analysis to determine the features of, and conditions in which, family and sexual violence and/or trafficking occur; and (xii) with specific reference to trafficking, proposals for legislative reform and multisector policies and strategies to combat and prevent trafficking, support for legislative harmonization and the negotiation of agreements and protocols between institutions and between countries, and reparation for victims.

1.20   *Activities to improve social interaction within communities*. These activities include programs and initiatives for: (i) education and awareness raising about ethical values and civic culture; (ii) recognition and appreciation of diversity and gender equality; (iii) conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence; (iv) community involvement and participation; (v) improving mechanisms for community participation (analysis, strategic planning, design, implementation and monitoring of prevention strategies); (vi) support for establishing relational networks and organizations within the community; (vii) strengthening of ties between the community and government institutions; (viii) financing small-scale community infrastructure works for prevention, prioritized by the community itself; and (ix) participatory planning and management of policies, through the strengthening of institutions for public participation such as community forums, roundtables, citizen councils and other mechanisms in which civil society can express itself.

1.21   *Situational prevention activities*. Beyond social prevention activities, the Bank plans to support programs for: (i) environmental design to improve security (improvements to public areas, accessibility, paths and walkways, parks and lighting), ensuring community and private sector involvement; (ii) analysis and implementation of laws and regulations for reducing violence such as control over the sale of alcohol and the carrying of weapons; (iii) incorporation of preventive measures into urban renewal bodies, neighborhood improvement programs, and the

restoration of public spaces, deteriorated areas and historic urban centers and social housing tracts; and (iv) developing and strengthening community liaison and outreach mechanisms for the development of situational prevention plans, such as fact-finding walkabouts, diagnostic workshops, and permanent public surveys.

1.22   *Support for the prevention of organized crime.* Planned activities are designed to prevent the emergence of organized crime at both the local and national government levels. This includes: (i) legislative, institutional and administrative strengthening of financial intelligence units to prevent money laundering; (ii) legislative, institutional and administrative strengthening to prevent trafficking in persons, including outreach and awareness campaigns; (iii) legislative, institutional and administrative strengthening for agencies responsible for port, airport, customs and border security; and (iv) the adoption of international conventions (with appropriate monitoring mechanisms) to foster regional cooperation in addressing transnational organized crime.

Component 3. Activities relating to prevention, criminal and alternative justice, and rehabilitation from a preventive perspective

1.23   *Policy frameworks and administrative cultures.* Recognizing that civic coexistence and public safety policies constitute an integrated value chain, police and penitentiary services take on special importance. Citizen security policies do not depend solely on the police, yet without transparent and effective policing it is impossible to pursue those policies effectively. Law enforcement institutions must govern their activities within clearly established legal and administrative frameworks based on the rule of law and full respect of international conventions such as the United Nations Convention on Human Rights. It is not enough to embody these principles in law; the challenge is to enforce them, through institutional reforms that will involve cultural change, overcoming authoritarian mindsets and embracing integrated perspectives that rise above the logic of militarized actions and operations. When it comes to the criminal justice system, the challenge again is to coordinate actions with an independent branch of government, with its own specific regulations and with varying degrees of political, functional and administrative autonomy.

1.24   *Support for policing and penitentiary systems.* The Bank could selectively support specific, preventive actions to enhance the institutional management of the civilian police and the penitentiary system. That support could be provided through technical assistance, training, logistical support, materials, computer equipment and training, as well as upgrading infrastructure for activities and initiatives, including: (i) support for internal restructuring and administrative planning within institutions; (ii) improving the recruitment and selection of personnel and the development of professional career paths (particularly in the penitentiary service); (iii) modernization of training academies, to develop the technical and professional skills of police officers and penitentiary staff, with an emphasis on preventive functions, human and civil rights, and service to the general public (especially victims and vulnerable groups, from a gender-sensitive and intercultural

perspective); (iv) policing programs with community involvement (community and neighborhood policing geared to solving problems); (v) training in the use of new information technologies, integrated with other justice administration entities (computerized crime maps, monitoring of the prison population, data consolidation systems and crime labs); (vi) improved police oversight and accountability mechanisms to evaluate performance, with active input from the public; and (vii) studies or strategic forums to examine or share information on crime trends and security problems in general.

1.25   *Support for the criminal and alternative justice sector.* Select activities under this heading, undertaken from a preventive standpoint, will seek to increase the supply of basic criminal justice services—formal and alternative—in places accessible to the community. They include support for: (i) establishing *juzgados de paz* (justices of the peace or magistrate's courts) and *casas de justicia* (one-stop legal offices) offering a full range of justice services for disadvantaged communities; (ii) introduction of specialized police stations for protection of families and women; (iii) establishment of conciliation, mediation and arbitration centers to help address backlogs in the formal criminal justice system, foster citizen participation and instill values of civic coexistence in communities; (iv) modernization of the criminal justice system with forensic laboratories, information systems for criminal investigations, facility renovations in the public prosecutors' and defenders' offices, forensic medicine institutes and technology platforms for multiagency handling of data on crime and violence; and (v) design and implementation of amendments to codes of criminal procedure.

1.26   *Support for social rehabilitation.* These discrete preventive activities are intended to rehabilitate prison inmates and juvenile offenders (tertiary prevention). Technical assistance, logistical support, materials, computer equipment and training facilities, and other assistance would be provided in support of: (i) comprehensive psychological, social and medical care; (ii) formal education at all levels; (iii) occupational and entrepreneurship training and coaching; (iv) development of alternative disciplinary techniques and improved social skills, including gender equality and interculturalism; (v) peaceful settlement of disputes; (vi) treatment for drug addiction and alcoholism; (vii) AIDS prevention initiatives; (viii) job placement and employment, fostering strategic partnerships with the private sector from the standpoint of corporate social responsibility; (ix) development and strengthening of alternatives to imprisonment, with proper supervision systems; (x) mechanisms to provide postimprisonment support, counseling and follow-up; (xi) improvements in the establishment and operation of criminal sentence enforcement courts; and (xii) approval and adaptation of international standards in the different national juridical systems.

II. CRITERIA FOR THE BANK'S WORK IN
SPECIAL RISK MITIGATION ACTIVITIES AND MECHANISMS

A. Activities not suitable for Bank financing

2.1   There are some activities for which the Bank should not lend its support, given the high reputational risk involved and the potential for the abuse of human and civil rights and interference in countries' political affairs. Such activities include: (i) support for military operations; (ii) activities to preserve state security or investigate political crimes; (iii) secret or undercover operations; (iv) purchase of lethal equipment such as weapons, munitions and tear gas. Patrol vehicles would be financed only to implement neighborhood policing strategies with community involvement; (v) support for special unit operations that are highly complex in the use of force and exposure to violence, such as bomb disposal units, drug eradication brigades, antikidnapping units and riot control units; and (vi) training in the use of lethal weapons or firearms. This list is merely illustrative, given the dynamic nature of the sector, and could be expanded to include other activities depending on their nature and scope.

B. Specific risk mitigation mechanisms

2.2   *General criteria.* The following criteria would have to be observed in any programs proposed for Bank support that would include components or activities relating to sensitive topics such as police support or juvenile or adult detention centers: (i) conduct a case-by-case analysis and develop a rationale from the technical, financial and value-added perspectives as to why the Bank should support it; and (ii) identify risk mitigation mechanisms whereby the Bank will have the support of independent specialized agencies to oversee compliance with program agreements relating to human rights, civil rights, transparency and combating corruption. By their nature, these programs in sensitive areas are unique and must be examined on a case-by-case basis, so they cannot constitute precedents for supporting or sustaining a program or project in another country. Bearing in mind the nature of these programs, they must always be submitted for formal consideration and discussion by members of the Operations Policy Committee.

1. Risk mitigation mechanisms for the police

2.3   While all the police forces of Latin America and the Caribbean have undergone reforms to varying degrees, they still face problems that could pose risks for the Bank.[15] Nevertheless, there is now a new approach that stresses community cooperation with the police in identifying and instituting actions to address crime problems. As a prerequisite to Bank participation, any civic coexistence and public safety programs that involve support for the police must from the outset (in their design and during implementation) include mechanisms for civilian oversight and

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[15]   In particular, the political ties of police forces, police forces with certain military features, and severe shortcomings in the internal and external police oversight and accountability mechanisms.

strengthening the internal affairs bodies within the police force. On the one hand, civilian oversight by the community or by NGOs of recognized expertise will help to create synergy in the external control of police work. On the other hand, strengthening of internal affairs bodies will make it easier to supervise, take action, and avoid excesses in the conduct of police work.

2.4   When it comes to strengthening the internal affairs bodies, particular attention will have to be paid to the following aspects: (i) the internal affairs areas must be independent of the police high command and senior ministry officials, or perhaps even established as independent bodies; (ii) the legal system must guarantee due process both for the victims of abuse and for police personnel; (iii) there must be a linkage between the internal affairs areas and the police career path, to ensure appropriate sanctions and incentives; (iv) there must be independent tribunals to channel investigations by the internal affairs areas; (v) police action must be governed by protocols that will ensure an adequate flow of information among the areas involved; (vi) police personnel must be required to declare their assets; and (vii) there must be safeguards to avoid conflicts of interest and to prevent the "co-opting" of civil society representatives participating in oversight bodies.[16]

2.   Risk mitigation mechanisms for the penitentiary system

2.5   The penitentiary systems of Latin America and the Caribbean have been identified as a sector given low priority by government.[17] Criminal justice is slow and is seen as unfair. There is a high percentage of prisoners who have not been tried and convicted.[18] Prison budgets are low, leading to a severe deficit in detention centers, deficiencies in basic services in penitentiaries,[19] overcrowding[20] and shortages of prison staff, most of whom are on no particular professional career path. Nevertheless, over the last decade governments have increased their awareness and have adopted a more integrated approach to civic coexistence and public safety, in which the penitentiary system occupies a critical position: if its problems are not addressed, policies for resocializing inmates are bound to fail.

2.6   Given these circumstances, as a prerequisite for Bank participation in civic coexistence and public safety programs that call for support for prisons, there must be strategic partnerships with specialized entities of recognized international

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[16]   These updated elements supplement those of the "dimensions of accountability" described in the 2002 "Preliminary guidelines for the design of violence reduction projects."

[17]   The prison populations per 100,000 inhabitants for selected countries of Latin America are: Chile 263, Brazil 219, El Salvador 260. The worldwide average is 150. FLACSO, Chile, 2008.

[18]   The rate of untried prisoners in many countries of the region exceeds 50%: it is 70% in the Dominican Republic, 63% in Uruguay, 86% in Peru, 76% in Mexico, and 60% in Venezuela. Comparative figures for France and Spain are 30%, and for England 20%.

[19]   In some cases conditions have been defined as constituting "inhumane, cruel and degrading treatment."

[20]   The overcrowding index is defined as the ratio between the system's capacity and the prison population. On this basis, prison overpopulation in Brazil is 88%, in the Dominican Republic 91%, in El Salvador 132%, and in Ecuador 128%.

standing[21] with which the Bank can identify action and monitoring plans, baselines and targets that will be achieved progressively.

2.7 With the support of specialized bodies, the Bank must also take into account the international conventions governing the use of force and the management of prisons, working conditions of prison personnel, and the overall treatment of persons in conflict with the law or detainees, as well as international rules setting physical standards for prison facilities. At the same time, Bank support will have to include integrated interventions such as alternative and restorative justice programs, strategies to relieve prison crowding and quicken the workings of the sector, and the institutionalization of judicial oversight mechanisms through sentence enforcement courts.

2.8 In terms of integrated interventions, the activities proposed for Bank support must not be designed exclusively for the construction or upgrade of penitentiary or police infrastructure. The Bank would finance such infrastructure only in the context of a broader process of modernizing and reforming the system, and only where this is essential to achieve the development goals of the programs. Such projects must also be consistent with the Agreement Establishing the Bank and with the guidelines established in the 15 April 1998 memorandum of the Bank's Legal Department.[22]

2.9 In the specific case of juvenile detention centers, and recognizing that internment is an exceptional measure under international treaties, resocialization mechanisms are particularly important because, taking a critical overview of the sector, it is here that the situation has deteriorated most sharply in many countries of the region, both in terms of physical infrastructure and legislative neglect.[23] [24]

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[21] NGOs, academic institutions and international agencies (ILANUD) that enjoy prestige as advocates in this area.

[22] This memorandum from the Legal Department established three tests that must be met before the Bank may participate in financing activities in such areas as prisons: (i) the activity must make a direct contribution to the Bank's basic mandate of accelerating the process of economic and social development, and it must promote investment and economic growth; (ii) the decision to participate in financing the specific activity must be based exclusively on economic factors; and (iii) the activity must have no aspects or dimensions of a political nature that could be interpreted as interfering in the internal political affairs of the country.

[23] It should be noted that the Bank has supported juvenile rehabilitation centers in several projects (Uruguay, Guatemala, Panama and Chile) with activities to improve integrated rehabilitation programs, training for technical and security staff, upgrades to physical infrastructure, and the procurement of operating materials and equipment.

[24] Since the Convention on the Rights of the Child came into force in 1989, the international community, acting through the United Nations system, has approved other international instruments that supplement and expand the new concept of juvenile justice. These include the Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the "Beijing Rules"), the Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty, the Standard Minimum Rules for Noncustodial Measures (the "Tokyo Rules"), and the Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the "Riyadh Guidelines"). All these international instruments coincide in two crucial aspects: deprivation of liberty as a last resort, and the socioeducational focus on social reintegration as the purpose of the penalties contained in each country's legislation (Frühling, Hugo. *La situación de la violencia juvenil en la región* [Juvenile violence conditions in the region]. Analytical paper prepared for the IDB, February 2009).

III. INNOVATION PRIORITIES TO SUPPORT THE BASIC COMPONENTS IDENTIFIED

3.1   The Bank now has an opportunity to expand the framework for the support it provides to countries in the area of civic coexistence and public safety, so as to continue exploring new target areas while adapting its operating mechanisms to help address this challenge. Below is a description of these key areas, showing how they relate to the operational and analytical challenges identified in this document.

3.2   ***Support for regional exchange mechanisms. Strengthening of the Inter-American Forum on Citizen Security and Violence Prevention.*** Institutional leadership has been identified as a key element of the design and implementation of effective violence prevention policies. With worldwide crime behaving in ways that transcend borders and jurisdictions, regional cooperation mechanisms have also been identified as important. From this perspective, the Bank is in a position to advocate for, and to facilitate, the inclusion of civic coexistence and public safety policies as a priority item in the regional dialogue and on national, regional and local agendas. To this end, it would be useful to give permanent status to the Inter-American Forum on Citizen Security and Violence Prevention, which was launched in Medellin in 2005, and held again in Lima (2007) and Jamaica (2009). Another mechanism that should be strengthened, as part of the Inter-American System, was launched recently by the Organization of American States (OAS) with the First Meeting of Public Security Ministers of the Americas. In addition, given the growing importance of local and subnational players in citizen security issues, another priority for the Bank is to establish a regional network of mayors.

3.3   ***Information as a regional public good. Strengthening of a regional system of standardized crime and violence indicators.*** There continues to be a critical shortage of reliable and timely information on crime and violence in most countries of the region, and beyond; such information should include not only police and judicial statistics but data from victimization surveys that can shed light on the dark figure of crime and on public fears about it. To address this deficit, the Bank will continue to foster the development of integrated information systems for measuring, evaluating and bringing transparency to the sector, and for providing decision-making tools for policymakers. Attention should be drawn to the recently approved regional public good of the Regional System of Standardized Citizen Security and Violence Prevention Indicators (operation RG-T1265), intended to build consensus in Latin America and the Caribbean on common and harmonized operating practices for conceptualizing, measuring and weighting of statistical systems that will reflect the principal manifestations of crime.

3.4   ***Multidimensional security. Inclusion of civic coexistence and public safety as a crosscutting issue within the framework of broader and integrated support to national and subnational governments.*** Violence has multiple causes and expresses itself in multiple dimensions, and there are multiple agencies and sectors addressing it. This means that the focus should be not only on specific civic

coexistence and public safety programs, but on seizing opportunities to address the phenomenon as a crosscutting issue through new investment programs, as national and subnational borrowers are now requesting. There are in fact various sector programs that can respond to this issue (e.g. health, education, neighborhood improvement or urban development in general, competitiveness, justice administration, and strengthening of subnational administration). In these cases, provided that the borrower agrees, the Bank could include a project or component within a more complex operation to support policies or to provide a catalyst for institutional arrangements or funding to promote civic coexistence and public safety.

3.5 ***Management of excellence in sector knowledge. Local and regional "good governance laboratories for security."*** To supplement the foregoing, there is a need for strengthened production, documentation and dissemination of knowledge in the area of civic coexistence and public safety. These laboratories are where the efforts of policymakers intersect with those of the academic world, civil society, and the private sector involved in corporate social responsibility efforts[25] to produce systematic documentation of lessons learned, to share promising practices, to assess innovative experiences, and to examine new manifestations of crime.

3.6 New target areas that should be explored include: (i) support for the establishment of juvenile justice systems in the region (the lack of which in many countries is a prime contributor to human rights violations); (ii) new approaches to the issue of violence from the ecological perspective of public health, which places special emphasis on rehabilitation from addictions (most of our countries lack adequate services and facilities for treatment of this kind); (iii) investigation into the citizen security capabilities of e-government, which involves systems for optimizing management and oversight of the security forces, as well as questions relating to respect for individual rights and privacy; (iv) the relationship between situational prevention and large-scale interventions involving infrastructure/public spaces/urban facilities (such as the issue of road safety: in many countries traffic accidents claim more lives than homicide); (v) innovative formulas for restorative justice, penal mediation, alternative dispute settlement and alternative justice as a way of streamlining law enforcement and making justice more accessible; and (vi) updating studies of the economic, social and institutional costs of violence as a tool for weighing the effectiveness and benefits of interventions and their contribution to the region's quality of life and its competitiveness.[26]

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[25] The Bank is supporting the establishment of interagency networks linking public and private partners, including bilateral and multilateral agencies, the local and international private sector involved in corporate social responsibility efforts, bilateral donors, philanthropic organizations and think tanks. The Bank is also a founding member and active participant in the Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence (together with the OAS, USAID, the Centers for Disease Control, the Pan American Health Organization, and the World Bank).

[26] Mention should be made of the work undertaken by ICF/ICS jointly with RES to update sector analytic studies, and with KNL to strengthen initiatives in knowledge management, to document lessons learned, and to consolidate the Bank's Citizen Security Sector Experts Group.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
CIVIC COEXISTENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAMS

1.1   **Citizen security**. Citizen security is a public good that includes the observance and enforcement of the basic right of citizens to go about their daily lives safely and peacefully. It entails respect for rules, a culture of legality, and the trust of the citizenry. Citizen security involves more than fighting crime; it embraces a much broader range of concepts such as the rules of coexistence, dispute settlement, and efficient justice and penitentiary systems.

1.2   **Civic coexistence and public safety in human development**. Civic coexistence and public safety are an inherent component of human development.[1] A society that respects individual rights and obligations allows for healthy interaction. By contrast, the fear and mistrust engendered by violence and insecurity affect a community's social and economic development and pose an obstacle to income growth. Any development policy must therefore recognize that its success and sustainability will depend on eliminating a climate of violence or insecurity.

1.3   **Violence is a phenomenon with many causes**. Violence has multiple causes and consequences, and reducing it requires that we identify the different factors associated with it. The greater the number of risk factors present, the greater the likelihood that violence will appear. Risk factors operate:

a.   *At the individual level*: Early exposure to violence, inequality and unemployment resulting from social exclusion, from racial or sexual discrimination, and from facilitators (alcohol, drugs, weapons).

b.   *In the home*: Dysfunctional families where parental attitudes are negligent or inconsistent, and where there is violence or conflict between the parents.

c.   *At the community or society level*: Situations or events in the community that result in violence or crimes related to cultural norms (physical punishment of children, men who insist on controlling women's activities), adherence to a culture of violence, collapse of the urban environment and social bonds, features of the neighborhood environment, ineffectiveness of private and public institutions of social oversight, a history of social violence, the degree of inequality.

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[1]   The United Nations and the World Health Organization (WHO) have incorporated the concept of human security and made it an integral component of the sustainable development paradigm. Human Development Report UNDP (1994) and WHO (2000).

1.4   If the factors are properly identified, and timely action is taken to reduce them, this can have a substantial multiplier effect.[2]

1.5   **Statistics on violence have serious shortcomings**. The source for statistics of this kind is the data collected and processed by government institutions, in particular the police and the justice system. While the quality and the timeliness of statistics vary greatly among countries, for the region as a whole there are some common shortcomings such as weaknesses in the data collection systems and a low propensity to report certain crimes, generating thereby what is called "hidden crime." The figures cannot be taken, then, as a fully reliable representation of reality, and descriptions and interpretive studies based on them may be open to question.

1.6   **A new paradigm for civic coexistence and public safety**. Citizen security is one of the main topics on the public agenda in countries of the region. In the past, the paradigm for solving the problem of "citizen insecurity" was based on efforts to restore public order, i.e. government measures (generally with an authoritarian approach involving the police) designed to avoid altercations and ensure that people could move freely through the streets and public places. This model has gradually been replaced by an integral focus on "civic coexistence and public safety," which embraces a set of actions by government, the private sector and civil society to guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms, to provide justice, and to oversee the peaceful pursuit of individual and collective social life. The change of paradigm has meant changes in policies, moving away from an exclusive and centralist "police-justice-prison" focus (with the emphasis on controlling crime) toward one that gives prominence, complementary to control efforts, to prevention strategies that emphasize citizen participation and that will reduce the risk factors for violence, enhance social development, and diminish the opportunities for crime.

1.7   **Prevention, deterrence and control**. An essential feature of an integral civic coexistence and public safety policy is that it covers a broad spectrum of actions, ranging from prevention to the legitimate use of force under the rule of law in the face of acts that threaten the security and safety of individuals. This change in policy does not rely solely on one type of action (prevention), but treats prevention and control as part of the same continuum, where effective punishment (a "hard" solution) is just one of the deterrents to certain types of violent behavior in the future (combating impunity as a means of prevention). An integral civic coexistence and public safety policy that stresses prevention will have to be pursued at the local level, so as to (i) identify the causes of the problem; (ii) establish a prioritized ranking of interventions with clear responsibilities among the different players in the process of change; (iii) indicate the community leaders; and (iv) identify targets and expected outcomes. Evidence from

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[2]   Crime Prevention Digest II, Daniel Sansfaçon and Brandon Welsh, International Center for the Prevention of Crime.

industrialized countries shows that prevention can produce not only long-term but immediate results, and is more cost-effective than control actions.[3]

1.8 **The "local focus."** The citizen security problem not only has many causes, but manifests itself in different ways depending on where it arises. This means that addressing it at the local level has the comparative advantages of: (i) bringing efforts closer to the community for a better understanding of its insecurity problems; (ii) facilitating coordination among public and private institutions and civil society; (iii) promoting the implementation and monitoring of agreed initiatives; and (iv) reinforcing decentralization trends that now allow and demand a more active role for local governments in this area.

1.9 **Integral civic coexistence and public safety policy.** An effective civic coexistence and public safety policy will provide integral solutions that address the different risk factors. Because violence has many causes, there is no single recipe. The origins and manifestations of violence differ among countries, regions, and even communities. Hence the importance of a policy that offers a strategic partnership and mechanisms for participation by government institutions, the private sector, and community organizations, in order to identify the causes and risks and the mechanisms for executing and evaluating interventions. By way of illustration, civic coexistence and public safety initiatives generally address the following areas:

a. *Prevention*:

(i) Human rights and a civic culture.

(ii) Risk control (disarming citizens, treating the consumption of alcohol and other drugs, preventing and responding to emergencies).

(iii) Social development projects targeted to vulnerable groups (youth, prostitutes, indigents and migrants, and more generally, support for excluded population groups).

(iv) The willingness of citizens to get involved and report crimes.

(v) Attention to domestic violence and child abuse.

(vi) Peaceful settlement of disputes.

(vii) Situational prevention projects (includes different kinds of projects for improving the quality of life in neighborhoods or communities, such as street lighting, better security systems, or improved urban layout).

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[3] Greenwood, P., "Diverting Children from a Life of Crime: What are the Costs and Benefits?" National Crime Prevention Council of Canada (1996), "A Sound Investment: Preventing Crime and Victimization." UK Home Office (2000), "The Economic and Social Cost of Crime." Home Office Research Study 217, Foundation Docteur Philippe-Pinel (2004), "The Key to Safer Municipalities." IDB (2002), "Guidelines for the design of violence reduction projects," p. 4. 2002, IDB, Prevención de la violencia [Violence prevention]. Technical Note 5.

     b. *Strengthening of security authorities:*

         (i)   The presence of security and justice agencies as a deterrent.

         (ii)   Work related to crime response, intelligence and prosecution.

         (iii) Legitimate use of force in the face of crime and acts of violence.

     c. *Strengthening of the judicial system*:

         (i)   Criminal investigation.

         (ii)   Trial and conviction of offenders.

     d. *Strengthening of the prison system*:

         (i)   Punishment of crimes.

         (ii)   Enforcement of sentences.

         (iii) Resocialization and reintegration of convicts.

1.10   **Institutional aspects of civic coexistence and public safety programs and policies**. Given the complexity and the nature of violence, civic coexistence and public safety programs generally involve many institutions, and implementing them demands effective coordination among different players. These programs normally encounter delays, explained in part by the usual problems of institutional capacity and in part by the time needed to reach consensus and to coordinate activities or projects. On this point, and recognizing that each situation is distinct, successful civic coexistence and public safety policies may be said to share certain common institutional features: (i) they create a system for allocating activities and resources among national and subnational institutions; (ii) they establish mechanisms for civil society and local communities to participate at each stage; and (iii) they support mechanisms to provide citizens with regular reports on the outcomes of the policies.

STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIC COEXISTENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

A. Crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean

1.1 *Analysis based on nonhomogeneous and uncertified statistics*. This annex provides an overview of crime and violence conditions in the region, based on available information from various national and multilateral sources. The figures are not always up to date, and there are sometimes problems of standardization, even within individual countries and regions. However, the analysis is useful because it reveals trends in Latin America and the Caribbean that, while in need of refinement with more solid data, suggest the relative magnitude of the problem in the region.

1.2 *Crime and violence rates continue to rise in the region*. In the global context, Latin America and the Caribbean remains one of the most violent regions, after sub-Saharan Africa. By way of illustration (see Figure 1), the murder rate was estimated at 28 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2007, and at 22 per 100,000 for Central America; both rates are above those of most other regions of the world.

Figure 1. Murder Rates by Region of the World

Source: *Crime, violence, and development: Trends, costs, and policy options in the Caribbean*. World Bank and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2007.

1.3   At the country level, murder rates are high and rising, as the following table
       shows:

**Table 1. Murder Rates in Latin America and the Caribbean**

Homicides per 100,000 Population in Latin America and the Caribbean[1]									
2000-2008									
Country	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**
El Salvador	37.3	34.6	31.1	32.7	41.0	54.9	55.3	61	55.4
Jamaica	44.0	40.0	36.0	54.0	58.0	49.0	49.1	57.3	58.4
Colombia	62.7	64.6	65.7	52.7	44.1	39.3	37.3	37	33
Trinidad & Tobago	10	11.8	13.4	17.8	20.1	29.6	28.4	30.3	42.2
Honduras	49.9	53.7	55.9	33.6	31.9	35.0	42.9	49.9	57.9
Guatemala	25.8	25.2	30.7	35.0	36.3	42.0	45.2	39.4	48.74
Brazil	26.7	27.8	28.5	29.1	27	22.0	25.7	20	19.3
Mexico	32.0	31.0	28.0	27.0	25.0	24.0	25.0	27	--
Peru	2.4	11.5	10.3	5.0	5.12	11.4	--	--	--
Panama	10.1	10.1	12.4	10.8	9.7	11.2	11.3	12.9	10.27
Ecuador	6.4	10.3	14.8	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	--	--
Argentina	7.2	8.4	9.3	7.9	6.2	5.8	5.3	5.1	--
Nicaragua	9.0	10.0	10.0	12.0	12.0	13.0	12.4	12.0	13.0
Uruguay	5.2	4.9	5.3	4.5	4.4	4.5	4.3	4.0	5.0
Guyana	10.0	10.6	18.9	27.4	17.4	16.6	21.4	14.95	20.36
Chile	2.6	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9

Source: See footnote.

1.4   Recent data on murder rates in some of the major cities of the region show that
       they remain high. For Medellín, Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro, for example, they are
       above 30 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

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[1]   For El Salvador, Policía Nacional Civil; Jamaica, Jamaica Constabulary Force; Colombia, Observatorio de
       Derechos Humanos and UNDP Colombia (2007-2008); Honduras, Número de Víctimas y Tasas de
       Homicidios en Honduras (1999-2006), OCAVI (2007), and Observatorio de la Violencia Universidad
       Autónoma de Honduras; Trinidad and Tobago, Ministry of National Security; Guatemala, Policía Nacional
       Civil; Brazil, Ministry of Health (DATASUS), Rede de Informação Tecnológica Latino-Americana, and
       Ministry of Justice; Mexico, 7 Letras; Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad A.C. 2003 and
       Secretaria de Seguridad Publica; Venezuela, Universidad Central de Venezuela UCV, Centro para la Paz y
       los Derechos Humanos, based on official data; Peru, Policía Nacional del Perú/CONASEC; Panama, data
       from OCAVI (2007) and Fiscalía Auxiliar de la Republica; Ecuador, data from Policía Judicial
       Ecuador/Flacso Ecuador; Argentina, Dirección Nacional de Política Criminal, Ministerio de Justicia y
       Derechos Humanos, wwwpolcrim.just.gov.ar; Nicaragua, Policía Nacional de Nicaragua and Instituto
       Nacional de Estadística; Guyana, Ministry of Home Affairs and Guyana Police Force; Chile, Ministerio del
       Interior, Subsecretaria Interior de Seguridad Ciudadana; Uruguay, based on data from Observatorio
   Nacional de Violencia y Criminalidad, Ministerio del Interior.

Figure 2. Murder Rates in Latin American Cities

Homicides per 100,000 Population for Latin American Cities, 2007

City	Rate
Santiago	2.6
Guayaquil	2.8
Quito	2.8
Buenos Aires	3
San José	5
Lima	6.5
La Paz	9
Panama City	11
Monterrey	12
Montevideo	12
Mexico City	15
Guadalajara	17
Bogota	18.8
Curitiba	20
São Paulo	21.5
Belo Horizonte	22
Porto Alegre	27
Queretaro	27
Medellín	33
Brasilia	38
Rio de Janeiro	43

Source**:** América Economía Intelligence, 2008, Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá.

1.5 *Women and young males are the groups most affected by violence.* Disaggregating the data by age group, we find that murder rates among young males[2] are extremely high, at 84.1 homicides for every 100,000 inhabitants. When rates of mortality from violence for different age groups are projected forward, we find that the projected rate for young males in 2005, 2015 and 2030 rises significantly to 90, 103 and 126 homicides per 100,000, respectively.[3]

Figure 3. Murder Rate Among Males, Age 15-29

Homicides Among Males, Age 15-29

Years	Rate
2002	84.1
2005	90.4
2015	102.9
2030	122.7

Homicides among males, age 15-29

Source: based on WHO data.

1.6 The region's rates of *violence against women* are also the highest in the world. In 1996, before the upsurge of violence in the region, the number of female

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2 Males between the ages of 15 and 29 years.

3 These data were prepared on the basis of information derived from WHO mortality and population projections for the years 2005, 2015, and 2030. For more information, visit: http://www.who.int.

homicides was estimated as the second highest in the world (after sub-Saharan Africa), at 22.9 per 100,000 inhabitants,[4] compared to a world average of 10.7 per 100,000 in the year.

1.7   Although most governments in the region have taken steps to improve the recording of victims and the care accorded them, the levels remain disproportionately high: on average, between 30% and 45% of women in the region have been victims of violence. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has conducted pioneering studies on violence against women, focusing mainly on cities, which allow us to appreciate the scope of this problem.

Table 2. Percentage of Women Age 15-49 Who Have Been Victims of
Physical, Sexual or Emotional Violence from their Partner

| Country	Physical violence	Sexual violence	Emotional violence
Bolivia, 2003	52.3	15.2	53.8
Colombia, 2005	39.0	11.5	65.7
Ecuador, 2004	31.0	12.0	41.0
Haiti, 2000	18.2	17.0	27.3
Mexico, 2003	9.3	7.8	38.4
Peru, 2004	42.3	9.8	68.2
Dominican Republic, 2002	21.7	6.4	67.5

Source: ECLAC, *Ni una mas!* (2007) p. 28.[5]

1.8   *Firearms as a vector of violent crime*. Firearms have contributed significantly to the increase in everyday violence in the region. The rate of homicides by firearms in the region is the highest in the world, at 15.5 per 100,000, five times the world average.

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[4]   Murray and Lopez, 1996.

[5]   ECLAC (2007a), *Ni una mas! El derecho a vivir una vida libre de violencia en América Latina y el Caribe* [Not one woman more! The right to live a life free from violence in Latin America and the Caribbean]. Santiago, Chile. ECLAC (2007b), *Data on violence against women in Latin America and Caribbean.*

Figure 4. Deaths from Firearms vs. Suicide

Source: Small Arms Survey, 2008.

1.9 *Firearm-related death rates are also extremely high for individual countries*. In fact, most countries of the region for which statistics are available are above the world average; only Argentina falls below the average. Thus, Colombia, Honduras and El Salvador stand at the head of the global ranking of mortality from firearms. The only countries outside the region that rank among the top 20 are South Africa (4th), the Philippines (10th), Albania (15th) and the United States (17th).

**Figure 5. Country Rankings by Firearm Mortality Rate
for Latin America and the Caribbean (different years)**

Source: International Action Network on Small Arms, 2007.

1.10   *Crime and violence exact high economic costs and hamper the region's growth.*[6] The effects of crime and violence on economic growth are many and varied. Among the most important is the impact on the accumulation of factors of production, which affects the accumulation of physical and human capital, reduces foreign investment[7] and tourism, and threatens the fabric of society. It also entails a significant increase in production costs through outlays on private security, insurance premiums, and investments in protective systems such as electrified fencing and gratings. Lastly, crime and violence can seriously undermine existing social infrastructure, especially in the poorest communities, thereby reducing income levels and boosting levels of crime and violence in ways that are transmitted from generation to generation.

1.11   The economic cost exacted by violent crime in the region is estimated at 5% of GDP; domestic violence alone costs 2% of GDP. Some countries have conducted studies to quantify the economic costs of crime and violence. For example, the cost for El Salvador is 11.5% of GDP, and 7.3% for Guatemala. In Mexico, the cost of insecurity is estimated at 15% of GDP, or 108 billion pesos. In the Southern Cone, Brazil estimates the cost at R$92.2 billion, equivalent to 5% of GDP.

1.12   The studies show that governments of the region are spending significant sums in the struggle against violence and that, with well-designed prevention programs, could be invested in other priorities that would boost social and economic development and attract investment and tourism. For example, some countries of the Caribbean (e.g. Haiti and Jamaica with 33.7 and 49 homicides per 100,000 population) calculate that they could achieve per capita economic growth rates of more than 5% if they could reduce their murder rates to the level of, say, Costa Rica (6.7 per 100,000).[8] Other studies show that if Mexico were able to reduce impunity and crime and violence, the country could increase per capita investment by 3% a year, or by 16% in five years.[9] [10]

1.13   The problem also takes a toll on the competitiveness of many countries in the region. The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 of the World Economic Forum, which establishes a country ranking (global competitiveness index, GCI) based on a number of factors, including the costs of crime and violence, shows

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[6]   It should be noted that the analytical methodology and the variables used to analyze costs differ from country to country.

[7]   Multinational firms are not investing in Latin America because of the high security costs entailed. While operating outlays for security represent 3% of the total costs of firms in Asia, the figure for Latin America is 7% (Council of the Americas, 2004).

[8]   Mata and Fernández, *Población y salud en Mesoamérica* [Population and health in Mesoamerica].

[9]   Instituto Mexicano de Competitividad, 2007. *Punto de inflexión: Situación de competitividad en México 2006* [Turning point: Competitiveness in Mexico 2006].

[10]   High rates of crime and violence have a significant impact on the competitiveness ranking of countries in the GCI, because of the costs they impose on businesses. For example, El Salvador ranks last in the region, and Guatemala second-to-last.

that these affect the GCI average. An example can be seen in Table 3: In the last year the GCI for Colombia was 74, for Mexico 60, and for Brazil 64: these averages were affected by the business cost of crime and violence, the index for which was 129, 127 and 116 respectively for the same year.

1.14   There is also an enormous cost in terms of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) lost to violence. For example, in 2002 Brazil lost 1,495 DALYs per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to 35 in the Netherlands or 193 in the United States.[11]

1.15   *Violence in the region is not a homogeneous phenomenon.* While some risk factors and manifestations of violence are similar, national differences in types of crime and in cultural and social characteristics demand policies tailored to each country, and even to different parts of the same country. The Caribbean region is especially affected by drug and weapons trafficking. Central America presents the characteristics of a post-conflict area, marked by the youth-violence binomial and a strong presence of youth gangs. In other countries, such as Colombia, the larger cities show high rates of street and domestic violence, while in other parts of the country the presence of outlaw groups constitutes a different manifestation of violence and the more complex problem of organized crime.

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[11]   For more information, see http://www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/bodgbddeathdalyestimates.xls.

Table 3. Impact of Crime and Violence on the GCI

	2002-03[*]	2003-04[**]	2004-05[#]	2005-06[#*]	2006-07[^]	2007-08[*^]	2008-09[*#]
Barbados	-	-	-	-	43	61↓	68↓
Chile	35	41 ↓	53 ↓	50 ↑	55 ↓	65 ↓	32↑
Nicaragua	54	65 ↓	68 ↓	68 ↑	78 ↓	79 ↓	78↑
Colombia	73	80 ↓	88 ↓	97 ↓	101↓	112↓	129↓
Panama	48	69 ↓	74 ↓	86 ↓	68 ↑	80 ↓	70↑
Costa Rica	55	70 ↓	80 ↓	92 ↓	93 ↓	108↓	73↑
Uruguay	37	36 ↑	61 ↓	64 ↓	83 ↓	85 ↓	15↑
El Salvador	70	92 ↓	97 ↓	105↓	123↓	131↓	134↓
Honduras	76	99 ↓	102↓	108↓	120↓	118 ↑	117↓
Jamaica	74	100↓	101↓	116↓	121↓	130↓	130↔
Peru	60	79 ↓	90 ↓	104↓	114↓	114↔	99↓
Dominican Republic	56	43 ↑	63 ↓	98 ↓	99 ↓	110↓	103↑
Mexico	75	89 ↓	93 ↓	115↓	117↓	119↓	127↓
Brazil	63	91 ↓	89 ↑	107↓	112↓	121↓	116↑
Ecuador	78	87 ↓	94 ↓	112↓	111↑	107↑	93↑
Guyana	-	-	-	113	125↓	129↓	111↑
Trinidad & Tobago	57	84 ↓	87 ↓	114↓	118↓	125↓	122↑
Argentina	65	93 ↓	99 ↓	102↓	106↓	106↔	94↑
Guatemala	80	102↓	104↓	117↓	122↓	128↓	132↓
Paraguay	69	95 ↓	86 ↑	109↓	109 ↑	116↓	119↓
Bolivia	53	63 ↓	81 ↓	84 ↓	96 ↓	95 ↑	100↓
Haiti	79	98 ↓	-	-	-	-	-

[*] For 2002-2003 the report contains data on 80 countries; [**] For 2003-2004 the report contains data on 102 countries; [#] For 2004-2005 the report contains data on 104 countries; [#*] For 2005-2006 the report contains data on 117 countries; [^] For 2006-2007 the report contains data on 125 countries; [*^] For 2007-2008 the report contains data on 131 countries; [*#] For 2008-2009 the report contains data on 134 countries.

Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009, World Economic Forum.

1.16   *The informal economy provides fertile ground for illicit activities*. According to Latinobarómetro polls, informal workers and those excluded from the labor market have less confidence than the rest of the population in such institutions as Congress, political parties and the legal system. As a result, informality and exclusion tend to erode the legitimacy of the civil, economic, political and public order. Informality saps respect for the law, producing such manifestations as inequity between those who obey the law and those who do not, unlawful activities such as commercial piracy, illegal sale of auto parts, informal security forces, and even links to organized crime. A high degree of informality can be understood as reflecting institutional gaps or weaknesses, leading to an "authority vacuum" that in some cases will be filled by criminal organizations.

1.17   *Countries of the region face a growing challenge that is becoming ever more complex and far-reaching in its impact: organized crime*. This type of crime, linked primarily to trafficking in drugs, weapons and human beings, mobilizes

vast financial resources (generally associated with money-laundering), makes use of the latest technology, and brings an international dimension to crime that further assaults the rule of law in our societies. Organized crime survives thanks to corruption, which it fosters and feeds. Organized crime also imposes itself by force, which it requires in order to pursue its unlawful activities. In the absence of the State, these illegal groups tend to impose a kind of local "law and order" through the distribution of financial assistance, extortion of "taxes," restrictions on individual mobility; forcible recruitment, and even executions. This process undermines governments' capacity to promote and protect human and civil rights.

B. Perception of crime and violence

1.18 *The perception of crime and violence has become more acute*. Society's concern over insecurity in the region has intensified over the last decade. In 2008, as Figure 6 shows, crime and public safety were considered the most important problem in the region, ahead of economic issues and unemployment.

**Figure 6. Ranking of Areas of Greatest Concern for
Inhabitants of the Region (1995-2008)**

Question: In your opinion, what is the most important problem in the country?

MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS IN LATIN AMERICA

|	
Crime and public safety	240
The economy, economic problems	112
Unemployment	99
Political situation, political problems	47
Inflation and rising prices	35
Health problems	19

Source: Prepared by the authors, based on data from Latinobarómetro, 2008.

1.19 *Crime and violence threaten the fabric of society*. The current high levels of victimization in the region are having an adverse impact on interpersonal trust. The following table shows the percentage of persons who said they were victims of crime from 1995 to 2008. The figure has risen by four percentage points, from 29% to 33% in 2008, peaking in 2001 (at 43%) and again in 2005 (at 41%).

Figure 7. Victims of Crime

Question: Have you or a relative been the victim of an assault, attack or crime in the last 12 months?

Source: IDB, based on data from 2008 LAPOP survey.[12]

1.20   Consequently, levels of interpersonal trust have declined gradually since 1996, from 20 percentage points to 17 in 2003 (Latinobarómetro, 2004). Other data on confidence levels show that only 13% of those who reported having been victims of crime in 2006 said they considered their neighbors "very trustworthy," while 21% thought them "not at all trustworthy." As shown in Figure 2, those low levels of trust have risen slightly since 2004.

Figure 8. Trust Levels of Victims of Crime in the Last 12 Months

Source: Prepared by the authors, based on data from the 2006 LAPOP survey.[13]

1.21   *Low levels of trust in the institutions of justice and the police.* There is a substantial lack of trust in justice and police institutions, which are responsible for providing security. Survey results show that between 20% and 50% of citizens in

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[12]   Results of the 2008 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey. Lucas Higuera, IDB. LAPOP surveys are conducted in 15 countries of the region. For more information, visit http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/.

[13]   LAPOP surveys are conducted in 15 countries of the region. For more information, visit http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/.

the region have no confidence in these institutions (see Figure 9).[14] Disaggregating the data by country, we find some significant variations. For example, between 60% and 80% of people in Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Panama, Guatemala and Mexico do not trust the police forces, while more than 50% of Chileans and Colombians do have confidence in those institutions.[15] Levels of mistrust are greatly affected by the slow pace and inefficiency of the courts, which in many cases results in widespread impunity. For example, studies in Mexico estimate that between 1996 and 2003, 96% of crimes never reached the courts; in Brazil, of some 50,000 murders committed every year, only 8% have been brought to trial, and the figure for Guatemala is only 4%.

Figure 9. Mistrust of Justice and Police Institutions (1996-2008)

Question: How much confidence do you have in the police? How much confidence do you have in the justice system?

Source: Prepared by the authors, based on data from Latinobarómetro 2007 and 2008 LAPOP survey.

1.22   On the other hand, there is only a small difference in the levels of confidence in those institutions between persons who said they had been victims of crime and those who had not. This suggests that, in general, having been a victim of violence does not have a significant effect on the level of trust/mistrust in these institutions, and that consequently the police forces and the justice system do not command much trust among the region's people.

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[14]   By contrast, the percentage of citizens reporting much confidence in these institutions ranges between 8 and 11 for all the years considered.

[15]   Data from the Latinobarómetro survey.

Figure 10. Level of Confidence in Justice and Police Institutions 1996-2005
(Crime Victims and Nonvictims)

Source: Prepared by the authors, based on data from the Latinobarómetro survey.[16]

1.23   Citizens of the region also believe that the police are the most corrupt public institution. Data from various surveys and countries of the region confirm this. The LAPOP survey shows that in both 2004 and 2006 the police were publicly regarded as one of the most corrupt institutions.[17]

Table 4.
Perception of Authorities as Corrupt

	2004	2006
Party leaders	29.73	27.11
Ministers	27.57	28.75
Police officials	26.98	26.29
Presidents	25	16.91
Mayors	22.83	25.48
Judges	20.26	24.11

Source: Prepared by the authors, based on data from the 2004-2008 LAPOP surveys.

1.24   These findings are consistent with other surveys conducted in the region and around the world. For example, the Transparency International Survey also finds the police to be the most corrupt public institution[18] in the great majority of countries in the region.[19]

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[16]   The correlations presented in the graphs are statistically significant.

[17]   Political party leaders and ministers were regarded as more corrupt. The police as an institution stand out in both years.

[18]   In most countries, political parties and the parliament/legislature are regarded as most corrupt. However, as this table shows, the police are regarded as more corrupt than the justice system.

[19]   The rating granted to institutions is 1 if they are considered totally transparent, and 5 if they are totally corrupt. Countries where people consider the police the most corrupt institution are shaded in blue.

Table 5. Level of Corruption in Public Institutions: Police and Justice

	2004		2005		2006		2007	
	Justice	**Police**	**Justice**	**Police**	**Justice**	**Police**	**Justice**	**Police**
Argentina	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.3	3.7	4.2	4.2	4.3
Bolivia	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.7	3.3	4.4	4.2	4.3
Brazil	4.2	4.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chile	-	-	4.1	3.5	3.6	3.4	-	-
Colombia	-	-	3.8	3.8	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.5
Costa Rica	4	4.2	3.6	3.8	-	-	-	-
Dominican Republic	-	-	3.8	4.3	3.1	4.4	3.7	4.3
Ecuador	4.5	4.3	4.6	4.3	-	-	4.1	4.1
Guatemala	4.1	4.2	3.9	4.2	-	-	3.8	4.3
Mexico	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.7	3.7	4.5	-	-
Nicaragua	-	-	4.4	4.3	-	-	-	-
Panama	-	-	4.5	4.4	3.4	4.2	3.9	4.2
Paraguay	-	-	4.6	4.7	3.1	4.6		
Peru	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.4	3.4	4.2	4.2	3.9
Uruguay	3.9	4.2	3.5	3.9	-	-	-	-

Source: Prepared by the authors, based on data from Transparency International.

1.25   These widespread negative perceptions can result in a widespread lack of trust in these institutions, as noted earlier, and can make it more difficult for society and the police to work together to address the problems of crime and violence. This tendency also has an adverse impact on the business climate, and therefore on the country's competitiveness, as firms do not trust the police to protect them from crime and criminals. The following table shows the ranking of countries in the region in terms of the reliability of the police for protecting businesses. As will be seen, business confidence in the police has been declining in most countries, with the exceptions of Chile, Barbados and Nicaragua.[20]

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[20]   However, it is not surprising that firms have more confidence in the police for protecting their business in Nicaragua and Chile. Generally speaking, police forces in both countries are held in relatively high public esteem.

Table 6. Reliability Ranking of the Police Forces for Protecting Businesses

|	2002-03[*]	2003-04[**]	2004-05[#]	2005-06[#*]	2006-07[^]	2007-08[*^]
Barbados	-	-	-	-	28	24 ↑
Chile	17	30 ↓	91 ↓	27 ↑	31 ↓	26 ↑
Nicaragua	54	61 ↓	79 ↓	47 ↑	58 ↓	56 ↑
Colombia	44	45 ↓	75 ↓	52 ↑	53 ↓	69 ↓
Panama	36	49 ↓	77 ↓	49 ↑	44 ↑	74 ↓
Costa Rica	46	62 ↓	54 ↑	64 ↓	65 ↓	79 ↓
Uruguay	35	41 ↓	81 ↓	54 ↓	70 ↓	86 ↓
El Salvador	39	55 ↓	82 ↓	56 ↑	80 ↓	97 ↓
Honduras	63	75 ↓	78 ↓	74 ↑	103 ↓	102 ↑
Jamaica	61	74 ↓	93 ↓	100 ↓	114 ↓	113 ↑
Peru	55	78 ↓	58 ↓	97 ↓	96 ↑	116 ↓
Dominican Republic	56	50 ↑	67 ↓	110 ↓	104 ↑	118 ↓
Mexico	71	82 ↓	55 ↑	102 ↓	105 ↓	119 ↓
Brazil	57	81 ↓	74 ↑	89 ↓	108 ↓	120 ↓
Ecuador	74	90 ↓	52 ↑	101 ↓	111 ↓	121 ↓
Guyana	-	-	-	116	125 ↓	122 ↑
Trinidad & Tobago	48	87 ↓	96 ↓	108 ↓	123 ↓	123 ↓
Argentina	73	94 ↓	32 ↑	86 ↓	109 ↓	125 ↓
Guatemala	76	100 ↓	33 ↑	117 ↓	115 ↑	127 ↓
Paraguay	69	91 ↓	53 ↑	114 ↓	112 ↓	128 ↓
Bolivia	78	83 ↓	50 ↑	106 ↓	121 ↓	129 ↓
Haiti	79	102 ↓	-	-	-	-

[*] For 2002-2003 the report contains data on 80 countries; [**] For 2003-2004 the report contains data on 102 ountries; [#] For 2004-2005 the report contains data on 104 countries; [#*] For 2005-2006 the report contains data on 117 countries; [^] For 2006-2007 the report contains data on 125 countries; [*^] For 2007-2008 the report contains data on 131 countries.

Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008, World Economic Forum.

C. Prison conditions in the region

1.26 *High rates of overcrowding.* Prison overpopulation and overcrowding are problems afflicting the majority of countries in the region. They reflect not only the shortage of prison capacity, but the type of inmates held (in terms of the type of crime). Although some countries have invested in new prison facilities, the prisoner population is rising drastically, and the prison system cannot keep up. The average prison overpopulation rate for Latin America is 60%, while in El Salvador, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru and the Dominican Republic the prisoner volume exceeds prison capacity by more than 80%.

Figure 11. Prison Overpopulation

Source: Prepared by the authors, based on data from the 2008 FLACSO–Chile report.

THE BANK'S ROLE IN THE
CIVIC COEXISTENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY SECTOR

1.1 The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was the first multilateral institution to support countries of the region with projects in the area of violence prevention and citizen security. Over the last 10 years, the Bank has approved investment projects in this area totaling US$227 million, in addition to technical cooperation operations.

Table 1. Programs Approved by the IDB

	UR-0118	CO-0123	JA-0105	CH-0178	NI-0168	GU-0163	GY-0071	HO-0205	PN-L1003	ES-0116	TT-L1003
Year approved	1998	1998	2001	2003	2004	2006	2006	2006	2003	2006	2008
Amount (US $millions)	17.5	57	16	10	7.2	29	19.8	20	22.7	27.9	24.5
Geographic area	2	2	3	3	3	1	2	2	2	3	1
Executing unit	CG	CG/SNG	CG	CG	CG	CG	CG	SNG	CG	CG/SNG	CG
COMPONENTS											
Institutional strengthening											
Information systems	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Facilitating access to justice		X									X
Police reform											
Police/community relations	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X
Improving the education matrix											
Social prevention of violence										X	
Domestic violence	X	X			X	X	X	X		X	
Educational activities	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Recreation and sports activities		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Conflict resolution and parenting		X	X								X
Vocational training		X			X	X		X		X	
Prevention of juvenile violence, young offenders	X			X	X	X			X	X	X
Situational prevention of violence							X				
Work with the media											
Communications strategy		X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Infrastructure	X		X					X	X	X	
Does the loan document call for a baseline?	No	No	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CG: Central government; SNG: Subnational government											
Geographic area: 1 (National); 2 (Province/state) and 3 (Local/municipal)											

1.2 The Bank's programs have provided support in the following areas:

   a. *Institutional strengthening*. Work to enhance citizen security management through the design of interagency and participatory public policies for the sector and the development of integrated information systems on crime and violence.

   b. *Prevention projects*. These are the backbone of Bank operations, focused on addressing the risk factors that influence and encourage violence. Activities include: (i) social prevention, work with target groups, especially vulnerable groups (primary), at-risk groups (secondary) and persons in conflict with the law (tertiary); (ii) social prevention of domestic violence; and (iii) situational prevention.

   c. *Selective control activities*. Support to the civilian police and the prison system, including: (i) administrative restructuring and planning; (ii) recruitment, training and professional development in preventive functions; (iii) design and operation of new information technologies; and (iv) performance evaluation and accountability to civil society.

   d. *Work with the media*. This includes activities related to the development of media campaigns, such as: (i) publicizing local trends identified by the Crime Observatory; and (ii) encouraging citizen participation in preparing local prevention proposals, in order to change public behavior and attitudes toward crime and violence.

Figure 1. IDB Target Areas

Source: Based on information from the IDB Office of Evaluation and Oversight.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND
CIVIC COEXISTENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY INTERVENTIONS

CRITICAL QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1.1   The preparatory work for this document included an analysis of available
        empirical evidence, as the basis for identifying criteria for Bank activities in the
        components relating to policy planning, prevention, and selective activities in
        crime control, criminal and alternative justice and rehabilitation. This annex
        presents a detailed discussion of those criteria.

A.   **Multisector government policies**

1.2   There is growing consensus among specialized think tanks, academics and
        policymakers that the most effective citizen security and public safety policies are
        those that transcend the bounds of specific departments or agencies to become
        policies of the State. This poses several special challenges: (i) legislative and
        penal reforms in themselves are not enough: they must be enforced in order to
        prevent apathy and impunity; (ii) policing and judicial work must be
        supplemented by activities in the social areas; (iii) the independent branches of
        government (executive, legislative and judicial) must be able to reach consensus;
        (iv) there must be incentives for collaboration that include, but transcend, the
        economic and financial considerations; (v) efforts must be ongoing and sustained
        with multiyear agreements that extend beyond the mandate of a particular
        administration. An example of specialized, participatory formulation of
        multisector policies can be found in Chile's National Public Safety Strategy 2008-
        2012, which has six areas of action (institution building; information; prevention,
        control and punishments; rehabilitation and reintegration; social; and attention to
        victims) that encompass initiatives and goals to which each of the sectors
        involved is committed. Chilean experience with "Funds awarded by competition,
        safe neighborhoods and vulnerable neighborhoods," supported by a loan from the
        Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), has been evaluated from several angles
        and has yielded some important lessons.[1] Critical questions to consider:

        • *Is there a legal framework that establishes a national citizen security system,
          with effective division of responsibilities for each of the sectors?*

        • *Are there mechanisms in place for public consultation, institutional consensus
          building and participatory development for establishing national citizen
          security strategies that include mechanisms for monitoring interventions and
          making any needed adjustments?*

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[1]   The IDB has also reviewed and evaluated experiences with funds awarded by competition in Chile and has
      prepared technical notes on the national strategies of Costa Rica, Panama, El Salvador, Dominican
      Republic, Haiti, Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Belize.

- *Beyond the public safety ministry or department responsible for the police, are there other high-level officials responsible for implementing programs for the social prevention of violence? Is there a designated agency to oversee this collaborative work throughout the system?*

B.   Policies coordinated between the national and local levels

1.3   Crime has taken on a "glocal" character (global+local). The manifestations of violence are closely linked to local conditions, so strategies must allow for a local approach within national and global support frameworks. Such strategies must focus on priority sectors and areas, but not lose sight of national objectives in the civic coexistence and public safety sector. It is essential, then, to coordinate efforts between the different levels of government (international, national, regional, local and neighborhood). This imperative to address the problem of violence "glocally" brings with it—as a necessary but not sufficient condition— the challenge of strengthening municipal governments through technical and financial support, and promoting agreements for joint and coordinated prevention efforts among the relevant public and private institutions. There is a broad range of interventions, administrative and regulatory, that municipal governments can coordinate in order to address the crime phenomenon, including local organized crime, such as: (i) commercial and fiscal controls to prevent the sale of stolen auto parts; (ii) control over illegal gambling; (iii) control over private security agencies; (iv) building codes that include security standards; (v) licensing of entertainment establishments and places where alcohol is sold; (vi) encouragement of safety and security pacts with taxi drivers, shopping centers and bank branches.[2] Examples of national-local coordination programs include the "safe communities" program introduced by the Chilean Ministry of the Interior in cooperation with 57 municipios,[3] and similar efforts under the PRONASCI Security and Citizenship Program in Brazil, the "Limpiemos México" [Let's Clean Up Mexico] program and the Security Assistance Fund in

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[2]   Notable among the studies on civic coexistence and public safety policies is one financed by the Bank, "Elementos marco para la formulación del Programa de Apoyo a la Seguridad y Convivencia: Diagnóstico y teorías de intervención" [Framework for the formulation of the program to support civic coexistence and public safety: Diagnostic assessment and theories of intervention], which presents the civic coexistence and public safety policy framework developed in Bogota during the Mockus-Bromberg administration. The policy was innovative in its local focus and emphasis on comprehensiveness, and served as technical input to the IDB program to support civic coexistence and public safety.

[3]   This program created the Community Citizen Security Council, tasked with designing a specific security policy for the municipio, comprising representatives of the education and health systems, the police and opposition political parties, and chaired by the mayor. Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia A.C. (Insyde), "Más comunidad, más prevención: Lecciones prácticas comparadas" [More community, more prevention: Practical lessons compared]*,* Insyde Working Papers Series 4, 2005.

Mexico, and the Safe Department and Municipios Program in Colombia.[4] Critical questions to consider:

- *Do the municipalities have the constitutional or legislative powers to deal with public safety issues, and in particular to work closely with the police at the local level?*

- *Is there an institution for national/local coordination of security policies? Does it function effectively? Does it result in institutional and economic/financial incentives for local enforcement of citizen security policies?*

- *Is there a general system at the local level for accountability, citizen oversight and fostering transparency? Does it operate in the area of citizen security?*

C.   Information, the key to action

1.4   Successful policies are formulated, implemented and evaluated on the basis of reliable information. This is important for diagnosing civic coexistence and public safety problems and setting priorities for government intervention, as well as for monitoring and evaluating policy outcomes and impacts. International victimization surveys are a standard tool used around the world to gauge subjective perceptions of crime and to determine the extent of "dark figure" crime that does not show up in court and police records. Empirical evidence reveals the importance of participation by civil society and specialized NGOs in following up on such surveys. (For example, in Chile, the Fundación Paz Ciudadana pioneered victimization surveys; in Mexico, CIDE conducts an academic survey; in Argentina, the Crime and Public Policy Laboratory at the Universidad Di Tella conducts systematic surveys). Other highly useful information methodologies are participatory local diagnostic assessments of security using the methodologies proven in the "Safer Cities" Program of UN-Habitat. Also noteworthy are the security observatories that produce standardized, timely and reliable information for decision-making. Other widely recognized examples are Centro de Estudio y Análisis en Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana de la Ciudad de Bogotá [Center for Civic Coexistence and Public Safety Research and Analysis of the City of Bogota] (CEACSC)[5] and Instituto CISALVA of Cali. A particular feature of the

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[4]   Empirical evidence shows that many of these institutional formulas have encountered serious problems of budgetary execution, and it is not always easy to articulate interests and administrative formulas among the different agencies involved. The Safer Cities program in the United Kingdom and the local security contracts in France and Belgium are also examples of innovative formulas to be borne in mind when articulating local and national interventions. Costa, Gino. Consulting study for the IDB, "El financiamiento y administración de programas locales de seguridad." Washington, DF. February 2009.

[5]   Enrique Peñaloza Quintero, Edna Sandoval Castaño, and Fabián González Sarmiento, "Descripción organizacional y procesos del Observatorio de la Violencia y la Delincuencia de Bogotá" [Description of the structure and processes of the Bogota Violence and Crime Observatory], Bogota, October 2003. The report is part of the evaluation of outputs, outcomes and early impacts of the IDB civic coexistence and public safety program.

system for ongoing monitoring of local security management, comprising "Bogotá cómo vamos" (BCV) "Cali cómo vamos" and "Medellín cómo vamos" programs in Colombia, is that it incorporates chambers of commerce, civil society institutions and academia.[6] Lastly, there is the Observatorio Centroamericano sobre Violencia [Central America Violence Observatory] (OCAVI), which has broadened its focus beyond the urban or national domain to the regional scale.[7] Critical questions to consider:

- *Is there a mechanism for consolidation and crossreferencing of information sources on the socially most serious crimes (e.g. among prosecutors, hospitals, forensic science institutes, public defenders, the police and the courts)?*

- *Are there independent sources that can monitor and compare statistics from official sources and that include victimization surveys and measures of social perceptions and fears?*

- *Do the authorities publish regular and transparent information on crime and victimization trends?*

D. The importance of a yardstick for measuring the economic and social cost of violence

1.5 The Bank has also been supporting the region's efforts to obtain timely and reliable statistics for characterizing the scope and manifestations of violence as a first step in designing solutions.[8] The IDB has played a pioneering role among regional multilateral agencies in fostering targeted research for measuring the economic costs of violence. Beginning with the 1999 Epidemiology and Costs report, and the national case studies in Peru, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, El Salvador, Panama and Brazil, work has helped to highlight the relationship between economic development, violence, competitiveness, the investment climate and the financial burden that violence prevention and control places both on government budgets and on the private sector.[9] The Bank has also worked to develop conceptual frameworks for monitoring and evaluating citizen security and public safety programs and policies (such as the model for the evaluation of social interventions in peaceful coexistence, designed by Instituto CISALVA to

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[6] The December 2008 survey on perceptions of violence and victimization for Bogota is available for consultation at http://www.bogotacomovamos.org/datos/AA_32_Encuesta_Seguridad_Camara.pdf

[7] Web site of OCAVI: http://www.ocavi.com/

[8] Mention should be made of the study on beliefs, attitudes and practices concerning violence in Bogota, Cali and Medellín, produced by Edgar Muñoz, María Isabel Gutiérrez, Óscar Adrián Arango, and Rodrigo Guerrero, 2004.

[9] The studies can be consulted at http://www.iadb.org/seguridad/publicaciones.cfm?language=SP#p9, along with the presentations and principal conclusions of the IDB seminar on the costs of violence, held in Washington, D.C. in May 2007.

measure early outcomes from the Unlearning Youth Violence Project in Cali).[10] There is also a growing body of analytical information on public safety policies in the region, prepared by universities and research centers, such as Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales [Latin American School of Social Sciences] (FLACSO) in Chile, which has documented progress with these policies in both thematic and territorial terms,[11] and the journal *Urvio*, published by FLACSO Ecuador,[12] which focuses on public safety issues in Latin America. Empirical evidence also shows that these studies have provided very useful input to the debate on violence from the perspective of economic competitiveness and have helped open dialogue with finance ministries to secure sustainable funding for public safety budgets in the region. Critical questions to consider:

- *Are studies being produced on the direct and indirect economic costs of violence? Is there a mechanism to incorporate those costs into the system of national accounts?*

- *Is there some form of budgeting by results for assessing interventions? Is there a transparent, sustainable and multiyear framework for public safety budgeting that reinforces its strategic nature?*

- *Are interventions subjected to cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit studies to determine their true priority?*

E. The prevention/control combination as a key factor eradicating violence

1.6 One of the main conclusions of The first Inter-American Forum on Violence Prevention and Citizen Security, sponsored by the IDB in Medellín (2005) and attended by representatives of national, subnational and local governments, academics and policymakers, acknowledged the need to move beyond the false debate over the merits of prevention versus control, calling these two dimensions complementary, not antithetical. In fact, as research has shown at the Centro de Estudios en Seguridad y Convivencia [Center for Civic Coexistence and Public Safety Studies] (CESC) at the Universidad de Chile, crime control measures can have a preventive effect if they serve to deter potential offenders.[13] Successful anti-crime strategies with a heavy prevention component, such as those supported by the Bank in Bogota and Cali, have helped forge a consensus that targeting

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[10] Instituto CISALVA, "Modelo para la Evaluación de Intervenciones Sociales en Convivencia, diseñado para medir los impactos temprano del Proyecto de Desaprendizaje de la Violencia Juvenil de Cali" [Model for the evaluation of social interventions in peaceful coexistence, designed to measure the early impacts of the Unlearning Youth Violence Project in Cali].

[11] Lucía Dammert, coordinator, "Reporte del Sector Seguridad de América Latina y el Caribe" [Report on the security sector in Latin America and the Caribbean], FLACSO Chile, 2007: http://www.flacso.cl/flacso/biblos.php?code=2572.

[12] See http://www.revistaurvio.org/principal.php?idtipocontenido=3.

[13] CESC, Boletín +Comunidad +Prevención, issue 1, "Proyecto de Apoyo y Difusión de Programas de Prevención Comunitaria del Delito" [Project to support and disseminate community crime prevention programs], October 2004, http://www.cesc.uchile.cl/pub_periodicas_cp_01.htm.

interventions according to risk factors can actually reduce crime, even in the extreme situations of armed violence and organized crime faced by those two cities. As to the time frame for measuring the outcomes and impacts of preventive policies, another lesson is that some (but not all) measures may take more time to produce results if they demand cultural changes with steep learning curves in family and neighborhood settings. Yet it is also possible to achieve short and medium-term results if policies can successfully coordinate multiple activities for prevention and control, so as to address all links in the value chain of the various manifestations of crime (as demonstrated by the success in reducing car thefts and murders in Buenos Aires between 2003 and 2004).[14] Critical questions to consider:

- *If there are "shock" strategies to control extreme violence in conflict-ridden areas, are social containment measures planned at the same time, and are there productive models offered as alternatives to the informal economy of organized crime?*

- *Do violence prevention programs allow for early victories, so as to gain more time for the reforms that will take longer to mature?*

- *Do the authorities rely on populist punitive measures that involve simply increasing penalties instead of promoting policies for effective law enforcement and reducing impunity indices in the control system?*

F. The effect of "invisible" factors for violence

1.7   Programs that pursue integrated approaches to the phenomenon of violence need to consider its more "privatized" and hidden manifestations, linked to domestic violence, violence against women, and gender-based violence. Policies for preventing domestic violence have been shifting their focus from awareness raising activities to institution building, formulation of specific legislation, intersector prevention plans, and strengthening of special bodies.[15] Yet in general they have not succeeded in reducing domestic violence, because they have been limited to isolated and uncoordinated actions by different institutions. With the Convention of Belém do Pará, Latin America and the Caribbean is the only region in the world to have international legislation for the prevention of violence against women. Yet it has been given very little concrete application, as the respective

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[14] Béliz, Gustavo. "Una nueva generación de reformas en materia de seguridad ciudadana?" [A new generation of citizen security reforms?], IDB, Washington, D.C., 2007

[15] The IDB supported these processes and cooperated in documenting them, e.g. the process of preparing local plans for the prevention and care of domestic violence in San Miguelito and Soná as part of the program to strengthen local government in those districts (Silma Pinilla, "Sistematizando el Proceso para la Elaboración de los Planes Locales de Prevención y Atención de la Violencia Intrafamiliar/Doméstica en los Distritos de San Miguelito y Soná, República De Panamá, 2004-2006" [Documenting the process of preparing local plans for the prevention and care of domestic/family violence in the Districts of San Miguelito and Soná, Republic of Panama], Panama, 2004).

monitoring mechanisms have demonstrated.[16] Consequently, there is a need to design and implement coordinated prevention policies of broader and more coherent scope that do not focus solely on awareness raising and training but address all the structural factors associated with this type of violence, such as labor instability, poverty, lack of social support networks, and drug use. Such prevention policies must also stress gender equality, which will have to be mainstreamed in all sectors and given particular attention at the community level in order to change attitudes. In any event, the policies adopted must not downplay the important role played by subnational levels of government, particularly the municipalities.[17] The guidelines and technical notes produced by the IDB between 2001 and 2002 were innovative in their recognition that domestic violence mirrors social violence, and that this justifies the addition of a domestic violence component to loan operations. Critical questions to consider:

- *Are crime statistics sufficiently disaggregated to yield data on domestic violence and violence against women?*

- *Are there effective mechanisms to train police, justice, education and health personnel in dealing with the issue?*

- *Is there a legislative framework for addressing the phenomenon, with clear provisions to ensure enforcement, not merely lip service?*

G. Youth as victims and perpetrators of crime

1.8 Young males between 15 and 24 years are statistically the most violence-prone population group, but also the most likely to be victims of violence. It is not surprising, then, that social and government responses place stress both on punishing young males (through tougher criminal penalties) and on seeking ways to protect them from crime and to anticipate the underlying risk factors.[18] The literature reveals little to date in the way of a global vision of the problem of youth violence, and suggests that it has been addressed piecemeal as a series of specific problems such as drug use, gangs, and school violence. Available

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[16] Shaw, Margaret. "La violencia contra la mujer y sus implicancias actuales" [Violence against women and its current implications]. Consultant study commissioned by the IDB, February 2009.

[17] Valérie Sagant (coordinator), Kathryn Travers, Sophie Ballu, Farida Danmeri, Carlos Guajardo García, Manar Idriss, Jessica Kramer and Michelle Virgin. "La seguridad de la mujer: una preocupación compartida a través del mundo" [Women's safety: A concern shared around the world], International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC), Canada, 2008, http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/publications/pub_207_1.pdf. On the occasion of its Eighth Annual Colloquium on Crime Prevention (2008) the ICPC published a compendium of practices and policies relating to women's safety, highlighting in particular those of the municipality of San Miguel de Tucumán, Argentina; the Grupo de Autoayuda de Mujeres in Maipú, Chile; Solidaridad, Mexico; the UNIFEM "Safe Cities" programs in Rosario (Argentina), Recife (Brazil), Santiago (Chile), and Bogota (Colombia). It also cites the role of the NGO "Coalition against Domestic Violence," and the Women's Institute for Alternative Development in Trinidad & Tobago, as well as national programs on violence against women in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela.

[18] Various authors, *International report on crime prevention and community safety: Trends and perspectives,* International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC), Canada, 2008.

information on the issue is fragmented, and there is now a need for comprehensive diagnostic assessments of the conditions facing young people, especially at the local level since manifestations of violence have local roots. However, empirical research into the causes of youth violence and the way the various associated risk factors are treated makes it possible to assess the effectiveness of the prevention models and strategies implemented, and to show that there have been two broad approaches to prevention: one focused on risk factors and how to address them, and the other on the teenager's development and his strengths.[19] Some promising examples of youth violence prevention programs are: (i) those sponsored by the Instituto Distrital para la Protección de la Niñez y la Juventud (IDIPRON) of Bogota, for the rehabilitation of youth gang members; (ii) the Polígono San Juan Bosco in El Salvador, under which socially at-risk youth and young offenders can complete their studies while learning a trade and acquiring an entrepreneurial outlook;[20] (iii) the "Hope for Kids" project conducted in two disadvantaged neighborhoods in Brazil;[21] (iv) the youth orchestras of Venezuela, supported by the IDB;[22] (v) the sports academies, music bands, and citizen guides programs for low-income youth in Medellín;[23] (vi) the "Afro-reggae cultural group" programs that sponsor workshops of various kinds (percussion, theater, *capoeira*, circus and IT) in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and have been documented by the Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania [Center for Security and Citizenship Studies] (CESEC) of Universidade Cândido Mendes in Brazil.[24] Critical questions to consider:

- *What is the school attendance rate among young males at the primary and secondary levels? What is the unemployment rate among young people legally able to work?*

- *Are youth gangs associated with organized crime? Are there diagnostic studies that shed systematic and scientific light on the phenomenon?*

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[19] The Bank has produced a series of studies on the youth issue, available on its website, addressing such topics as youth gangs (http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=824851), international strategies against youth violence (http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=821501), and recommendations for dealing with it (http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=826065).

[20] http://www.ilo.org/public/spanish/region/ampro/cinterfor/temas/youth/exp/observa/e_salv/donbosco.htm.

[21] Valérie Sagant (coordinator), "International Compendium of Crime Prevention Practices," International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC), Canada, 2008.

[22] It is estimated that more than 2 million youngsters have played in these orchestras since they were founded, Evaluations show encouraging results, in terms of improving the psychosocial and behavioral profile of young people and their academic performance. Program to Support the Centro de Acción Social por la Música, Phase II, project concept document, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=903934.

[23] The evaluation of the bands program showed comparatively better results than the sports schools program, in terms of fostering nonviolent conduct among its participants.

[24] Silvia Ramos, "Brazilian responses to violence and new forms of mediation: The case of the Grupo Cultural AfroReggae and the experience of the project 'Youth and the Police,'" CESEC, Brazil, 2006, http://www.scielo.br/pdf/csc/v11n2/30429.pdf.

- *Is there a special, legally valid system of juvenile criminal justice that respects international law and treats minors as individuals with full rights?*

H.   The schools as a setting for violence and a platform for solutions[25]

1.9   While there has been growing concern in the region over outbreaks of violence in the schools ("bullying" and criminal violence), there are no consistent data to gauge the magnitude of the phenomenon at the regional level.[26] Violence in the schools must be prevented, not only because it impedes learning and injures its victims physically and psychologically, but also because empirical evidence shows that youngsters who engage in violence run a greater risk of going on to a problem-filled life.[27] Generally speaking, policies on this issue in the region are not well focused on specific interventions, planning and effective evaluation and monitoring systems.[28] Their main focus has been on primary prevention, together with some secondary prevention efforts. The literature shows that policies for preventing school violence (as noted in the case of civic coexistence and public safety policies) need to coordinate measures in three different spheres: national (for a common conceptual and strategic framework); local (to localize interventions as far as possible with the assistance of municipal governments) and sector (to supplement assistance with multiple social programs). Examples of promising practices in the region include: (i) the "Paz nas escolas" [Peace in the schools] program in Brazil, involving 90,000 pupils at 3,618 schools, where the school becomes a place for the entire community to help build solidarity; (ii) the "Habilidades para la vida" [Skills for life] program in Colombia, sponsored by the Fundación Paz y Alegría, which was evaluated by the World Bank and the Pan American Health Organization as part of a regional study on school health and nutrition in Latin America, finding positive changes in pupils' behavior, with an impact on their families and improved management of disputes; (iii) the "Convivir en la escuela" [Getting along at school] program of the Fundación Convivir of Argentina (which PAHO has designated a Regional Center of

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[25]   Definition coined in the document on preventing school violence ("Sistematización de buenas prácticas y lecciones aprendidas en prevención de la violencia escolar. Formación de la política de seguridad ciudadana" [Documentation of good practices and lessons learned in school violence prevention. Formulation of citizen security policy]), authored for the IDB by Jorge Varela. Washington, D.C., February 2009.

[26]   Catalina Mertz, "La Prevención de la Violencia en las Escuelas" [Prevention of violence in schools], Fundación Paz Ciudadana, Chile. 2006, http://www.pazciudadana.cl/upload/areas_info_educa/PAZ-EDUCA_20071001165618.pdf. Cecilia Tijmes and Jorge Varela, "Convivencia Escolar: Recopilación de Experiencias Nacionales" [Getting along at school: Compilation of national experiences], PazEduca program, Fundación Paz Ciudadana, Chile 2007, http://www.pazciudadana.cl/upload/areas_info_educa/PAZ-EDUCA_20071001155751.pdf.

[27]   The Fact Sheet of the U.S. Alliance for Excellent Education (2003) states, for example, that: (i) youngsters who drop out of middle school are 3.5 times more likely to be arrested during their lifetime; (ii) 47% of those involved in drug crimes did not complete high school. Cited in interview with José Joaquín Brunner, Director, Fundación Paz Ciudadana, and Director of the Education Program of Fundación Chile, at http://www.pazciudadana.cl/upload/areas_info_educa/PAZ-EDUCA_20080220145324.pdf.

[28]   Krauskopf, D. "Estado del arte de los programas de prevención de la violencia en ámbitos escolares" [State of the art in school violence prevention programs]. PAHO and GTZ Costa Rica, (2006).

Excellence for its strategies to promote health and life skills in the schools), which promotes thinking about rights, self-esteem, drugs, alcohol, healthy habits and social skills.[29] Critical questions to consider:

- *Is there a comprehensive national policy that promotes intervention as a continuum that extends from the classroom to the community outside the school and to the neighborhood?*

- *In addition to the students, are the private sector and other agents encouraged to participate in school and community life? Are universal prevention initiatives pursued as a supplement to those targeting the most vulnerable groups?*

- *Is there real leadership and a coordination team in charge, good planning (diagnosis and evaluation), allocation of time and resources, training for teachers, and long-term planning?*

I. Opportunities and conditions for citizen participation in prevention policies

1.10   Experience shows that citizens can become involved in the issue of violence and crime through two contrasting channels. The first is characterized by people taking justice into their own hands, vigilantism, appeals to discrimination, and the formation of informal economic networks linked to organized crime, constituting a kind of perverse social capital. This is the community reaction that tends to occupy the vacuum left by government inaction or the complicity of the authorities.[30] The other channel, of growing and varying importance in the region, finds expression through neighborhood forums, assemblies, civic committees, community alert mechanisms, neighborhood associations devoted to situational prevention, virtual spaces that appeal to prevention through the use of new technologies and diversified solidarity networks that embody a growing citizen proactivism, and often produce virtuous social capital. Experience with such expressions, however, points to the need for clear and effective channels of institutionalization and feedback with the authorities, who by definition have a monopoly on the use of force in a democratic society. To the extent that there are no institutionalized channels, participation is wasted and people revert to apathy and cynicism in the absence of tangible results. Success stories of community participation include: (i) the "São Paulo em paz" [São Paulo at peace] plan to prevent violence and promote peaceful coexistence through working groups

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[29]   See http://www.convivir.org.ar/system/contenido.php?id_cat=165.

[30]   The evaluation of the bodies responsible for designing and implementing the "Barrios vulnerables" [Vulnerable neighborhoods] program in Chile provides convincing evidence of various associated phenomena, such as the influence of drug use on the perception of fear in the neighborhood, the effect of crime shifting to neighboring areas, the need to coordinate prevention efforts with shock policies in order to reclaim the territory controlled by drug traffickers, and the importance of replacing the informal economy associated with drug trafficking with an alternative productive paradigm.

constituted by community members and representatives of the authorities;[31] (ii) the "Fico vivo" [I'm still alive] program in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, intended to halt the dizzying rise in murders in the city, using community forums, mass awareness campaigns, and other methods.[32] Critical questions to consider:

- *Do national, subnational or municipal laws provide for the institutionalization of specific mechanisms for citizen participation in the security area, without politicization or partisan co-opting?*

- *Are there mechanisms that guarantee public access to the most important statistical information generated by the public safety system?*

- *Is there some kind of citizen participation in areas most susceptible to administrative corruption? Does it guarantee confidentiality for filing complaints and for monitoring actions?*

J.   Situational prevention and inclusion of a preventive focus in urban planning

1.11   Situational prevention seeks to reduce "crimes of opportunity" by including elements in urban planning that will heighten the offender's risk of arrest and diminish citizens' sense of insecurity. This preventive methodology has been used to varying degrees in several countries of the region, such as Chile, Brazil, Honduras, El Salvador and Colombia. Perhaps the most striking example is to be found in Medellín, with construction of the Metrocable and the community design of public spaces. Situational interventions must have a community focus that activates social oversight mechanisms and creates networks to strengthen the social fabric. Community infrastructure maintenance activities can also be used to reduce crime,[33] recognizing that settings that are poorly maintained, vandalized and unaesthetic are conducive to violent behavior.[34] Noteworthy among situational prevention initiatives are those involving the introduction of new

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[31] Valérie Sagant, coordinator, "International Compendium of Crime Prevention Practices," International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC), Canada, 2008.

[32] This program has shown its effectiveness in reversing the rising murder rate in the target area, and has been cost-effective: the program is 10 times cheaper than a simple repression program. Cited by various authors, Second report of the international seminar, "Intercambio de Experiencias Latinoamericanas de Prevención Comunitaria del Delito" [Exchange of Latin American Experiences in Community-based Crime Prevention], Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia A.C. (Insyde), Insyde Working Papers Series 8, Mexico City, 2005, http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/8_SCT-_SEMINARIO_2_listo_.pdf.

[33] Nathalie Alvarado and Beatriz Abizanda, "El aporte del enfoque de seguridad y convivencia ciudadana en los programas de mejoramiento de barrios" [The contribution of the civic coexistence and public safety approach to neighborhood improvement programs], in Eduardo Rojas, editor, "Integración urbana: Desafíos y lecciones de los programas de mejoramiento de barrios en América latina" [Urban integration: Challenges and lessons of neighborhood improvement programs in Latin America] IDB, Washington, D.C., 2009.

[34] The Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) corporation has a Latin American chapter (www.ctped.cl) with information on academic work and applied research (http://www.cpted.cl/publicacion/79519ccde8bb8863b062a3334e991d1f.pdf). PAHO has a sustainable development and environmental health library (http://www.bvsde.paho.org/sde/ops-sde/bvsde.shtml) with information and documentation on situational prevention experiments.

management technologies such as closed-circuit TV cameras in public and private places and georeferencing and identification systems, the use of which must be properly regulated to avoid the invasion of privacy and a too-broad concept of public space. The spread of gated communities and big shopping centers and even systems for certifying cities, personal property and safe areas by the police and academics, also pose urban planning and social challenges of the first order. Critical questions to consider:

- *Do urban plans and building codes encourage the adoption and enforcement of rules that enhance civic coexistence and public safety?*

- *Is there a police administrative board that inspects and enforces those rules using suitable criteria of transparency and citizen oversight?*

- *Do the authorities responsible for infrastructure and essential public services serve on the councils that analyze and implement citizen security policies?*

K. Reforms and innovations in criminal justice and the prison system

1.12   In criminal justice reform, the tendency over the last decade has been to move away from inquisitorial systems of prosecution toward adversarial systems, as a way of making the system more effective from the viewpoint of both the prosecution and the defense.[35] One area where progress has been made is restorative justice, which applies measures other than imprisonment so as to enhance the prospects of rehabilitation for offenders, and to alleviate backlogs in the courts and overcrowding in prisons.[36] The literature shows that this model helps to bring justice closer to the community, offering nimble and participatory methods for settling disputes. One of the keys to its success is to enforce the duty of reparations to victims, as a means of creating a climate of greater trust and security.[37] In addition, a comparative analysis of experience suggests a number of

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[35]   The Bank has been involved in institutional strengthening of the public prosecution function. It has also supported efforts to strengthen the public defender function as a component of justice modernization programs in the region.

[36]   In light of debate over the usefulness of imprisonment in reducing crime: applied research in the United States, conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice, shows that there is a relationship between higher incarceration rates and lower crime rates. However, the impact of prison sentences on crime is less than that of other factors, such as fewer young persons in the population, smaller urban populations, lower unemployment rates, and more high school graduates. (Don Stemen, "Reconsidering incarceration: New directions for reducing crime," Vera Institute of Justice, January 2007, http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/379_727.pdf).

[37]   Evaluations of alternative justice methods in England show that they can improve trust and credibility in the justice system; more than 90% of accused persons and victims recommend restorative justice above conventional approaches to criminal justice. See Michael Ledwidge, "Acciones para la confianza y la rendición de cuentas de la policía, e Introducción a la justicia restaurativa" [Police confidence-building and accountability actions, and Introduction to restorative justice] in Insyde Working Papers Series 1, Mexico, 2004. Recent experience in the United Kingdom is reviewed in Rob Allen and Vivien Stern, "Justice reinvestment: A new approach to crime and justice," International Centre for Prison Studies, United Kingdom, 2007, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/justice-reinvestment-2007.pdf.

items for the present policy agenda, including: placing the prison system under civilian leadership and demilitarizing it, strengthening budgets, fostering a professional prison guard service, and making prison policy multidimensional by including physical and mental health, education and vocational training aspects, among others. Among the innovative efforts undertaken in the region the following may be noted: (i) the design and implementation of a new prison model in the Dominican Republic, with a focus on human rights;[38] (ii) the program for concessioning prison infrastructure in Chile,[39] using a mixed model;[40] (iii) occupational opportunities in prison (the seafood filleting plant in Mar del Plata, the beehive factory in the prison at Rancagua); (iv) the introduction of therapeutic communities (Quito prison) and treatment of mental illnesses (equine therapy in Queretaro) and special facilities for juveniles (Quito);[41] (v) the Law on Humanization of the Prison System of Uruguay (Law 17897 of 2005), which among other things established a supervised parole system, with the result that recidivism among parolees has been 30% below the national average (15% versus 55%).[42] Critical questions to consider:

- *How many inmates in the prison system have not been convicted?*

- *Are there mechanisms to oversee prison administration, involving civil society and specialized national and international organizations? Are there special academies for training prison staff, where the subject matter goes beyond just guard duties and security?*

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[38] Andreu Estela Barnet ¨Visión del nuevo modelo penitenciario dominicano: Retos y perspectivas¨ [Overview of the Dominican Republic's new penitentiary model: Challenges and outlook]. Lecture given at the close of the justice component of the Program to Support Reform and Modernization of the State (PARME), Office of the Attorney General of the Dominican Republic. July 2007.

[39] In this model the government is responsible for surveillance and security of installations and for supervising and overseeing the concessionaire's performance. The private firm designs, builds and maintains the facilities and supplies internal services (laundry, food, prison store) and services relating to the social reintegration of inmates (education, vocational training, social and medical care, care for the children of female inmates, etc.)

[40] Experience since 2008 shows that concessioned prisons offer better living conditions for inmates, but that their operating costs are higher. It has not been possible to measure their effectiveness in terms of preparing inmates for social reintegration and preventing recidivism. See Lucía Dammert, "El sistema penitenciario en Chile: Desafíos para el nuevo modelo público-privado" [The penitentiary system in Chile: Challenges for the new public-private model]. FLACSO Chile, Paper to be delivered at the 2006 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, available at http://www.calcutauc.cl/wpcontent/uploads/2007/04/Carceles%20subencionadas%20(L.%20Dammert).pdf.

[41] Rob Allen, of the International Center for Prison Studies at King's College, London. Special presentation given at the IDB Clínica Intensiva de Capacitación [Intensive Training Clinic], Santiago, Chile, November 2008.

[42] María Noel Rodríguez, "Hacia una reinterpretación de la reinserción social en el contexto de los derechos humanos: la experiencia uruguaya" [Reinterpreting social rehabilitation in the context of human rights: The experience of Uruguay], Centro de Estudios en Seguridad y Convivencia [Center for Civic Coexistence and Public Safety Studies] (CESC), *Debates penitenciarios*, issue 5, Chile, 2007, http://www.cesc.uchile.cl/publicaciones/debates_penitenciarios_05.pdf.

- *Is there an integral and carefully worked out criminal policy that, among other things, addresses and analyzes the variables of prison infrastructure, tracks the recidivism rate, assesses the impact of penal reforms, and analyzes the best alternatives for treating inmates?*

L. Progress in police reform and building public trust

1.13 One of the best measures of success for any police force is its ability to garner the trust and support of the citizenry. Recognizing this, some reforms have attempted to bring policing closer to the community. Community policing programs are a key component of this effort, and several have been studied and evaluated: e.g. Bogota (Colombia), Villa Nueva (Guatemala), São Paulo and Belo Horizonte (Brazil) and the nationwide "Plan cuadrante" [Quadrant plan] in Chile.[43] Evaluations of programs of this kind have found that they build public confidence and trust in the police, although there are no conclusive data about their effectiveness in reducing crime and violence. Some significant reforms to enhance transparency: (i) in Brazil, the police auditor (*ouvidor*) for the State of São Paulo serves as a citizens' ombudsman; (ii) El Salvador has created the office of the Inspector General of the national civilian police;[44] (iii) in Peru, police reform has strengthened internal and external oversight bodies and enhanced transparency (for example by including an NGO in the oversight arrangements for police procurement). These reforms have shown that, to be successful, there must be strong leadership at the highest level, backed by support within the ranks.[45] Critical questions to consider:

- *Is there an independent mechanism to oversee police conduct? Does it have investigative powers and effective means?*

- *Are there independent disciplinary tribunals for dealing with cases investigated by the internal affairs units? Is there coordination between the two areas?*

- *What is the degree of administrative transparency in the areas of human resources and pay, licenses, promotion and advancement, personal wealth declarations, documentation and follow-up on cases of human rights violations and inappropriate use of force?*

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[43] Hugo Frühling, "Calles más seguras: Estudios de policía comunitaria en América Latina" [Safer streets: Studies of community policing in Latin America], summarizing experience in São Paulo and Belo Horizonte (Brazil), Bogota (Colombia) and Villa Nueva (Guatemala). IDB, Washington, D.C., 2004.

[44] Antia Mendoza, "Supervisión de la policía por sociedad civil ¿Transición hacia la reforma policial democrática?" [Civil society oversight of police: Toward democratic reform of the police?]. Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia, A.C. (Insyde), Insyde in Civil Society Series 16, Mexico City, June 2008.

[45] Gino Costa, "Transparencia, rendición de cuentas y control en las reformas de las policías de Nueva York, Perú y México" [Transparency, accountability and control in reforms of the police forces of New York, Peru and Mexico], presented at the IDB Training Session on Civic Coexistence and Public Safety, November 2008.