Emphasizing Prevention in Citizen Security

The Inter-American Development Bank’s Contribution to Reducing Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean

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The Inter-American Development Bank incorporated, nearly a decade ago, violence prevention in its lending portfolio. Since the first citizen security project loan was approved, the IDB has accumulated valuable experience on the design and implementation of violence prevention operations, placing the Bank at the forefront of this type of lending in the region. To date, the IDB has financed more than US$ 150 million for six citizen security loans, technical cooperation, and international seminars and meetings. In addition, several other citizen security projects are in advanced stages of design.

This report overviews the Bank’s work in this area, analyzing, based on available data from completed projects, what works and the challenges that remain in reducing and preventing crime and violence. For example, Colombia (Bogotá) and Uruguay have completed their operations with success in the areas of community policing, institutional strengthening, community mediation units, domestic and youth violence prevention, and social awareness campaigns. This report also presents recommendations to maximize benefits and increase the effectiveness of the interventions in future project loans.

Despite the accomplishments in this area, it is important to emphasize that crime and violence prevention is not a “one shot deal” but a process that ought to be sustained over time and governments in the region must fully commit to combat it.

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Chief
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Introduction

In less than a decade, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has developed a sizable lending portfolio in violence prevention (that currently totals US$130 million in loans to member governments, plus several operations in the pipeline) and a significant record of research, international seminars, meetings, and technical assistance. This paper reviews the IDB’s work in this area, analyzes what seems to have worked and the challenges that remain, and draws lessons for future lending. It is based on research and project reports, internal monitoring and evaluation systems, ex-post evaluation and interviews with Bank staff working in both Headquarters and the Country Offices on different aspects of these operations. It is a work in progress since only two loans—one to Uruguay and the other to the city of Bogotá1—have been fully executed and there is only preliminary evaluation data for lending to the cities of Cali and Medellín. Conclusions are, therefore, only tentative.

It is important to underscore that this analysis is being carried out because the above operations have opened a new lending line in the IDB portfolio; however, these loans do not capture all that the institution is doing to reduce violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. The IDB has pioneered lending in modernization and administration of justice including activities in criminal justice that relate directly to controlling crime and violence and reducing incentives for criminal acts. In addition, it has a long tradition of lending in the social sectors, including investments in early childhood development, youth and employment—key elements in the social prevention of violence. The IDB also has a long tradition in infrastructure lending, some of which (such as, for instance, investment in transport systems) can contribute to the situational prevention of crime. Unlike these operations, the ones reviewed in this report have as their defined objective the prevention of violence and crime and, therefore, respond to an expressed need of governments for specific, stand-alone loans. A corollary is that the Bank will likely never know the full impact of its lending in violence reduction since at least a portion of it has unrecognized (and unmeasured) violence reduction impacts.

The above discussion has pointed to a characteristic feature of violence prevention: because of its many causes it has multiple solutions. This feature has, to a large extent, shaped the nature of the Bank’s stand-alone violence prevention operations. By adopting an epidemiological approach to violence prevention, the IDB typically identifies the dominant risk factors associated with violent activity and then attempts to minimize them through specific interventions. As such, a variety of actors, which often do not have a tradition of working together (for example, law enforcement officers and social service providers), are needed to execute these projects. The other defining element of the IDB’s work in this area, as is described later, is the focus on the prevention of violence rather than on crime or solely violent crime. This stems from the recognition that the fight against violence needs to include criminal as well as noncriminal (culturally accepted) forms of violence, and that the solutions go well beyond those related to the courts and the police.

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1 The citizen security project in Colombia was divided in four different loans. The Bank financed a loan at the national level, and three other loans at the local levels in the municipalities of Bogotá (US$10 million), Cali (US$15 million) and Medellín (US$12 million). The Bogotá loan was fully disbursed and impact evaluation data are available. In the cases of Cali and Medellín, evaluations are currently underway.
Overview

The world has become a more violent place since the mid-1980s. In the mid-1990s (the latest comparative figures available), only Africa registered higher homicide rates than Latin America and the Caribbean. The region recorded an average of 16.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (based on 17 countries), while Africa recorded an average of 22.2. The world average is of 8.8 (Krug EG et al., 2002). These high average homicide rates mask substantial variability between countries, between cities and even between neighborhoods. For instance, in 1995 some cities had staggering homicide rates (Cali, for example, had 112 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), while other cities had very low rates (Santiago had 2.2 homicides per 100,000) (Buvinic and Morrison, 2000). Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, average homicide rates in the region rose by more than 80 percent, which means that most countries have become aware that they have a “violence problem,” regardless of the above-cited differences between countries in their initial violence levels (Buvinic and Morrison, 2000). Violence appears regularly ranked as the fourth or fifth main citizen concern in opinion polls (see table 1), and governments throughout the region are investing in policies and programs specifically designed to combat it.

Table 1. Ranking of Citizen Concerns in Latin American and the Caribbean, 2000-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>21.28</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.42</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.37</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>21.18</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.78</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.73</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.39</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.37</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.45</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime and Violence</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.34</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.74</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.92</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Salaries</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors calculations based on data from the Latinobarometer.

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2 However, the region falls below the world average when all intentional injuries, which include homicides, suicides and war-related injuries, are taken into account.
In Latin America and the Caribbean (as in other world regions) there is parallel growing awareness of the problem of domestic or family violence, partly because of forceful lobbying by the women’s movement and partly because of published research results on the magnitude and characteristics of this type of violence. While prevalence data for family violence is much weaker than for homicides and is prone to significant underreporting, victimization surveys indicate comparatively high average rates of violence against women, again with significant variability between countries. Recent evidence from 15 countries shows that between 7 and 69 percent of adult women have been at some point physically abused by their intimate partner (see table 2). Typically, between 20 and 30 percent of adult women with partners report having been physically abused at some point in the relationship, and when sexual and psychological abuse are added, this figure can grow to more than half of all women with partners (Morrison and Biehl, 1999).

Table 2. Male Partner Violence Against Women. Population-based Studies from Latin America and the Caribbean, 1993-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of Study</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>% of women Physically assaulted by a partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Study **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barbados</strong></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Sao Paulo</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Pernambuco</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>6097</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>7602</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>6807</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>10689</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>6595</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>6827</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>2347</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Guadalajara</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monterrey</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Leon</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Managua</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>8507</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>5940</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>17369</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Cusco</td>
<td>1497</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>4755</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>22-55</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Study population: I = all women; II = currently married/partnered women; III = ever-married/partnered women; IV = women who had a partner within the last 12 months
a. Sample group included women who had never been in a relationship and therefore were not in exposed group
b. Physical or sexual assault.

c. During current relationship
Source: Ellsberg, Heise et al. Forthcoming.

3 For more information, please visit the website: http://www.iadb.org/sds/SOC/site_471_e.htm
There is even less evidence on the prevalence of family violence against children and the elderly. While there is no known research on the elderly, recent studies suggest that child abuse is pervasive. For instance, a population-based national survey of Chilean students in grades 8 through 11 showed that 60 percent reported suffering some form of physical abuse and 36 percent reported suffering severe abuse (Larrain et al., 1997). A recent analysis of survey data reported child abuse in 23 percent of families in urban Colombia (in 1993) and in 13 percent of the households in Mexico City (in 1999). This means that 30 percent of the children and 20 percent of the youth in Colombia, and 18 percent of the children and youth in Mexico City have said that they suffered abuse. In both countries having been abused as a child increased the probability of living in a violent family as an adult (Knaul and Ramírez, 2005).

Violence is mostly a learned behavior and the intergenerational transmission of violence through abusive family situations helps explain the persistence of violence in all societies, but does not explain the rapid growth of this problem in Latin America and the Caribbean. There is no single cogent, empirically supported explanation of why Latin America and the Caribbean is the second most violent world region and why violence has increased so sharply in the last decades. The most compelling data at the macro or societal level links the high levels of violence in the region, first, with the demographic transition that has boosted the segment of the population that is most prone to aggression (youths). Second, there is a significant relationship between violence and the region’s historically high and still growing income inequality. While there is no data to prove it, it is likely that the social exclusion of groups by ethnicity and/or race, which is closely linked to inequality, has also fueled violence in a number of countries where they constitute a sizable marginalized percentage of the population. Third, another likely determinant is the rapidly growing trade in weapons and drugs, linked to globalization and organized crime as well as to the civil conflicts of the 1980s. Finally, there is evidence that inertia is at play at the societal level, and that violence begets more violence (Buvinic and Morrison, 2000; Fajnzylber et al., 1998).

In addition to these macro variables, a variety of institutional, community, household and individual variables help explain the region’s comparatively high levels of violence (but not the sharp rise of the last decades). Risk factors include, notably, the institutional weaknesses of the judiciary, the penal system and the police, including serious problems with law enforcement and corruption; situational triggers to crime and violence in poor urban slums with deteriorated urban infrastructure; an authoritarian culture that grants authority to men in the family and condones violence against women and children; high youth unemployment rates; and a tradition of heavy drinking among males. Poverty has not been directly linked to the rise in violence, but it can aggravate the consequences of violence since the poor tend to lack the resources needed to minimize the impact of violence on individuals and families.

The pervasiveness of violence both inside and outside the family, or what we call domestic and social violence, poses a major obstacle to economic and social development as it hinders growth, exacerbates poverty, generates a climate of fear among citizens and presents difficult challenges for democratic governance and peaceful coexistence in the region.
The IDB was the first development bank to respond to problems related to violence in its borrowing member countries by providing loans for citizen security. For a bank with a tradition of financing economic and social infrastructure, underwriting work whose aim is to curb violence required bold leadership, sound justification and guidance in lending.

After listening to the concerns of the region’s citizens and convinced of the intrinsic importance of reducing violence, President Enrique V. Iglesias launched the Bank’s work in violence in 1996 with a gathering to stimulate reflections on ethics, violence and citizen security.

The basic justification for Bank lending in this area was found in research that documented the economic importance of reducing violence by calculating the economic costs of different types of violence. Thus was met the economic justification test required by the Bank’s Charter. This gave a distinctive instrumental feature to the Bank’s policy approach to violence reduction: the Bank lends for violence reduction operations because violence hinders economic and social progress.

Perhaps one of the most lasting Bank contributions is that it both funded violence reduction operations and carried out pioneering research to quantify violence’s economic costs. One way to classify and measure these costs is to group them into direct costs, nonmonetary costs, and economic and social multiplier effects (Buvinic et al., 1999). Direct costs measure the value of resources spent on goods and services to prevent violence and attend to its victims. It also includes expenditures for public security and criminal justice system to apprehend and/or prosecute the perpetrators of violence (see table 3).

### Table 3. Some Costs of Violence in Latin America, in Percentage of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct Costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Losses</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Losses</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect Costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment and Productivity</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor and Consumption</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transfers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Londoño and Guerrero, 1999.
Indirect costs measure the nonmonetary effects on victims of violence, such as increases in morbidity and mortality due to homicide and suicide, alcohol and drug abuse, and depression. A way to measure the nonmonetary effects of violence is by using the disability-adjusted life year (DALY) measure, which quantifies the years of healthy life lost to violence-related mortality and morbidity. In Latin America and the Caribbean, violence ranks as the most important cause of DALYs lost for men aged 15 to 44, and the fifth most important cause of DALYs lost for all men. Latin American and Caribbean men lose more DALYs to violence and alcoholism than men in any other region of the world (Medici, 2005).

Economic multiplier effects measure the impact that crime and violence have on the overall economy, such as the decreased accumulation of human capital, higher school dropout rates, lower labor market participation rates, lower productivity, higher rates of absenteeism, lower income and, in turn, lower savings and investment. Another effect is the intergenerational impact on the economic future of children that are victims or have witnessed violence in the home, since these children are more likely to show behavioral problems in school, repeat grades and drop out. Finally, the social multiplier includes the intergenerational transmission of violence, erosion of social capital, reduction in the quality of life, and decline in participation in democratic processes. While the empirical evidence to document these social multiplier effects may be most difficult to gather, their impact on development may be the most serious and most lasting.

Cost studies carried out by the IDB have made a persuasive case for the economic benefits of investments in reducing violence. They show that, overall, violence can cost countries anywhere between 5 and 25 percent or more of annual GDP, and that specific forms of violence, such as family violence against women, can cost countries up to 2 percent of GDP (Londoño et al., 2000; Morrison and Orlando, 1999). These numbers are especially telling in a region where average per capita GDP growth in the last decade was either negative or stagnant.

A second distinctive feature of the Bank’s policy approach to violence reduction is that it mainstreamed the fight against domestic violence against women into the overall violence reduction effort and in stand-alone violence operations. It achieved this, to a large extent, based on the economic rationale, by providing evidence on the impacts of violence on women’s wages, and by making the conceptual link between domestic and social violence, using evidence from industrial countries (see box 1 for more details on mainstreaming). Recent studies in Latin America and the Caribbean replicate these findings on the intergenerational transmission of violence: violent homes are more prone to reproduce violence than nonviolent ones in Latin America and the Caribbean as well as in industrial countries (Knaul and Ramírez, 2005).
The third distinctive element of the IDB’s policy approach, embedded in the nature and objectives of the institution, is the emphasis on the prevention side of the continuum between violence prevention and violence control. The preference for preventive actions is grounded in research that shows their greater cost-effectiveness when compared with control interventions (see, for instance, Greenwood et al., 1998).

This is attractive to an institution that uses economic arguments as a principal decision-making rule. In addition, social prevention fits well with the conceptual paradigm that links domestic and social violence and with the Bank’s strong tradition of social sector lending (helping to explain the preference for social versus situational prevention investments in this first generation of projects). Lastly, an emphasis on prevention helps define actions in support of police that avoid contradicting basic principles established in the Bank’s Charter regarding activities that may be funded with IDB resources. Support for the control rather than prevention functions of the police forces could result in activities that interfere in national political matters and/or vio-

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**Box 1: Mainstreaming Domestic Violence in IDB Lending Operations**

The IDB has mainstreamed the objective of reducing domestic violence against women in its lending operations on citizen security in Latin American and Caribbean countries. How did this happen, and how can it be replicated? Six elements have contributed to the IDB’s success.

- **Relevance.** Latin America and the Caribbean is the second most violent region in the world (after Sub-Saharan Africa). Along with high rates of homicide, there are high rates of victimization of women and rising violence since the mid-1980s. As a result, reducing violence is a priority for citizens in the region, and there is growing awareness of violence against women, especially in the NGO sector.

- **Leadership.** Listening and responding to these citizen concerns, IDB President Enrique V. Iglesias, in a bold move for a development bank, launched work on violence reduction in 1996 and assigned resources to it. The IDB organized high-visibility seminars to catalyze interest in the region and undertook badly needed research. The region’s response and interest were immediate.

- **Grant Financing.** Modest but critical grant financing was made available to undertake the work (IDB and Nordic Trust Fund Monies to the IDB).

- **Availability of Expertise.** The IDB was able to tap into local expertise in the region on domestic violence, facilitating research and project interventions.

- **Research.** Research showed the intrinsic as well as the instrumental value of mainstreaming attention to domestic violence in lending for violence reduction operations. It made the case that violence is mostly a learned behavior and that one of the earliest opportunities for learning violence is in the home. Thus, domestic violence is deserving of attention in its own right and is a key to preventing the transmission of violence to future generations. The research also provided a sound economic rationale for investing in domestic violence reduction operations (Morison and Orlando as cited in Morrison and Biehl, 1999).

- **Openness to Innovation.** A new generation of IDB operations, citizen security lending, was launched in parallel with the mainstreaming efforts to emphasize violence prevention in all IDB loans. These new designs provided a unique opportunity for mainstreaming a gender perspective from the start, increasing the likelihood that this perspective would be incorporated in future designs. This last element is perhaps the most difficult to replicate because the very nature of the mainstreaming task calls for integrating new thinking into established practice.

late human rights, directly contravening Bank mandates. As a result, IDB guidelines for designing violence reduction projects state, “in all their work with police forces, IDB teams should emphasize the strengthening of the preventive functions of the civilian police force” (IDB, 2003). These guidelines were prepared to help Bank staff navigate requests from governments in potentially proscribed areas; they highlight the overall preventive framework for Bank interventions and give examples of proscribed activities.

Underlying these policy features is the basic assumption that violence can be reduced and prevented. In his speeches on the topic, President Iglesias has often repeated that violence is not fatal. This statement guides the Bank’s policy approach to violence reduction and is backed by the well-known examples of the cities of Bogotá and Cali, where comprehensive interventions set up by committed municipal governments led to significant drops in homicide rates (Llorente and Rivas, 2004; Londoño, et al., 2000) (see box 2).

**Box 2: What Worked in Bogotá**

In the 1993-2002 period, homicide rates in Bogotá plunged from 80 to 28 homicides per 100,000 people; accidents were reduced in half; and the police increased capture rates by 400 percent without an increase in the size of the police force. The Bogotá success with violence reduction illustrates the importance of political commitment, sustained across three different administrations, and of the allocation of sufficient resources to combat crime and violence. Among the strategies implemented, the available evaluation data links the following to reductions in violence:

- **Campaigns to Promote Citizen Disarmament and Control of Alcohol Consumption.** Effective information systems provided detailed information on violent crime events, resulting in the formulation of the Plan Desarme that controlled the circulation of firearms. In 2001, for instance, around 6,500 firearms were voluntarily returned to the police as a result of the Plan. In addition, with the implementation of Ley Zanahoria, alcohol sales ended at 3 AM on weekends to reduce the rates of violent crimes. Firearms and alcohol control had a significant (although not large) effect in violence reduction.

- **Actions to Recuperate Decayed Urban Spaces.** Two of the most violent areas in Bogotá—Avenida Caracas and the Cartucho zone—underwent urban and transport infrastructure renewal. As a result, levels of crime and violence declined substantially in both areas. In Avenida Caracas, the levels of homicide declined by 60 percent from 1999 to 2003. At the same time, in the Cartucho zone, robbery went down by 70 percent between 2000 and 2003.

- **Frentes de Seguridad.** Neighborhood crime-monitoring committees encourage collaborative relationships between community police officers and local residents, which have reversed the levels of mistrust between police and community. As a result, there has been an increase in crime prevention efforts.

- **Family Police Stations.** Evaluation data shows that protective measures available through these police stations established to control family violence were more effective than conciliation measures in reducing physical violence against women in the family.

- **Professionalization of the Police.** Police reform and modernization were accomplished through a plan emphasizing results-based performance. An epidemiological approach was introduced to monitor crime and violence data, which allowed the design of crime prevention actions. Training in preventing policing has been widely accepted by citizens as an efficient alternative to reduce violence and improve coexistence.

Influenced by these examples and the epidemiological perspective to define the problem and identify risk and protective factors for violence, the Bank emphasizes a multi-faceted response, with stand-alone violence projects that include interventions in a variety of key sectors; significant investments in information systems for identifying the problem, tracking progress and developing appropriate responses; emphasis on social prevention as well as the prevention functions of the police; and a key role for local governments in implementing the package of interventions to combat violence. In this framework, violence reduction is a local response and requires the involvement of local government.
Bank Operations

Since 1998, the Bank has approved US$130 million for six stand-alone operations, a total investment of more than US$190 million. A project in Uruguay (US$17.5 million loan) has been fully completed. A portion of a loan to Colombia (US$57 million), dealing with a project in Bogotá has also been executed, while evaluations are underway for the portions of the project that were carried out in Cali and Medellín. Operations in Chile (US$10 million), Honduras (US$22 million) and Jamaica (US$16 million) are in the beginning stages of execution; a loan for Nicaragua (US$7 million) has recently been approved, and a citizen security project in Guatemala (US$27 million) is in the approval stages. Projects in Guyana, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago are in different stages of preparation. The Bank has identified additional possible citizen security programs in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela.

In addition to the stand-alone operations, the IDB has financed US$16 million for 75 technical assistance projects in areas as diverse as domestic violence, judiciary reform, media campaigns, health and education, designed to contribute to the reduction of crime and violence. For example, in 1996 the first technical cooperation was approved to create local treatment and prevention networks for domestic violence victims in six countries.

All stand-alone operations have, in varying degrees, included activities in the following areas: (i) institutional strengthening, including information systems; (ii) preventive policing; (iii) work with women, youth and communities; (iv) communications and social awareness; and (v) monitoring and evaluation. Annex 1 lists the events and publications that the Bank has financed in the area of citizen security.

Institutional Strengthening

Region-wide polling show high levels of distrust in the institutions responsible for deterring crime and administering justice. On average, more than a third of citizens polled between 2000 and 2004 responded that they had low trust in the justice system and the police. Behind this distrust is the low effectiveness of these institutions, including an insufficient capacity to craft and enforce appropriate crime prevention policies. Institutions such as the police are more focused on implementing reactive rather than prevention measures to fight crime. Data on crime and violence events, which in most cases is collected by the police, suffer from high levels of underreporting, in part because of lack of citizen trust. At the same time, these institutions do not have the necessary human resources with the capacity to analyze and interpret the data and evaluate results. In addition, there is lack of effective coordination with other government sectors in collecting reliable information on crime and violence to develop proper interventions. Finally, access to the justice system is inadequate. It is expensive to present a case before the courts, thus limiting low-income citizens’ access to these services.

In response, the Bank has financed the following institutional strengthening actions in its lending operations:

- Provision of technical assistance, training, and equipment to institutions in charge of controlling and preventing crime, including at the municipal level, in all its projects;
- Specific components to finance the development of crime and violence information, monitoring and evaluation systems in Co-

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4 This includes IDB and counterpart financing for a total of US$192.2 million.

5 Authors’ calculation based on Latinobarometer data.
lombia (US$4.1 million), Uruguay (US$1.1 million) and Chile (US$0.4 million);\(^6\)

- Strengthening of the judiciary to improve the functioning of the criminal justice system in Colombia (US$2.3 million at the national level and US$9 million at the municipal level) and Jamaica (US$2 million); and

- Training and instruction programs for public officials involved in all Bank operations to analyze information provided by violence and crime information systems and develop public policy and programs.

In Uruguay, institutional strengthening activities changed the organizational culture of the Interior Ministry, from an exclusive emphasis on violence control to violence prevention, including the development of violence prevention policies and an action agenda. The renovation of the existing rudimentary equipment to gather data, the creation of a unified geo-referenced data collection system, and the training all staff working in the Ministry yielded evident benefits. For instance, until the year 2000, the number of crime and violence events, which were registered manually by the police, was 32,960 cases. In 2003, with the information, monitoring and evaluation system fully functioning, the number of cases registered skyrocketed to almost 200,000 (Davrieux, 2004). This increase reflected both the improved information system and a real increase in violence rates as a result of the economic recession while the loan operation was in execution (Davrieux, 2004).

In Bogotá, Colombia, the local government’s commitment to develop policies and programs on citizen security resulted in the creation of an office for citizen security in the municipality and the allocation of critical financial resources, both of which were maintained through three administrations. Bank resources helped fund the gathering and analysis of statistics on crime and violence through a “violence observatory,” as a basis for policy formulation. As a result of these information efforts, effective policies were adopted to combat crime, including the control of firearms and restrictions in the sale of alcohol (see box 2).

Although the information provided by the observatory has been central to designing programs, the program’s evaluation yielded suggestions for improvement, including: (i) pinpoint each neighborhood in each municipality to collect data; (ii) include other types of crimes such as sexual crimes; (iii) improve the dissemination of results and analyses to the media; and (iv) increase dissemination in the communities and take a more user-friendly approach to presenting the data (Cendex, 2003a).

One of the main challenges facing IDB project teams has been the lack of institutional capacity among counterpart agencies to design and manage violence prevention policies and projects. Resources have been used to train counterparts in areas such as strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, providing client services and communicating with the public. Training has also been provided in technical areas such as information gathering, crime reporting, responding to domestic violence complaints, and conflict prevention activities with youths. In addition, the Bank has emphasized inter-institutional cooperation and knowledge sharing as a basis to formulate policy through the development of the above-mentioned information systems. Projects in execution have met or are meeting their training objectives in terms of outputs (courses offered, numbers of staff trained), but there is yet no evaluation data on the effectiveness of these trainings for institutional strengthening.

**Preventive Policing**

The rapid increase in the levels of violent crime in the region has intensified existing perceptions regarding the inadequacy of police forces, calling into question their legitimacy and effectiveness. With the exception of Chile, where 60 percent of the people say they trust the police, most citizens see the police as part of the prob-

\(^6\) All citizen security operations incorporate the development of information, monitoring and evaluation systems. However, the above-mentioned loans include a component that solely finances this activity.
lem, not the solution. Not surprisingly, there has been exponential growth in private security forces, which in some countries are double the size of public security (Sanjuán, 2004).

The poor performance of the police is at the core of the citizen security problem in Latin America and the Caribbean. Common problems attributed to the police include: a tendency to overextend its responsibilities; low capacity in intra- and inter-agency coordination and cooperation for efficient management of crime; inadequate training and professional status; an antiquated reactive rather than a modern problem-solving model of policing; recurring illegal practices (abuse of power, corruption and excessive use of force); deficient internal and external control; and excessive bureaucracy and centralized decision-making (Sanjuán, 2004). Compounding these problems, fiscal constraints have often resulted in the allocation of insufficient resources for the proper functioning of the police. To this is added the usually low schooling levels of new recruits and the inadequate salary structure for police officers, which can lead to corruption.

Countries perceive citizen security projects as a window of opportunity to make their police more effective through training and equipment. The demand to finance these interventions has been high, and the Bank has had to tread carefully in order to respond to countries’ demands without violating its Charter. It has financed activities only with the civil police and not the military police, and it has emphasized professional police training and preventive and community policing in all its loans. The Bank has financed work with the police in justice reform programs and in stand-alone citizen security operations. The latter have included activities such as those listed below.

- All operations have included police training as well as the review and modification of police training curriculums (Colombia, US$4 million); training in preventive and community policing (Uruguay, US$1 million); in police investigations and in dealing with high risk groups, such as women and youth.
- Operations in Jamaica included technical assistance and training to strengthen the Police Public Complaint Authority to increase the accountability of and public confidence in the Jamaica Constabulary Force (US$0.2 million). They also included activities to implement a new police code of conduct and make police stations more community-friendly and accessible (US$0.3 million).
- Pilot testing of community policing in specific neighborhoods in Uruguay.
- All operations included improved information systems, such as the purchase of hardware and software, and the installation of integrated information systems.
- Operations in Colombia and Uruguay included institutional strengthening of planning capacity; while they also improved co-
ordination with other agencies of the criminal justice system in Uruguay.

Police strengthening and support for preventive policing appears to have been quite successful in Bogotá, where the effectiveness of police captures, for instance, increased by 400 percent between 1994 and 2002, and the number of firearms handed over to the police tripled between 1995 and 2003 (Llorente and Rivas, 2004). Activities to strengthen Bogotá’s police were results-oriented: police officers were rewarded according to the performance of crime indicators. The police received training on human rights issues and on how to treat citizens, fostering a change in police culture. A “Code of Police” that teaches norms of coexistence between citizens and police was also developed as part of the program. In addition, information systems allowed the police to improve their response time and effectiveness in reducing and preventing crime and violence. The success of the program in Bogotá is linked directly to other unique features of that experience; namely, the sustained commitment of different administrations, which translated into continued priority for violence reduction actions and a significant rise in police budgets (which roughly tripled).

In Uruguay, the government’s commitment to the project was affected by the severe economic crisis. Moreover, the specific community policing pilot project was too small in size to yield lasting results (Davrieux, 2004). Nevertheless, police forces underwent a shift toward preventive policing, and more than 1,400 police officers received a 150-hour course on violence prevention methods and human rights, as well as in the philosophy and methodology of community policing and community relations. In addition, 585 police officers were trained on how to adequately treat citizens and victims of domestic violence. In addition, taking courses in preventive policing became a requirement for promotions, and the level of education required to apply for certain positions was raised. These improvements were reflected in a more than 25 percent increase in the number of citizens that said they trusted police performance in their communities (Davrieux, 2004). As a result of the loan the police drafted a proposal to reform the law that constitutes the police force.

Despite these positive experiences and results, there are limitations to the types of activities that the Bank can finance in this area. To date, it has not financed more comprehensive police restructuring and reform projects, including salary and incentive structures, decision-making processes, and internal and external accountability, which may be key to improving police performance and reducing violence. Police reform continues to represent a challenge for the governments of the region and for the Bank.

Work with Women, Families, Youth and Communities

Social and domestic violence have become major problems for citizens in the region. Risk factors associated with both types of violence are complex and highly correlated. These range from early exposure to violence in the household, to youth association with violent peers, and to living in communities where poverty and inequality are high. In response, most Bank lending, targets project activities to simultaneously tackle both domestic and social violence risk factors, principally through social prevention, although support for improving the delivery and coverage of victims’ services has also been incorporated. The Bank has supported activities which work with women to reduce domestic violence as well as with high-risk children and youth to prevent them from engaging in violent behavior. In addition, it has financed community-based prevention initiatives.

Work with Women

Significant efforts have been made to curb domestic violence against women. The IDB has played a major role in bringing this topic to the forefront of prevention and control agendas, both within the Bank and in member countries. Combating domestic violence serves multiple

10 The Bank is starting to incorporate internal and external accountability mechanisms in the design of new operations, as are the cases of Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Peru.
purposes because it contributes to reducing the impact of violence on future generations, since suffering and witnessing domestic violence as a child increases the likelihood of future violence (Jaffe et al., 1986).

In order to raise awareness among the public and policymakers, the Bank has supported activities such as televised debates and seminars, the identification of multi-sector treatment models that are replicable, and technical assistance funds for research and pilot projects. Some interventions of this kind are listed below.

- The project in Uruguay included a separate US$1.1 million component whose goal was to prevent domestic violence. Activities included a campaign to make the public more aware of the problem and promote attitudinal changes (US$75,000); training for public officials to learn and develop skills that would enable them to assist victims of domestic violence (US$70,000); and greater coverage and improved assistance for victims of domestic violence and rehabilitation services for perpetrators (US$953,000). As part of the design of this component, the Bank financed a survey of 545 households in order to determine the magnitude and characteristics of domestic violence.

- The project in Colombia ensured that specific indicators for gender and domestic violence were collected and included in national information systems on crime and violence; and that the police received training to handle domestic violence cases.

- The Colombia project also established family police stations in Bogotá to provide multiple services to victims of domestic violence.

- A group of Jamaican NGOs received violence prevention services (US$5.2 million).

- Multi-sector crime prevention models in Chile include specific pilot projects on abuse against women and children.

- Projects in Jamaica and Uruguay include training of judges and court personnel on domestic family issues; while projects in Colombia incorporate training and education courses for workers in the country’s conciliation and mediation centers.

The loan prompted the government of Uruguay to begin an extensive program of work on domestic violence against women. One of its main outcomes was the development by the Ministry of Education and Culture of a national plan to fight domestic violence spanning the years 2004 to 2010. Six hundred staff of the health, education and justice ministries received training to identify and provide better services to victims. A new law to prevent domestic violence was approved in 2003 and is currently in place. A decrease in the number of households reporting domestic violence was associated with nine projects designed to increase and improve services to assist victims in areas where they had previously been lacking. Research data showed a decline in psychological abuse from 46 percent in 1997 to 33 percent in 2003 (Davrieux, 2004). Police also may have contributed to the reduction of domestic violence against women. Four officers in each police district were trained to assist victims. An action guide for handling domestic violence cases was also developed and distributed to all the police stations nationwide. This helped increase the number of charges filed by more than 200 percent between 1997 and 2000 (Davrieux, 2004).

Family police stations in Bogotá provide protection and conflict resolution services to families (the latter are particularly useful to prevent conflicts from turning into more serious violence against women and children). The stations provide multiple services including medical screening, psychological counseling, legal aid, and police services. They were set up to help reduce the backup of cases in the courts. Most client families had issues related to children’s rights such as food allowance, custody and visitation rights (Cendex, 2003b). Evaluations show that these stations were more effective in their protection than in their conflict resolution function. They provided protection to victims but were less adept at mediating cases of physical ag-
gression against women, which constituted about 40 percent of the caseload. In a high number of cases, conciliation agreements without a protection component were violated and led to more aggression. Even so, evaluation data revealed that clients rated family police stations as the public sector institution that was most helpful in improving their domestic violence situation (Llorente and Rivas, 2004).

Youth at Risk

A large percentage of youth in Latin America and the Caribbean are at high risk of engaging in dangerous behaviors such as association with gangs or other high-risk peer groups, alcohol and substance abuse, and violent behavior (Witt and Crompton, 1996). Some of the underlying risk factors that lead to such behavioral problems include: high inequality fueling increased opportunities to commit crimes; being raised in areas with high levels of poverty; inadequate parenting skills; complex household arrangements; high levels of community disorganization; poor quality education in the public school system; high youth unemployment levels and lack of recreational and income-generating opportunities; drug trafficking, and the availability of firearms and other weapons.

As a result, levels of youth crime and violence are very high. In the Americas, adolescents aged 10 to 19 years old account for 28.7 percent of all homicides. For example, in Valle del Sula, Honduras, in 1999 youth aged 15 to 19 accounted for 90 percent of social violence incidents. In Nicaragua, 2 out of every 3 criminals are under the age of 25 and the number of gangs increased by 58 percent between 1999 and 2001. In Colombia, in 1998, 15- to 34-year-olds accounted for 60 percent of homicides.

Governments have increased considerably their requests to the Bank to finance components to reduce youth violence and diminish the impact of risk factors that lead to it. Components in loan operations to work with at-risk youth involve multiple stakeholders and include activities covering the spectrum from primary to tertiary prevention, such as:

- Skills training and income generation programs to facilitate youth’s entry into the labor market in all operations;
- Accelerated training to reenter formal schooling; modules in school curriculums to promote mediation skills and coexistence in schools in Uruguay, Colombia and Honduras;
- After school and weekend programs in all operations to promote the constructive use of recreational and leisure time; and
- A rehabilitation program in Uruguay (US$11.6 million).

Available evaluations from the programs in Uruguay and Colombia suggest moderate success in interventions that place youth in the labor market, encourage youth to reenter school, and change aggressive attitudes. There is, however, no data on the effects of these interventions on reducing violent behavior. For instance, between 1998 and 2002, 5,000 Uruguayan youths received training and social integration skills. As a result, 24 percent were able to enter the job market for the first time immediately after the intervention was finished. On the other hand, accelerated training to encourage youths to return to school did not yield significant results. Only 15 percent of youth who received this type of training went back to school. However, these results may be relevant if we take into account the context in which they were achieved. At the time, schools had difficulties reincorporating or keeping students with behavioral problems due mainly to cultural differences with other students, which were reduced as a result of the intervention.

At the school level, the project provided training in conflict resolution skills and effective peer socialization in the classroom for 8,000 teachers from 346 primary and secondary public

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"Cultural" in this context means that youth come from very poor backgrounds and lack basic resources to attend school, such as money for transportation, inadequate food intake, and lack of resources to purchase classroom materials.
schools located in high-risk areas. Students showed great improvements on how they handled conflict in the school and in the home. The immediate and positive outcomes of the interventions at the school level prompted Uruguay’s National Administration for Public Education to commit to sustaining school-based violence prevention activities.

Another youth skills-training model was the creation of a rehabilitation center, with capacity for 300 male offenders ages 18 to 29. The purpose of the center was to provide these youth with comprehensive interventions such as job-skills training, education and skills for rejoining the family and community in a minimum-security setting. The aim of these comprehensive interventions was to reduce the rate of recidivism by 10 percent after five years of implementation.12 Because of delays in completing the building’s renovation, the center began functioning in 2002 and was not able to house 300 inmates until 2004. However, at the end of loan execution in 2004, only 101 young men had been admitted (Davreux, 2004).

A set of indicators was developed to monitor and evaluate the progress made by these young men and measure the effectiveness of the interventions. Unfortunately, because of the delay in constructing the building, the first full evaluation of the program will only be available in 2006, once the inmates have completed 24 months of rehabilitation. Available data at the end of loan execution, show that 17 percent of the inmates enjoyed work furloughs; that beneficiary testing and family visits every six months improved family relationships; and that 15 percent of the inmates developed more advanced social and cognitive skills.

Despite the above achievements, the effectiveness of this intervention appears to be quite low when its high cost (US$11.6 million) is taken into account.13 This further reinforces the Bank’s position emphasizing prevention rather than remedial or control approaches, which are generally less cost-effective.

In Bogotá, continuing and extensive work with at-risk youth has been carried out on a wide menu of interventions. While training activities did provide beneficiaries with basic technical and business management skills, they did not facilitate their entry into the labor market. Moreover, those youths who were able to find a job did not find one in the areas for which they had been trained (Cendex, 2003d). We do not know if this was due to problems with the training or resulted from labor market constraints. Hence, it would be useful to develop monitoring mechanisms to ensure that these young people are actually finding jobs that make full use of the skills learned during the program. Nevertheless, positive results were achieved in the area of schooling. Despite limited program coverage to address the problem of school desertion, the majority of youth who attended school training were able to re-enter the formal education system (Cendex, 2003d).

Evaluations of after-school and recreational activities in Bogotá appear to have had the largest impact. Youth that were part of these interventions expressed interest in creative and artistic activities as an alternative to training. The beneficiaries showed significant changes in the perception of violence and how to confront it, whereas the control group still believed that the only way to solve conflict was to carry a gun all the time without engaging in dialogue or any other means to avoid an escalation of the conflict (Muñoz, 2005). In addition, the beneficiaries perceived that their participation in the program also contributed to the reduction of crime and violence. Some of the reasons given by these young people were that these programs reinforced the development of values and promoted peaceful coexistence. In addition, they also perceived that these programs provided alternatives to occupy their free time, and pro-

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12 The rate of recidivism in 1997, at the start of the loan, was 39.2 percent (Instituto Médico Forense, Uruguay).
13 For this component, $3.9 million were earmarked for the youth skills training program, and $7.7 mil-
moted the development of their identities as social agents in their communities (Cendex, 2003d).

The experiences cited above (skills training and school-based interventions in Uruguay and Colombia, and recreation and leisure activities in Colombia) illustrate that interventions with at-risk youth could help reduce levels of violence by diminishing youth’s idle time, increasing their human capital and changing aggressive attitudes. At the same time, they also suggest that tertiary prevention activities, such as the rehabilitation center in Uruguay, can have low cost-effectiveness and take longer to yield significant results.

Community Involvement

Given the multi-faceted nature of crime and violence, it is vital to involve the community in developing and implementing prevention strategies. In addition, community participation is an essential tool in changing attitudes, and empowering and mobilizing its members. This can be achieved by forging partnerships with key stakeholders such as law enforcement, health and education ministries, churches, NGOs and other civil society organizations, and the media. Below are listed some of the bottom-up approaches that the IDB is supporting in its loan operations.

- Delivery of violence prevention services by civil society organizations in most loans.

- Establishment of centers for violence prevention in three operations. These centers include the delivery of public and private violence prevention services (Uruguay, US$0.6 million); multipurpose facilities to showcase and centralize the delivery of services (Jamaica, US$1.5 million), and basic justice services for nonviolent conflict resolution (Colombia, US$1.7 million).

- Community mobilization to strengthen social networks, and promote the implementation of productive activities as well as the social use of area and community spaces in Chile (US$2.5 million) and Jamaica (US$612,000).

The conciliation and mediation centers (Casas de Justicia) in Colombia offer a variety of basic justice services for the nonviolent resolution of conflicts in zones where such services were previously out of reach of the population. This initiative has yielded significant results both at the national and municipal levels by providing services to three times the target number of clients (30,000) set for the 1999-2002 period. The vast majority of cases were related to non-compliance with agreements, rights violations, and money issues. Property rental issues were the leading cases resolved (55 percent), followed by other types of contract issues (17 percent), and domestic disputes (11 percent). Community members found the centers to be adequate mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Some form of conciliation was reached in 46 percent of the cases registered, while agreements were reached in 83 percent of the cases, and agreements were fully reached or partially implemented in almost 50 percent of the cases. Although results speak for themselves, citizens still believe that the local authorities must make additional efforts further publicize the availability of the services offered in these centers.

Between 2000 and 2002, the two pilot violence prevention centers in Uruguay (each staffed with one lawyer, one psychologist, one social worker, and three police officers specialized in community policing) provided services in more than 1000 cases related to domestic violence, legal disputes with neighbors or family members, and other legal matters. Increased trust in the ability of these centers to perform their services prompted the more active participation of social organizations in matters such as neighborhood safety, which improved the overall perception of safety in those communities (Davrieux, 2004). In addition, the success of the 180 neighborhood safety commissions that were created has rapidly expanded them to other areas of the country. This indicates an increase in citizen and community participation in solving crime as well as in the capacity of the police to
work closely with the community (which resulted from the preventive policing initiatives financed by the loan).

Involving communities in crime and violence prevention yields positive outcomes. While it is clearly impossible to set up generally applicable goals for community crime and violence prevention (because they depend heavily on local circumstances and conditions), the experience to date shows that local authorities should actively support these efforts and assist communities in developing innovative solutions.

Social Awareness Campaigns

At times, the media was considered to be a part of the violence problem in the region because of the broadcasting of violent programs directed to children and youth, as well as the generation and dissemination of new and shocking crime and violence data. However, the media can also be a powerful tool in curbing domestic and social violence. Working with the media at the local levels, while linking these endeavors at the regional and national levels, should go a long way in reducing overall violence.

Most Bank programs have emphasized the need to disseminate statistics on violence, as well as the need to change attitudes through communication. The Bank has, for instance, used the capacity of the media to make inroads into the general tolerance for domestic violence in the region, by producing and distributing a documentary entitled *Battered Lives: When Men Abuse Women*. This film became the cornerstone of a regional campaign to raise awareness about domestic violence. In addition, several stand-alone operations have allocated funds for the activities listed below, which were carried out in Colombia, Jamaica and Uruguay.

- Campaigns targeting key representatives of the public, the legislature, and the judicial system to raise their awareness of the problem of domestic violence in Uruguay (US$75,000); short-term high impact campaigns to reduce crime and violence during local and national holidays in Colombia (US$0.3 million).

- Comprehensive strategies aimed altering (through education and the appropriate use of the media) cultural patterns that foster a violent response to conflict in Colombia (US$0.3 million) and Jamaica (US$0.6 million). Activities included training workshops for journalists, communicators, and persons in related fields in Colombia and social marketing activities targeted at inner-city youths in Jamaica.

In Cali, the campaign, *Fiesta por la Vida* (Party for Life), introduced as a result of the high levels of crime and violence observed during days of celebrations, has contributed to a reduction in violence during in such events (Muñoz, 2005). However, a similar campaign launched in Bogotá did not have the expected impact in reducing violence. The Bogotá campaign included too much symbolism and was too abstract for youths to understand and process the message. In addition, citizens perceived that in order for a campaign like this to have an effect on individuals, it had to be sustained over time and should be targeted to everyone, not just youths. Campaigns geared toward the establishment of norms such as *Ciudad de los Niños y las Niñas* (City of Boys and Girls) and initiatives implemented at the school level seem to have produced the expected outcomes. According to evaluations, children are perceived as excellent channels to spread norms of behavior to their families and communities (Cendex, 2003e).

Budget limitations prevented Uruguay’s Ministry of the Interior from launching all the planned campaigns. However, campaigns against domestic violence and alcohol and drug abuse, as well as those that publicized information about police reform, yielded positive results in public opinion surveys. Despite the short-term nature of these interventions, they were able to transmit to the public what the government was doing to fight crime and violence (Bastón, 2004). This translated into a decrease in citizens’ perception of violence and an increase in trust, especially trust of the police forces, which initiated a new relationship that led to their collaboration in solving crime and reducing violence (Davrieux, 2004).
These experiences demonstrate the potential of employing the media to change attitudes regarding violence. However, the comparatively limited amount of resources allocated to this component may have diminished the quality and quantity of the campaigns. For example, only 9 percent of the total cost of the operation in Colombia was allocated to media campaigns, while in Uruguay and Jamaica the allocation only amounted to 4 and 3 percent, respectively. The Bank could allocate more resources to social marketing campaigns in the design of its loans and persuade local governments to explore and expand this area further. This should include tools to measure the long-term impact of violence reduction campaigns.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation activities in violence prevention operations help to introduce corrective actions during project execution, and to assess project results and outcomes. These activities are particularly important for new areas of lending, such as stand-alone violence prevention operations, where there is no past performance record and most interventions are being tried for the first time. The Bank faced numerous challenges in selecting the types of indicators to monitor and evaluate these operations because violence has many causes and interventions address only part of the problem. Moreover, when the first citizen security loans were prepared, there were no references in the development literature and no other operational experience. Victimization surveys and other tools are now being used in the preparation of new citizen security projects to create baseline data to compare pre and post intervention situations and measure results more reliably. These data should also provide a basis for comparison with other citizen security projects in region.

There are two types of evaluations to measure the impact of violence prevention interventions: (i) macro evaluations, which attempt to determine whether a program as a whole has lowered violence levels, and (ii) micro evaluations, which determine whether beneficiaries of specific interventions (e.g., an after-school sports program) have lower levels of violent behavior than comparable nonbeneficiaries. Micro evaluations are underway in Colombia and Jamaica. They are methodologically straightforward and should be useful to compile a list of good practice interventions. Macro evaluations are significantly more complex to undertake, especially because of the extraneous factors that affect violence which often are difficult to control or measure and because it is inherently more difficult to measure the impact of multiple rather than single interventions. However, the implementation of victimization surveys to gather baseline data in the Bank’s new loans should aid in better gauging the project’s overall impact on the levels of crime and violence.
Analysis and Lessons Learned

On balance, the emerging project experience and evaluation data suggest that there are successful components in these loans that are worth replicating in new ones. These components include unified information systems on crime and violence; domestic violence treatment interventions, including the protection function of family police stations; police training; specific interventions for youth at risk, such as building conflict resolution skills into school curriculums and the development of parental skills; the Casas de Justicia (Houses of Justice), or one-stop providers for social and judicial services and referrals; and targeted media campaigns. Less successful or more modest results have been obtained to date with interventions supporting community policing (partly because of their restricted scope in Bank loans), as well as with other primary and secondary prevention interventions for high-risk youth (such as skills training and school reentry programs). More importantly, while the problem of crime and violence is complex, has many causes and requires multifaceted responses to address the different types of violence and their manifestations, the IDB experience to date tends to question the viability and impact of these comprehensive, multi-sector designs. This is not to say that well-crafted, comprehensive violence reduction strategies do not work—the 65 percent drop in homicides in Bogotá in less than a decade attests to the contrary—but that given the limitations under which the Bank and the countries operate, simpler, less ambitious designs are worthy of consideration, especially when critical conditions, such as long-term political commitment, are difficult to ensure or maintain over time.

More specifically, the Bank’s lending experience yields some preliminary lessons in the areas of the limitation of designs, how to measure success, the value of reliable information for project design, the need for political commitment, the issue of finding the appropriate executing agency, the importance of ensuring community involvement, trade-offs between long- and short-term impact interventions, and the need for complementary activities.

The Limitations of Overambitious Designs

One of the most important lessons drawn from the citizen security programs is that they are too broad in scope and do not focus enough on short-term impact interventions that are often low in cost (such as restricting alcohol sales). The need for multifaceted responses to violence’s multiple causes has led the Bank to include multiple components and work with many different agencies and actors. Implementation has been complex and, while the two older projects (Colombia and Uruguay), to their credit, have successfully executed all or most of the planned activities, a more narrow approach may have been more efficient and yielded more visible results. The emphasis on social prevention (which yields results in the long rather than the short term) has likely compounded this perception of low-impact interventions. Situational prevention initiatives, which seek to increase the perceived effort of committing crimes, increase perceived risks, or reduce anticipated rewards, are an attractive alternative because they are more likely to deliver short-term results. Also attractive are interventions that seek to reduce immediate triggers of violent behavior, such as restricting the sale of alcohol or the number of firearms in civilian hands.

Overambitious Objectives or How to Measure the Success of Violence Prevention

Overambitious designs often have overambitious objectives and indicators to measure results. Even if one could attribute causality unambiguously to project interventions, it is quite unrealistic to expect that a violence prevention project will yield reductions in homicide and violent crime rates in the short period of 4 to 5 years. There are several reasons for this, including the fact that prevention usually is a long-
term proposition with time lags in terms of results, that artificial increases in rates are likely, and that no project design will ever be able to control all the factors that may affect rates. These external factors include, importantly, variables completely outside anybody’s control such as the pace of the demographic transition. Only comprehensive interventions, difficult to orchestrate in a project framework, can sometimes achieve results in the short term. In Bogotá, it was possible to reduce prevalence rates with a package of comprehensive violence prevention interventions.

The Uruguay project provides a good example of the different factors affecting violence rates and alerts to the importance of a careful choice of indicators to measure project results. Between 1998 and 2002, the period of implementation of the citizen security loan in Uruguay, homicides rose by 20 percent and violent assaults rose by 100 percent. The public’s perception of insecurity, which was used along with homicides and assault rates as an indicator of project impact, also climbed. But the fact that indicators behaved contrary to what was expected does not mean that the project had no impact. The rise in rates was likely the result, first, of the serious economic crisis and high unemployment rates that hit the country in the early part of the period and, second, of enhancements in police information systems, which led to vastly improved recording of violent acts and raised rates artificially. The project also resulted in a 400 percent increase in reports of domestic violence. The public’s perception accurately mirrored these rates.

The choice of the right indicators to measure the results of violence prevention projects is tricky as results may be subject to time lags, artificial value inflation due to better recording of events, and external factors that are beyond project control. The choice of indicators needs to be made very carefully, giving preference to intermediate indicators that may better reflect project performance and limiting ambitious measures of results and impact. Public opinion and public perception indicators, which are prone to value inflation, should be avoided. Generating reliable baseline information is crucial, both to design the intervention and measure performance. A thorough baseline epidemiological profile of violence and crime is critical to “customize” citizen security designs.

The Value of Reliable Information for Project Design, Surveillance and Impact

Cities, such as Bogotá and Cali, which, during loan implementation, successfully reduced their levels of crime and violence, established reliable information and monitoring systems. A unified system of data collection that provides policymakers with reliable and timely information helps develop adequate policy responses and cost-effective strategies for prevention. Bank operations specialists agree that this is a worthwhile investment of Bank resources. The operation of information systems requires strong partnerships involving the municipality or other main coordinating agency, the police, service providers (such as hospitals and clinics), community groups and other government agencies. Information systems and data, therefore, can help forge consensus between political and social actors and sectors involved in the decision-making process, increasing the sustainability of project actions. In addition, these systems are the basis to measure the results of policies and their impact in preventing and reducing violence. Illustrating the importance of information, the Colombian Department of Statistics acknowledged the valuable information that victimization surveys implemented in 2004 provided for combating crime and violence.\(^\text{14}\)

The Need for Political Commitment at the National and Local Levels

An important lesson, corroborated by IDB projects, is that preventing violence and increasing citizen security is a long-term process that requires ongoing government priority. It takes time to build community infrastructure, increase institutional capacity, change public perceptions of crime and violence and of the institutions in charge, and alter individual behavior. Moreover, the diversity of sectors and actors involved add

\(^{14}\)http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2004/septiembre/16/29162004.htm
complexity and need for time. This “cultural” transformation, both at the institutional and individual levels, may take years to have an impact and requires sustained government engagement. While sustained political commitment is an issue in Bank operations across sectors, it tends to be a more pressing matter with citizen security projects both because of the nature of prevention activities and because these projects are often implemented through subnational government agencies where the turnover of leadership and principal staff is greater than at the national level. Mayors who provide key leadership have short two- or three-year tenures, while new municipal administrations often have different priorities and can amend the project’s scope and/or play down its importance.

Citizen security operations need to be based on an explicit agreement or social contract between government and citizens to avoid the potential volatility of interventions and ensure their implementation over different administrations. The case of Bogotá is a replicable illustration of political will and commitment at the local level. Activities initiated at the beginning of the loan were sustained through three different municipal administrations. This was partly the result of an agreement between the citizens and government during the first administration that insured the allocation of resources (an office and a budget) to deal with matters of security in the municipality over time and gave priority to peaceful coexistence as a citizen value (Mockus, 2002).

The Dilemma of the Appropriate Executing Agency

Because of the complex nature of citizen security projects, solutions involve a lead executing agency coordinating the action of several ministries as well as of nongovernmental actors. The choice of this lead agency affects project execution. Experience shows that in cases were the Ministry of the Interior was the lead agency, the project favored remedial interventions, information and surveillance systems and actions with the police, since these are areas of competence of the Ministry. Concomitantly, social prevention and work with communities have been weaker. Municipalities have a more balanced portfolio and are better able to coordinate action by security and social sector agencies, but cannot run projects at the national level. There is no ideal executing agency, and projects can only counteract agency weakness through institutional strengthening, for instance, by expanding the Ministry of Interior’s focus on and institutional knowledge of violence prevention.

Increase Community Involvement in Crime Prevention

Successful crime and violence prevention efforts are designed and implemented by people with a thorough understanding of their community and how to take advantage of its strengths and resources. In addition, they are more effective when all members of the community support the effort. Since crime and violence may have different characteristics in different communities, it is important to carry out a good diagnosis effort in order to design tailored initiatives involving the community. Collaboration with civil society organizations can facilitate undertaking this diagnosis. It is key to increase the involvement of communities to strengthen both social capital and assist in developing innovative solutions to succeed in reducing and preventing violence.

The Trade-offs between Long- and Short-term Impact Interventions

The first generation of Bank projects emphasized social prevention and “soft” control solutions over situational prevention, as well as more “hard” control solutions. The advantages of the former are that they fit well with Bank mandates and Charter limitations on Bank funding, and that they tend to be more cost effective. But the trade-off is that there can be long lags in terms of results, while crime and violence (as well as the average four-year length of Bank projects) require results in the short term. One
solution is to expand the range of situational prevention interventions, especially those that can have immediate results, such as street surveillance systems, target hardening measures, open phone lines for reporting domestic violence, and restrictions on the sale of alcohol, among others. This would require the expertise of architects and urban development specialists, among others, and the Bank could expand the range of expertise in the design of citizen security operations and tap the expertise of both urban development and health professionals.

The Need for Complementary Interventions

The inherent inability of viable citizen security projects to address the multiple causes of crime and violence and the call made here to narrow the range of project objectives and interventions to more manageable ones with quick results could lead to unsustainable cures unless they are complemented by other Bank investments that build social prevention over the long term, such as early childhood development programs (which are very cost-effective in reducing the probability of future criminal behavior). In addition, social protection and public works programs are called for in the short term to complement citizen security interventions especially in countries undergoing economic downturns or low growth and high unemployment. This can help avoid the surge in crime and violence that could undermine citizen security operations in execution. It would be desirable that these complementary programs include some indicators of performance in terms of violence reduction, although they clearly do not fall under the banner of citizen security operations.
Conclusions and Recommendations

The IDB was the first development bank to invest directly in violence reduction. Eight years of fruitful collaboration with Latin American and Caribbean governments and citizens have yielded some of the results and lessons spelled out in this report. The Bank’s contributions to this emerging development field have included:

• Generating estimates of and underscoring the economic costs of violence, therefore helping place the issue squarely in the region’s development agenda.

• Mainstreaming the issue of domestic violence in its development agenda and in citizen security projects by quantifying its economic costs, and drawing the links between domestic and social violence.

• Underscoring the efficiency of violence prevention approaches.

• Financing a first generation of stand-alone citizen security projects as well as research, seminars, communications and pilot interventions.

Yet challenges remain for the Bank and the region. Some of these include:

• Collecting more reliable and comparable statistics on crime and violence, giving emphasis to making visible “hidden” or under-reported forms of violence, such as violence against women, children and the elderly.

• Identifying, documenting and evaluating cost-effective interventions to prevent and reduce violence, placing emphasis on those targeting youth.

• Expanding the range of cost-effective situational violence prevention interventions in Bank projects and, more generally, developing a second generation of less complex, higher impact Bank project addressing citizen security. Seeking to complement these projects with parallel investments in social prevention, social protection and employment generation/public work programs.

• Promoting the professionalism and reforming the police forces, and keep working on defining the appropriate roles for government, citizens and development organizations, including development banks in supporting this reform process.

• Lastly, designing and including in all efforts components to measure the cost effectiveness of interventions and their impact on violent behavior. This is especially important since the promotion of citizen security is a new field, which means that most interventions have no performance record in the region.
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ANNEX I

List of IDB Seminars/Events on Violence Prevention


- April 30 to May 1, 2003. “Preventing and Responding to Urban Crime and Violence Prevention in the Latin America and Caribbean Region: The Role of Municipal Governments and Local Communities.” Washington, D.C.

List of Publications on Violence Prevention


