This document was prepared by: Carlos Santiso, Division Chief (IFD/ICS); Nathalie Alvarado, Coordinator of the Citizen Security and Justice Cluster (IFD/ICS); Karelia Villa; Rodrigo Serrano; Arnaldo Posadas; Andres Restrepo; Laura Jaitman; Dino Caprirolo; Gloriana Sojo; Viviana Vélez; Heather Sutton; Rogelio Granguillhome; Mauricio Bastien; Pavel Munguia; Nathalie Hoffman (IFD/ICS), with input from all colleagues in the IFD/ICS division. We gratefully acknowledge inputs received from Santiago Levy and Marina Bassi (VPS/VPS); Ana Maria Rodriguez and Philip Edward Keefer (IFD/IFD); and KNL.

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ANNEX

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BWC</td>
<td>Body-worn camera</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Development Bank of Latin America</td>
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<td>CSI</td>
<td>Citizen Security Initiative</td>
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<td>CSJ</td>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice</td>
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<td>DEM</td>
<td>Development Effectiveness Matrix</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>IASES</td>
<td>Instituto de Atendimento Socioeducativo do Espírito Santo [Espírito Santo Socio-Educational Support Institute]</td>
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<td>ICPC</td>
<td>International Centre for the Prevention of Crime</td>
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<td>IFD/ICS</td>
<td>Innovation in Citizen Services Division</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>LPR</td>
<td>License plate reader</td>
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<td>MBC</td>
<td>Movimento Brasil Competitivo [Competitive Brazil Movement]</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>POP</td>
<td>Problem-oriented policing</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-private partnerships</td>
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<tr>
<td>SESNSP</td>
<td>Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública [Executive Secretariat of the National Public Safety System]</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFD</td>
<td>Sector framework document</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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I. THE SECTOR FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF EXISTING REGULATIONS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY 2010-2020

A. The Citizen Security and Justice SFD as part of existing regulations

1.1 Consistent with paragraph 1.20 of “Strategies, Policies, Sector Frameworks, and Guidelines at the IDB” (document GN-2670-1), which stipulates that Sector Framework Documents (SFDs) should be updated every three years, this document replaces the Citizen Security and Justice Sector Framework Document (document GN-2771-3) approved by the Operations Policy Committee on 17 July 2014.

1.2 The Citizen Security and Justice SFD is one of 20 SFDs prepared under the framework of document GN-2670-1, which together provide a comprehensive vision of development challenges in the region. The Citizen Security and Justice SFD is complemented by the SFDs for Urban Development and Housing (document GN-2732-6), Labor (document GN-2741-7), and Education and Early Childhood Development (document GN-2708-5). These address issues relating to the revitalization of degraded urban areas; the recovery of public spaces; workforce integration for at-risk youth and juvenile offenders; violence prevention in schools and activities to develop social and cognitive skills; and vocational training programs for young people neither working nor studying nor seeking jobs.¹ This SFD also complements the SFDs for Gender and Diversity (document GN-2800-3) and Poverty and Social Protection (document GN-2784-3), in addressing issues of the prevention and treatment of violence against women, and skills development among marginalized, socially excluded, and impoverished populations.

B. The Citizen Security and Justice SFD and the IDB Institutional Strategy

1.3 The Citizen Security and Justice SFD falls within the framework of the Update to the Institutional Strategy 2010-2020 (document AB-3008) of the IDB, which prioritizes citizen security within the region’s challenges given the high levels of violence affecting citizens’ well-being. The strategy proposes to address the region’s challenges by focusing on three crosscutting dimensions that affect development in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), one of which is to strengthen institutional capacity and the rule of law.

1.4 This SFD is also aligned with the Bank’s Strategy on Social Policy for Equity and Productivity (document GN-2588-4) and the Operational Policy on Gender Equality in Development (document GN-2531-10).

II. INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE IDB’S WORK

2.1 Challenges in generating sector evidence in the region. Despite its critical importance, study of the area of citizen security and justice in the region has lagged behind. Citizen security and justice is still becoming established as a specific field of public policy and a specialized academic research discipline. Although research has increased significantly in the more developed nations, it remains incipient in the region (see Figure 1). There are substantial gaps in technical skills and knowledge

¹ These young people are often referred to as “nininís,” the Spanish term for “the neither-nor-nors.”
in the region in terms of the quality of crime statistics and evidence surrounding the effectiveness of sector policies, strategies, and interventions.

2.2 Other challenges for generating knowledge in the region in this sector are inherent to the challenges and idiosyncrasies of the sector, including: (i) a tradition of opacity in crime information; (ii) high turnover among political leaders in the sector, leading to short policy cycles and frequent shifts of priorities; (iii) the absence of long-term security strategies that can be sustained over time; and (iv) political sensitivities regarding crime data and the outcomes of crime prevention policies. There are also technical challenges in generating evidence and conducting evaluations, for example, sample size (number of prisons, neighborhoods, etc.).

2.3 **Theoretical framework.** Poor security is the result of multiple factors, associated mainly with the fragile socioeconomic conditions of the population, as well as institutional weaknesses in the entities responsible for security and justice, and a lack of social cohesion. In light of the number of possible factors related to crime and violence, this SFD has been prepared with reference to theoretical models and frameworks from various disciplines (economics, criminology, psychology), which have helped to create an understanding of criminal and antisocial behavior. Becker’s economic theory (1968) of the costs and benefits to an individual of committing a crime, and the theory of deterrence, which identifies three factors that increase the cost of committing a crime and may serve to deter criminal behavior: (i) the likelihood of being detained and sentenced; (ii) the severity of the punishment; and (iii) the swiftness of punishment (Nagin, 2015). Policies to control crime will be more effective where deterrence predominates (Durlauf and Nagin, 2011).

2.4 Secondly—and as a complement to the Becker and rational choice models—are criminological, development, life-course (Brofenbrenner, 1981; Farrington, 2003), and public health theories that explain the determinants of individuals’ criminal behavior with reference to social factors. In particular, the public health literature identifies a series of risk factors over an individual’s life course (childhood, adolescence, and adulthood) that make him or her more or less likely to become involved in crime and violence. These risks are divided into three categories: (i) individual risks (childhood trauma and abuse, intrafamily violence, harsh upbringing, alcohol, drugs, etc.); (ii) interpersonal and community risks (disadvantaged or violent neighborhoods, antisocial or delinquent peers, presence of gangs, etc.); and (iii) institutional and structural risks (poor schooling, scant work opportunities, a lack of recreational opportunities) (World Health Organization (WHO), 2002). These factors evolve over time and their interdependence shifts; this allows the profiling of individual behavior and the identification of relevant windows of opportunity for policy-making (Chioda, 2017). In summary, the likelihood that an individual will commit a crime depends on that person’s propensity to commit crime and/or expose themselves to risky situations. These situations are related to the incentives and difficulties that a person faces, such as personal experiences and history, capacity for self-control, social context, physical location, police presence, functioning of the justice system, and possible victims or partners in crime.

2.5 The evidence below is organized according to the conceptual framework that has been developed to guide Bank intervention in this sector (IDB, 2012)² and is based

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on the theories described above: (i) social prevention; (ii) situational prevention; (iii) policing; (iv) criminal justice; (v) prison system and rehabilitation; and (vi) citizen security governance. In determining the scope of the review of evidence, the main criterion for inclusion was the existence of a strategy for identifying causal effects on crime- and violence-related variables. Both experimental studies and quasi-experimental analyses were included.

A. Social prevention

2.6 Experiences and personal history influence an individual’s capacity for self-control, as well as social and emotional skills, values, education levels, and the technical skills needed to secure good employment; as a result, they can influence a person’s propensity to crime. This section is based on the structure of an individual’s life course. and so it first analyzes the evidence on domestic violence from an intergenerational transmission of violence perspective. It then analyzes the evidence regarding the effectiveness of crime prevention interventions involving children, adolescents, and young adults.

2.7 Early exposure to violence is a predictor of future violence. Studies from the United States demonstrate that exposure to violence at an early age increases the likelihood that children will subsequently become aggressors and commit violent acts (Heise, 2011; Logan et al., 2016). Research suggests that survivors of child abuse and children that have been exposed to domestic violence or other types of violence are more likely to exhibit various types of violent behavior later in life (Logan, Leeb and Barker, 2009; Duke et al., 2010; Obach et al., 2011).

2.8 There is promising evidence in terms of reducing violence against women through behavior change programs. Interventions of this nature have been implemented in Africa, the United States, and Australia, with a view to preventing and reducing violence against women. They have included programs aimed at changing social norms and traditional gender behaviors by educating parents and promoting the economic empowerment of women. In the Oxfam program “We Can”, tolerance of violence against women was reduced among the target population. Robust community randomized trials of the “Stepping Stones” and “Sister for Life” programs in South Africa found that violence against women was reduced by up to 51% over two years (Jewkes et al., 2008). Also in South Africa, the “IMAGE” program (which combines group credit-based microfinance with training in gender issues) succeeded in reducing the prevalence of physical and sexual domestic violence against women participants by 55% (Pronyk et al., 2006). The evidence in LAC is preliminary, but some programs have shown promising results. For example, Brazil’s “Program H” uses educational activities and community campaigns to help young men question traditional gender behavior and norms, including violence against women. An evaluation of the program showed a positive change in 10 out of 17 gender attitudes in the treatment group six months after implementation, while there was no significant change in the control group (Pulerwitz et al., 2006). In Chile, an evaluation of a similar program demonstrated significant improvements in

3 Some of the interventions in the social area, aimed at improving factors such as early childhood development, student retention, social inclusion, or employability, foster a range of skills and behaviors in young people that support a positive life course and can create positive externalities in terms of reducing crime and violence. Thus, the planned activities in these areas will be coordinated with the Social Sector, which addresses such issues.
attitudes to violence and gender equality among participating students (Obach et al., 2011).

2.9 The evidence is mixed, however, in terms of the impact of women’s economic empowerment programs on reducing violence against women. The best results appear to be obtained when microfinance programs for women are combined with participatory workshops and gender-oriented curricula. Perversely, the economic empowerment of women can increase the incidence of domestic violence in some situations, at least in the short term (Heise, 2011). A study by Haussherfer and Shapiro (2013) of a conditional cash transfer program in Kenya indicated that there was a significant reduction in levels of physical, sexual, and emotional violence (to close to zero) as a result of a drop in the intensity of cortisol (the hormone produced in response to stress). However, Angelucci (2008) demonstrated that although small conditional cash transfers reduced violence by 37% in rural households in Mexico, higher transfer amounts increased the aggressive behavior of spouses with traditional opinions concerning gender roles. This may be due to the fact that women’s access to large cash transfers can threaten the masculine identity of their spouse. Hidrobo et al. (2013) conducted a randomized experiment to evaluate cash transfer programs in Ecuador, and found that this type of policy had positive effects in terms of reducing violence against women, with the impact increasing where women are more educated. In the United States, reductions in the gender wage gap account for 9% of the reduction in domestic violence between 1990 and 2003 (Aizer, 2011). Lastly, while there is no evidence that social communication campaigns can prevent violence in isolation, robust evaluations point to significant changes in service awareness and usage, gender attitudes, and acceptance of violence against women and girls (Ellsberg et al., 2015).

2.10 One-stop centers for female victims reduce violence. Agüero (2013) examined the role of one-stop centers for women in Peru, and demonstrated that women living in districts with one-stop centers were less likely to be victims of violence. Moreover, experimental evaluations conducted in Washington, D.C. (Kiely et al., 2010) and Hong Kong (Tiwari et al., 2005) revealed significantly lower rates of revictimization among pregnant victims of violence that had received psychosocial support.

2.11 There is evidence of the importance and cost-effectiveness of breaking the cycle of violence starting at an early age (Heckman, 2014). Research into crime and violence has traditionally focused on adolescents and adults. This is motivated by the age profile of victims in the region, which identifies young people and young adults as high-risk populations. In recent years, one branch of the literature has placed emphasis on the family as a conduit for policies to mitigate crime and violence, focusing on helping children to control and limit aggressive behaviors throughout their lives (Heckman, 2006). This branch is based on evidence concerning the way chronically disruptive behavior at an early age leads to criminal behavior in adolescence and adulthood, and the ways in which parental behavior can influence long-term criminal behavior from an early age (Knudsen et al., 2006).

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4 For example, a randomized, controlled trial found that application of the South African program “Sisters for Life” to small groups of women, combined with an existing microfinance program, reduced intimate partner violence by 51% over two years. A second study of the same program found that the positive impact on violence was more a function of training than of the microcredit component (Kim et al., 2009, p. 824).
2.12 Early childhood stimulation programs prevent future antisocial behavior. Investment in the first three to five years of life through early childhood stimulation programs represents a promising intervention for reducing aggression and criminal behavior over the long term. These investments create a solid foundation for developing the cognitive and psychosocial tools in children that are central to achieving positive results over an entire lifetime (Chioda, 2017). One of the most studied programs is the Perry Preschool Project in the United States, which focused on low-income, preschool-aged children with low IQ. The program was based on an active education model that emphasized the participants’ intellectual and social development (Parks, 2000). The program yielded a cost-benefit of US$12.9 for each dollar invested, a substantial proportion of which was attributed to the reduction in rates of criminality among participants (Bellied et al., 2006). In LAC, these programs are still very recent and have not been evaluated with any great frequency. The Programa Hogares Comunitarios de Bienestar [Community Welfare Homes Program] in Colombia has produced encouraging results in terms of child cognitive development (CAF, 2014). However, it is still too early to determine the impact of this program on crime.

2.13 Home visit programs have proven successful in mitigating short-, medium-, and long-term criminal behavior. Home visit programs have yielded relatively positive effects over the life course of treatment groups. One of the best examples of this is the Nurse-Family Partnership program in the United States, which focuses on providing support to low-income pregnant women not only in the prenatal period, but also during the first two years of life (CAF, 2014). Program outcomes benefited not only mothers, but also the children over time. The Nurse-Family Partnership was successful in reducing the likelihood that children would participate in criminal activity in adolescence and adulthood, while reducing risky behaviors among mothers and improving child cognitive and noncognitive capacities (Olds et al., 1997; Heckman and Kautz, 2014; Chioda, 2017). There are two promising interventions in the region: in Chile (Aracena et al., 2009) and Jamaica (Walker et al., 2011). In the case of Chile, it is still too early to evaluate the impact of the intervention on criminal behavior, but the study has shown positive results in terms of improving the mothers’ mental and nutritional health and linguistic development among the children. In the case of Jamaica, youth participation in physical aggressions or aggressive behaviors has declined in frequency, together with levels of depression and social inhibition.

2.14 How to prevent violence in adolescence? To mitigate the risk factors that lead to violent behavior in young adults and adolescents, protective factors need to be understood. Factors that can be reinforced by means of specific interventions include flexible and adaptable temperament; conciliatory personal traits; positive social interaction; stable and positive links with family members, teachers, or other adults; a commitment to education and school activities; friends or peers with

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5 Participating children attended preschool for 2.5 hours from Monday to Friday over a two-year period. Over the same period, the ratio of children to adults was 1:5, which enabled the teachers to visit the homes of each participant for 1.5 hours each week. In addition, parents participated in monthly group sessions facilitated by program administrators.

6 Protective factors are those personal, social, and institutional resources that foster the successful development of adolescents, or that reduce the risk of impaired development or criminal behavior (Jessor et al., 1995).
positive behaviors; and peaceful conflict resolution skills (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 2004; Resnick et al., 2004).

2.15 **Education helps to protect against crime.** The vast majority of evidence concerning education programs to reduce violence emanates from developed countries. Empirical studies have concluded that the quality of education, of education levels, and the duration of schooling have a negative impact on crime and rates of imprisonment. In the United States, Lochner and Moretti (2004) found that a one-year increase education levels reduced state detention rates by 15% on average. Deming (2011) showed that attending a first-choice school led to a 50% reduction in criminal activity among high-risk youths, with effects that persisted seven years after the random allocation. In the United Kingdom, Machin, Marie, and Vujčić (2011) found that a one-year increase in male education levels reduced incarceration rates by 20%. The same causal mechanism was studied by Hjalmarsson, Holmlund, and Lindquist (2015), who concluded that an additional year of education reduced the youth incarceration rate by almost 15.5% in Sweden. Jacob and Lefgren (2003) demonstrated that the level of serious property crimes committed by adolescents falls by 14% on school days.

2.16 **There is evidence to support the effectiveness of school-based youth violence prevention programs in LAC.** In Colombia, for example, a randomized experiment in schools participating in the “Aulas en Paz” [Classrooms at Peace] program showed improved social integration and significant reductions (of up to 10%) in aggressive behavior (Chaux, 2012). In Jamaica, the Youth Development Program, which provides counseling and life skills training to strengthen the social and emotional capacities of young people that have dropped out of school, was successful in reducing aggressive behaviors among young people (Guerra et al., 2010). In Brazil, the “Abrindo Espaços” [Creating Spaces] program conducted in Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco showed a reduction in youth violence of between 14% and 16% in participating schools compared with a control group (Waiselfisz and Maciel, 2003). In Barbados, the school-based “Peace Ambassadors” program has helped more than 150 young leaders in more than seven secondary schools to influence their peers to resolve disputes peacefully. In Chile, programs aimed at reducing young people’s exposure to opportunities for risky behavior (for instance, by lengthening time spent at school from a half day to a whole day) showed an average reduction of 21.7 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants (17.5%). The greatest reductions were seen in property crime, which fell by 22% (Berthelon and Kruger, 2011).

2.17 **Counseling and cognitive and behavioral therapies have also proven effective in enhancing self-control and resilience among at-risk youth.** The “Becoming a Man” program in Chicago, for instance, uses cognitive behavioral and psychosocial therapies to treat adolescents, showing reductions of up to 44% in arrests for violent offenses, though the impact diminishes over time (Heller et al., 2013). Similarly, empirical analyses of the YouthBuild USA Offender program, which provides employment and educational training to young offenders between 16 and 24 years of age, showed improvements in educational capacity, with participants graduating with bachelor’s degrees. Other, similar programs are based on multistystemic therapy, which aims to reduce antisocial behavior among young people by providing home-based services that focus on strengthening parenting skills, family relationships, and young people’s social networks (school, community, classmates).
A study that reviewed this program four years after implementation found evidence that it had been effective in improving family relationships and in reducing recidivism by 63% (Bourduin et al., 1995). Sawyer and Boudin (2011) also found that the positive impact of multisystemic therapy persisted over the long term, reducing the number of arrests for serious offenses by 36% and the number of days of detention in adult centers by 33% over a 22-year reporting period following the completion of initial treatment. An example of a mentoring program is the “Big Brothers, Big Sisters” program, which focuses on at-risk youth in single-parent households and promotes positive relationships between adults and young people (positive role models). Evaluations of the effectiveness of this program show that 46% of participating youths are less likely to use drugs, and 32% are less conflict-prone (Waller, 2014).

2.18 There are promising programs that aim to reduce violence by strengthening links between youths and the community. In England, the “Youth Inclusion Program” seeks to link at-risk youth to their communities as productive members through mentoring, academic assistance, and developmental support. A preliminary evaluation of the program carried out from 2003 to 2006 reported a 59% reduction in juvenile arrests and a 25% decline in criminal acts in targeted communities (Laliberté, 2015). The “Cure Violence Chicago” program, which adopts a public health approach, aims to break the cycle of violence and social intolerance in communities by developing peaceful dispute-resolution capabilities. The impact evaluation of this program in Chicago (Skogan et al., 2009) highlights a reduction of 41% to 73% in the number of gang-related shootings and murders in five of the eight targeted communities (Skogan, 2009). This program has yielded mixed results when implemented in other contexts. In LAC, Trinidad and Tobago recently adopted the model in 16 communities, under the “REASON” program. Though it is still too early for final outcomes, a mid-term evaluation showed promising preliminary results.

One innovative example in this area is the “E-Responder” program in New York, which uses new technologies to identify conflicts between young people on social networks and prevent potential criminal acts. Preliminary results from an impact evaluation of this program showed that the interventions succeeded in mitigating conflict by 40% (Citizen Crime Commission of New York, 2017).

2.19 The evidence regarding employment as a disincentive to criminality is mixed. Recent research has found that unemployment among disadvantaged youths affects the risk that they will commit crimes. It is also been shown that employment is not always sufficient to prevent criminal behavior if the knowledge and soft skills

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8 Though there were no significant changes in homicides and shootings compared with communities without the program, there were significant changes in woundings and attempted homicides, as well as reductions in calls to the police to report armed individuals and homicides (Maguire, Corsaro, and Oakley 2016).
necessary to secure access to quality, well-paid employment are not cultivated (Lustig and Liem, 2010). Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell (2008) analyze a major vocational training program for disadvantaged youths in the United States and show that approximately 29% of program participants were arrested over a 48-month reporting period (compared with 33% of youths in the control group). However, the authors concluded that once all measurable positive effects were taken into account, program costs were so high that they exceeded benefits for the full sample under most scenarios. Nonetheless, there is convincing—albeit limited—evidence concerning the effectiveness of short-term, low-cost programs such as summer employment. Heller (2014) found that assigning youths to a summer work program, accompanied by cognitive behavioral therapy, reduced violence by 43% over 16 months (3.95 fewer arrests for violent crime per 100 youths). Lastly, Gelber, Isen, and Kessler (2014) studied New York City’s lottery-based youth employment program and found that program participation led to a 10% reduction in incarceration rates compared with the baseline.

2.20 **Conditional cash transfer programs have also created positive externalities in terms of crime and violence prevention.** Although the objective of these programs is not to reduce violence, there is evidence that they have helped to reduce family-based risk factors while supporting positive behaviors among young people. The positive externalities of these programs were assessed in the case of the “Bolsa Familia” conditional cash transfer program in Brazil, which was initially designed as a strategy for poverty reduction. The program has shown a significant reduction in crime rates in neighborhoods close to schools (Chioda et al., 2012; Loueiro, 2012). The “Familias en Acción” [Families in Action] program in Colombia also helped to reduce crime (Camacho and Mejia, 2013), with robberies and car thefts declining in particular (by 7.2% and 1.3%, respectively). However, the program has not been able to demonstrate an impact in terms of discouraging young people from becoming involved in criminal activity.

2.21 **The private sector and civil society play a key role in supporting well-being and security in communities.** If citizen security strategies are to achieve greater impact, results, and sustainability, they must involve not only different areas of government, but also civil society and the private sector (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime [ICPC], World Bank, Sou da Paz Institute, 2011). The private sector creates employment and helps to support social and economic progress in communities. It can also provide innovation, resources, and skills to local communities (Crime Prevention International, 2011). Over the last decade, interest in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the area of crime and violence prevention has grown due to concern regarding the costs imposed by criminality, corporate social responsibility, and the emergence of social philanthropy (ICPC, World Bank, Sou da Paz Institute, 2011). An evaluation of Target’s “Safe City” program in the U.S. found that the success of this PPP—which brings together local police, neighboring businesses, and community leaders to address criminal activity in retail stores—was linked to the level of collaboration in analyzing problems of delinquency and the shared development of a response plan. Positive changes were observed in perceptions of safety of personnel in the communities, as well as reductions in crime in two of the four areas studied (La Vigne et al., 2009). In LAC, however, despite growth in PPPs, there is relatively little information regarding their outcomes.
or impact in terms of their ability to prevent or reduce crime and violence. Other significant examples include the case of Ciudad Juárez in Mexico. The city uses public-private sector forums, online tools, and social networks to promote collaboration between small and medium-sized enterprises and the federal police for addressing reported crimes, combating violence, and transforming neighborhoods into safe areas with prosperous businesses. In addition, Movimento Brasil Competitivo [Competitive Brazil Movement] (MBC) introduces private sector management processes in the public sector, resulting in better public services at lower cost. In the State of Pernambuco, the government, with MBC assistance, lowered the crime rate from 54 to 47 per 100,000 inhabitants, a reduction of 13.4% in a period of 12 months.

2.22 Lastly, an innovative financial instrument in LAC, social impact bonds, offers the potential to leverage additional funding and promote innovative solutions in social and security policies. Social impact bonds are contracts between the government and an external organization, where the government pays for a service only when the external organization meets preset targets.

B. Situational prevention

2.23 Disorganized physical spaces (abandoned infrastructure, trash, graffiti) and social disorder (street fights, the open consumption of alcohol or drugs) are important for understanding the relationship between crime and location. Such disorder may indicate institutional failings, as well as a lack of social capital to support intervention for the common good. This, in turn, influences the opportunities and incentives for committing crime (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999).

2.24 Improvements in the physical environment alone are insufficient to reduce or prevent crime over the long term. The model of intervention generally used—“Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design”—offers recommendations for the planning, design, and management of the physical environment, with a view to reducing urban crime (Cooke, 2003; Kruger et al., 2001). However, there are no experimental evaluations to indicate the impact in terms of deterring crime. Robust studies are helping to build knowledge regarding the characteristics of the physical environment and their impact on crime and violence. For example, Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005) used an experimental evaluation to demonstrate that physical revitalization—reflected in the relocation of families to social housing developments—reduced arrests for violent crime among youths compared with a control group. However, behavioral problems and property crimes increased in the case of young males. The positive effects were not maintained over time.

2.25 The quality of the physical environment, when combined with social interventions, can affect crime and violence. This is particularly the case for the improvement of informal urban neighborhoods, which is approached using combined investments in

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9 Promising examples of PPPs in the region that involve various private, public, and community stakeholders include “Bogotá Cómo Vamos” [How’s It Going, Bogotá], in Colombia; “Paz Activa y Paz Educa” [Peace Activates and Peace Educates] in Chile; “Sistema de Formación de Animadores Juveniles Comunitarios” [Training System for Young Community Leaders] in Argentina; “Papo de Responsa” [Chat Projects] in Brazil; and “Tijuana Innovadora” [Innovative Tijuana] in Mexico.

10 http://ficosec.org/.

11 In 2014, the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) launched a US$5.3 million program to promote the first social impact bonds in Latin America.
basic infrastructure and social and urban services. These programs have become increasingly integrated over time, incorporating other variables such as support for vulnerable groups and citizen security (Brakarz et al., 2002; Urban Development and Housing SFD, 2013). UN-Habitat’s “Safer Cities” program is another example of a comprehensive neighborhood improvement program designed with focus on security. This model promotes the planning and implementation of safe urban designs through partnerships between local governments, the police, the private sector, and civil society, with a view to (i) strengthening the social fabric, (ii) reducing inequality, (iii) improving the urban physical environment, and (iv) promoting local governance (UN-Habitat, 2007). These interventions, where comprehensive, have shown positive effects in terms of crime reduction, perceptions of the risk of violence, and trust in institutions. For example, in addition to improving infrastructure and public spaces, the “Programa Urbano Integral” [Comprehensive Urban Program] in Medellín, Colombia supported cultural activities, contributing significantly to improvements in citizen security in targeted neighborhoods (UN-Habitat, 2011). Nonetheless, Galiani et al. (2014) found that improvements to housing in El Salvador’s slums failed to influence crime, though they did improve perceptions of safety in the home by 27%. In terms of interventions seeking to reduce opportunities for crime, there have been a number of cases where the sale of alcohol was restricted as part of comprehensive programs to reduce crime. This measure instituted in Bogotá (Colombia) and in Diadema (Brazil), along with others, reduced the number of homicides in Bogotá by around 74% in 1993-2004, and in Diadema by 70% in 1999-2005 (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2010).

2.26 Evidence remains weak regarding the impact of other situational prevention mechanisms, including closed-circuit TV, public lighting, policing of public spaces, security guards, certification of safe homes, and residential alarms. Fresh research needs to be conducted that limits biases in the selection process and ensures sufficient statistical power. There is some evidence from the region pointing to the weak effectiveness of closed-circuit TV as a strategy (Firminio and Trevisan, 2012) and the potential for displacing criminal activity (Gómez et al., 2017; Munyo and Rossi, 2016).

C. Police professionalization

2.27 There is ample evidence showing that police presence and patrolling strategies support reductions in crime and violence. Police presence acts as a disincentive as it increases the probability of arrest, while new policing intervention strategies enhance the effectiveness of police action and, accordingly, the likelihood that criminals will be captured. In both cases, the risks associated with criminal involvement are heightened; they also create greater public confidence in police performance and improve the incentives to report crime.

2.28 A lack of efficiency and effectiveness in policing heightens perceptions of insecurity. A perception that the police force is incapable of maintaining order creates a lack of confidence among citizens regarding the capacities of the criminal justice system and law enforcement generally (Ahmad et al., 2011). Crime victims tend to trust institutions (including the police) 10% less than those who have not been victims. Similarly, there is a correlation between crime and citizens’ behavior. Where levels of insecurity are higher, citizens exhibit less willingness to value police work and to collaborate with it (Corbacho et al., 2012).
Cases of corruption or abuse of power on the part of the police have a significantly negative impact on public confidence, particularly among minorities. Although only a limited number of officers are responsible for a disproportionate number of complaints from citizens, this has a negative impact on public perceptions. In the U.S., effective early warning systems are being developed to facilitate identification of those officers at greatest risk of engaging in misconduct (Durose et al., 2002; Kenney, 2004; and Kenney, 2008). Internal control mechanisms and protocols have also been developed for case management, including the identification, investigation, and resolution of complaints (Kenney, 2013). Nonetheless, given a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of such control processes carried out by the police themselves, a wide range of other, externally based control mechanisms has arisen (Miller, 2002).

Evidence shows that police effectiveness in preventing and addressing crime depends on close interaction with citizens (Lum and Nagin, 2016). The main role of the police is to prevent, identify, and address problems experienced in the community (Goldstein, 1979; Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Although technological improvements are essential, greater willingness on the part of citizens to report crimes and provide detailed information to the police has had a significant effect on police effectiveness in the past (Kenney, 2013). In fact, with the exception of cases such as corruption and organized crime, citizens do report the majority of crimes that occur in their communities to the police (Bayley, 1998). Technology has helped to facilitate closer communication between police officers and their communities (McGovern, 2017).

Police effectiveness and efficiency cannot be ensured by implementation of any single model. Policing models can be categorized according to three types of objectives: controlling crime, maintaining order, and providing public or social services. The weight of each of these categories depends on the expectations of citizens, the nature of crime, social cohesion, and the capacity of each police agency (Wilson, 1978; Kenney, 2013). Thus, no single model can ensure police effectiveness and efficiency. The effectiveness in reducing crime of patrol models adapted to local contexts has been confirmed since the first evaluations in the United States, for example, community-oriented policing (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Wycoff, 1998) or problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1979).

Models of community (or proximity) policing have helped to strengthen relations between police forces and communities for the prevention, investigation, and resolution of crime. The concept of community policing has been used to describe a variety of programs (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988). However, community policing consists of changes in organization and police culture, as well as alterations in decision-making processes regarding policing and proximity of the police force to the community. Where priorities and the means of achieving them are defined by the community and the police officers assigned to the area. In other words, it is a process rather than a product, structured around three components: citizen engagement, problem resolution, and decentralization (Skogan, 2005). The success of these actions depends on the ability of the police to listen to citizens, take on board the problems they identify, and try to solve them (Wycoff, 1988). The interventions that have been evaluated, such as Chicago’s “Alternative Policing
show a statistically significant reduction in crime in the majority of areas where the model has been implemented (Skogan et al., 1998). In LAC, community policing models such as Chile’s “Plan Cuadrante de Carabineros” [Quadrant Policing Plan] and Colombia’s “Plan Nacional de Vigilancia Comunitaria por Cuadrantes” [National Plan for Quadrant Community Policing] have succeeded in reducing the rates for certain types of crime. An evaluation of the Colombian program’s effectiveness pointed to a 22% reduction in homicides in the eight targeted cities. Police officers’ sense of responsibility towards citizens and their level of motivation also improved (Mejía et al., 2013). Other examples in the region include the “Comuna Segura” [Safer Commune] program in Chile, which was successful in reducing crime with community support (Ruprah, 2008), and community policing stations in certain areas of São Paulo in Brazil, which reduced the fear of crime and increased confidence in the police in targeted areas (Frühling et al.; and Kahn, 2000). There is also qualitative evidence regarding efforts to increase legitimacy and trust in police agencies in the Caribbean countries by taking a community policing approach. In Barbados, for example, a citizen security survey in 2010 showed very positive public opinion of the community police force compared with the other seven Caribbean countries (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2013).

Recent assessments have demonstrated the effectiveness of the problem-oriented policing (POP) model in reducing crime. More than a policing practice, this model is a philosophy derived from community policing, which seeks not only to address the immediate concerns of the community, but also the underlying factors leading to crime and criminal behavior in the long term (Goldstein, 1979). It focuses on locations where crime occurs, or on those people most likely to be victims or perpetrators of crime. This is based on evidence that criminal acts tend to be concentrated in certain locations at certain times of the day. Likewise, the majority of crimes are committed by a small percentage of offenders, while a small number of victims account for most cases of victimization (Braga, 2012). Numerous studies, including a recent one by the IDB (2016), have confirmed the “law of crime concentration at place”, showing that crime is concentrated in certain geographical areas, is stable over time and in space in a small number of “hot spots”, and only on a limited number of specific city street segments (Eck and Weisburd, 1995; Evans and Herbert, 1989; Felson, 1987; Gill et al., 2016; Ajzenman and Jaitman, 2016; Pierce et al., 1988; Sherman, 1989; Weisburd, Maher, and Sherman, 1992; Weisburd and Green, 1995). Careful analysis of crime problems in hot spots will yield policing strategies that not only respond to crime, but can also prevent it by understanding and addressing the situations and dynamics that lead to crimes in those specific places (Braga and Weisburd, 2012). Several evaluations of patrolling interventions focused on specific locations have shown positive results (Braga et al., 2014; Weisburd and Eck, 2004). Randomized controlled trials of policing interventions in hot spots have generally shown statistically significant reductions in crime, nonsignificant immediate spatial displacement, and some evidence of a diffusion of benefits (Bowers et al., 2011).

Relatively little is known regarding the effectiveness of new security technologies. There is evidence that better information management and analysis can contribute to better predictions of crime and in certain cases to reductions in
crime. An analysis of the effects of a modern program of information integration and monitoring for patrols in Brazil demonstrated that property crimes were reduced by 24% and personal crimes by 13% (Soares and Viveiros, 2010). A related study by Garicano and Heaton (2010) concluded that information technology investments, where linked to specific organizational and management practices, could increase police productivity (as in the case of CompStat, New York’s police management system). There is also little evidence that the use of technological equipment is effective in reducing rates of violence. In one study, Taylor and Boba (2011) used a randomized controlled trial to measure the impact of vehicle license plate readers (LPRs) on auto theft. They found that while LPR technology significantly improved the numbers of license plates checked, as well as the recovery of stolen vehicles and the apprehension of car thieves, there was no effect in terms of reducing rates of auto theft. Another randomized experiment found that the availability of technology per se did not improve officers’ effectiveness in reducing crime (Lum et al., 2015). An extensive review by Lum et al. (2015) of police officers’ use body-worn cameras (BWCs) found that there was insufficient evidence to confirm the effectiveness of this innovation. Recent studies are beginning to yield some answers. For example, it seems that officers do not necessarily have negative attitudes towards BWCs in general (see, for example, Ellis et al., 2015; Jennings et al., 2015; Owens et al., 2014). However, their impact in terms of improving citizen satisfaction, accountability, police forces, or citizens’ behavior remains unclear. For example, Ariel et al. (2015) found that BWCs reduced the use of incidents involving force, but Katz et al. (2015) found that arrests by officers wearing BWCs increased (Owens et al., 2014).

2.35 Studies have shown that police stations to deal specifically with violence against women have had mixed results. The existence of such stations facilitates official access by the victim to the criminal justice system. However, it has not necessarily contributed to reduction in violence against women. Studies of police stations in Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru have demonstrated that these have helped to boost public awareness of violence against women. (UN Women, 2011). However, victims do not generally receive the type of assistance guidance they need, and staff training is inadequate or absent (Jubb et al., 2010). Lastly, it should be emphasized that partnerships between police and communities are key to addressing violence against women. In the U.S., for example, a comparative study demonstrated the effectiveness of such partnerships for improving police services and victim protection, as well as for ensuring that these crimes do not go unnoticed or unattended (Worden, 2001).

D. Criminal justice

2.36 In addition to police forces, the criminal justice system also includes public prosecutors and the courts, which are essential to ensuring the proper and effective administration of justice. Swift and decisive judicial action by these institutions helps to reduce crime and violence by discouraging criminal behavior and incapacitating offenders (through incarceration). As analyzed below, the evidence suggests that it is better for the criminal justice system to emphasize prevention and deterrence, rather than punishment alone (increasing the prison population). Nonetheless, it does suggest that the impact of incapacitation is greater when applied to the most dangerous criminals.
The evidence confirms that sentence severity has an effect in deterring crime. It seems obvious, in principle, that the imposition of more severe sentences by the penal system constitutes a better means of deterring crime. For example, an analysis by Philippe (2013) showed that more severe sentences reduced recidivism rates by 5%. Similar results are reported by Drago et al. (2009), who evaluated the impact of an increase in the length of sentences during the great Italian amnesty of 2006, concluding that where an increase of approximately 25% in sentences is expected, the propensity to reoffend falls by around 18% over seven months. Bell (2014) has shown that increases in sentence severity introduced in response to the August 2011 riots in London led to a 13% reduction in riot-related crimes.

Nonetheless, numerous studies have confirmed that incapacitation through long sentences does not deter potential criminals and is therefore ineffective in reducing crime. Stolzenberg and D’Alessio (1997) studied the effect of more severe sentences for reoffenders (“three strikes” laws) in California, and concluded that these did not have a significant effect in terms of reducing lesser and violent crimes. Lee and McCravy (2009) studied changes in recidivism among young people in conflict with the law, who after turning 18 faced changes in sentence severity. The authors found that behavioral changes among minors turning 18 are marginal. Durlauf and Nagin (2011) find that longer sentences generate less deterrence for a given level of punishment. In summary, a deterrent effect cannot be created through incapacitation alone (Nagin, 2013). In addition, Buonanno and Raphael (2013) have shown that the preventive impact of prison declines where incarceration rates increase.

There is evidence that incapacitation through incarceration fails to deter crime or reduce recidivism. Experimental or quasi-experimental studies demonstrate that imprisonment not only fails to reduce recidivism, but also has criminological effects, particularly in the case of individuals rated as being at low risk of offending (Bench and Allen, 2003; Cullen, Jonson, and Nagin, 2011). For example, the negative consequences associated with incarceration include (i) an individual’s future predisposition to commit crime, due mainly to social interaction with more experienced prisoners, which can lead them to develop criminal skills as their human capital depreciates (Steffensmeier and Ulmer, 2005); (ii) a sense of resentment against society (Sherman, 1993) and strengthening of the offender’s “abnormal identity” (Matsueda, 1992); (iii) the social and economic stigmatization of individuals, which in turn creates a series of cumulative disadvantages; and (iv) a reduction in family and community links, and a severing of links with employment and education entities (Darul and Nagin, 2011). Different researchers, such as Drago et al. (2011), have shown that harsh prison conditions actually intensify criminal activity upon release. Chen and Shapiro (2007), taking advantage of a discontinuity in the assignment of federal inmates to different security levels, arrive at the same conclusion. Gaes and Camp (2009) show that when criminals are placed at higher levels of security than are warranted, they tend to have higher levels of recidivism than when they are placed at the correct security level.

Incarceration has criminological effects on low-level offenders. Alternative sentencing is a promising option. In the case of low-risk offenders, investing in custodial sentences or policies that increase sentence severity does not, based on the evidence presented, appear the most efficient means of preventing and reducing crime, as the effects of sentence severity on recidivism are minimal. It should be
noted that the evidence stems from the United States in particular, which has one of the highest rates of incarceration in the world and lower rates of crime than LAC countries. In any case, custodial sentences do not appear to have deterrent effects compared to alternative sentencing. Instead, as mentioned previously, incarceration can increase recidivism compared to noncustodial sentences, independent of sentence length (Nagin, 2013). A similar study by Spohn and Holleran (2002) of recidivism rates among more than 1,500 serious offenders in Kansas City showed that incarcerated offenders were significantly more likely to be arrested (2.3 times), sentenced (1.8 times), and incarcerated (2.2 times) for a new offense than those receiving alternative sentences. The authors also found that incarceration has a more pronounced criminogenic impact on drug offenders than on offenders incarcerated for other types of crimes. Similarly, a random evaluation of four juvenile courts in the U.S.\textsuperscript{13} confirmed the positive impact of alternative measures when compared to prosecution through the regular courts (Stickle et al., 2008). A recent systematic review of 29 experimental studies involving a total of 7,304 juveniles concluded that the processing of minors through the criminal justice system is linked to an average increase of between 5% and 6% in crime rates (Petrosino et al., 2010).

2.41 Experimental studies of the effectiveness of drug or drug treatment courts as an alternative sentence for those found guilty of minor offenses and suffering from addiction have found that recidivism rates among participants are substantially lower than in control groups. They have also been shown to be more cost-effective. Gottfredson and Exum (2002) conducted an evaluation of Baltimore City’s drug treatment court, in which 235 eligible individuals were randomly assigned to either a drug treatment court or traditional treatment. The authors showed that after one year, 48% of drug treatment court participants had been arrested for repeat offenses, compared with 64% of those participating in traditional methods. Similarly, Gottfredson et al. (2003) found that the program remained effective after two years (the rearrest rate in the treatment group was 66%—15% lower than that of the control group), and even after three years (Gottfredson et al., 2006). A quasi-experimental evaluation by Rempel, Green, and Kralstein (2012) provides evidence that participating in drug courts reduces criminal behavior: after 18 months, drug courts reduced the probability of recidivism by almost one quarter compared with the control group (from 64% to 49%), and the total number of criminal acts by more than half (from 110.1 to 52.5). Nonetheless, Deschenes and Turner (1995) analyzed a post-adjudication program for probationers with a first-time felony conviction for drug possession and found no statistically significant differences in terms of new arrests between participants in the drug court program and those on probation. The absence of an effect was attributed to treatment that failed to include sufficient elements of community service, restitution, and education (Gottfredson et al., 2003).

2.42 Another alternative approach is electronic monitoring. The results of studies to monitor offender movements have been mixed, very likely due to insufficiently robust evaluation design (Latessa et al., 2002). However, the results of a number of electronic monitoring evaluations have yielded promising results in terms of reducing recidivism, but knowledge in this field remains nascent. A study by Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2013) in the Province of Buenos Aires randomly allocated offenders

\textsuperscript{13} Juvenile courts are venues in which alternative programs (community service, addiction therapies, educational projects, etc.) may be mandated instead of prison for young people accused of minor offenses.
to judges with different preferences regarding electronic monitoring as a sentencing option. The authors found that electronic monitoring, as a substitute for incarceration, led to a reduction of between 11 and 16 percentage points in recidivism rates. Similarly, in Sweden, Marklund and Holmberg (2009) compared an early release program involving electronic home monitoring with a control group; they found that 38% of the control group had been tried for new offenses during the monitoring period, while the corresponding proportion in the early-release group was 26%. In addition, Bales et al. (2010) used propensity score matching to determine the impact of electronic monitoring on medium and high-risk offenders in the state of Florida, finding that it reduces the risk of supervision revocations or absconding by 31%.

2.43 Other types of less-studied alternative sentences include day fines. In one of the few evaluations of this type of intervention, Turner and Petersilia (1996) make use of the implementation of a day-fine program for offenders in Maricopa County (Phoenix, Arizona), offered to low-risk offenders as an alternative to routine probation. The authors showed that lower supervision levels for participating offenders did not lead to any increase in recidivism, with an arrest rate of 11% among participants after one year, compared with 17% in the comparison group. Lastly, community service appears very promising in terms of reducing recidivism. A study by Wermink et al. (2010) in Holland concluded that recidivism was significantly lower among offenders that had completed community service (28%) compared with those that had been incarcerated (52%). Other approaches worth highlighting—due not only to their innovative features but also their lower costs of implementation (compared to incarceration)—are restorative justice and community sentences. For example, in a meta-analysis of 519 studies, Sherman et al. (2015) showed that restorative justice conferences led to a decrease of between 7% and 45% in repeat convictions/arrests two years after random assignment, finding these to be a cost-effective approach. Similarly, Villetaz et al. (2006), in an analysis of 300 studies, concluded that there were no significant differences between community custody and noncustodial sentences in terms of reductions in recidivism. However, when propensity score matching studies were included, the authors reported a reduction in recidivism as a result of noncustodial sentences. Potential savings from the use of community sentences are substantial given the much higher costs of incarceration.

2.44 Evidence is scant regarding the effectiveness of programs to improve access and congestion in the justice system. Initiatives worth highlighting in LAC include the Free Legal Assistance Centers (ALEGRAS) or mobile justice units in Peru, and Colombia’s juzgados de paz [magistrates’ courts], the objectives of which are to bring the justice system closer to the population by offering an affordable forum for resolving conflicts, particularly in the area of civil law; as well as Colombia’s conciliation centers, the purpose of which is to resolve family and civil disputes without recourse to the courts. However, as mentioned earlier, the operation and effectiveness of these methods have not yet been the subject of rigorous evaluations (Pousadela, 2013). Similarly, a number of programs that have shown reductions in case resolution times lack rigorous evaluations—for example, “Justicia en Línea de México [Online Justice in Mexico]” and “Digitización de Expedientes Judiciales en Lima Norte [Digitization of Court Case Files in Northern Lima],” among others.
Increased access to justice among women has an impact on the investigation of cases of violence against women. Recent qualitative studies of programs that promote access to justice for women have shown positive effects in improvements in victim support and the prosecution and sentencing of perpetrators. However, the evidence on the causal relationship between impunity and violence against women is still rudimentary. Several countries have recently experimented with innovative approaches to improving access to justice for women, such as specialized courts for domestic violence in Brazil, Spain, the U.S., Uruguay, and Venezuela. The impact of these reforms on violence against women remains to be seen, but some studies show that they are improving attitudes and encouraging rejection of these behaviors (UNFPA, 2009). Protective orders can help to reduce violence against women under certain conditions (Logan and Waker, 2010). Lastly, “comisarías de familia” [family police services] or “coordinated community response” provide interdisciplinary support to protect the rights of women and children in cases of domestic violence, sexual abuse, and restraining orders. These have proven effective in improving service coordination and the quality of assistance to victims, but results have been mixed in terms of their impact on the reduction and prevention of violence against women (Post et al., 2010).

E. Prisoner rehabilitation and reintegration

One of the objectives of prison institutions is to reduce crime by rehabilitating and reintegrating criminals. However, this objective is affected by living conditions in these institutions, as well as by security levels and a lack of sufficient resources, capabilities, and programs.

Punitive conceptions of the prison system have been shown to be ineffective (Hedeerson et al., 2007; MacKenzie, 2006). In this context, and given continued growth in the region’s prison population, the purpose of prison has been the subject of ongoing debate, leading to a reassessment of the concept of retributive justice in favor of a more restorative (nonpunitive) approach. The concept of social rehabilitation may be defined as “a structured effort to change the attitudes and behavior of prisoners, focused on eliminating future criminal behavior” (Pollock, 1997). In this way, well-designed and effectively implemented social rehabilitation programs can not only reduce criminal behavior, but also provide stability and order in prisons, reduce idleness among prisoners, and relieve the stress of being incarcerated. Similarly, rehabilitation supports the social, economic, and workforce reintegration of former prisoners, thus helping to reduce recidivism. Lipsey and Cullen (2007) reviewed eight meta-analyses covering 18 years of research, and in all of these, rehabilitation treatment was reported to have favorable effects, with an average reduction in recidivism of between 10% and 40%. These reductions were significant for young people and adults in residential and community treatment environments.

The key to effectiveness in rehabilitation programs is knowing how and for whom these work (Miranda, 2013). Although the evidence has confirmed that structural conditions of overcrowding prevent the effective implementation of treatment and rehabilitation programs (Snyder and Sickmund, 2006), essential features can be identified that support success in these programs. For example, no program can yield positive results without a conscious and voluntary decision by prisoners in favor of individual transformation (Villagra and Viano, 2008). Likewise,
rehabilitation programs that have been proven effective in reducing recidivism are those that successfully combine individual needs, circumstances, and learning styles (Petersilia, 2003). To this end, tools have been developed to identify basic principles of “Risk, Need, and Responsivity” (Bonta and Andrews, 2005): i.e., that help to identify which intervention works best in response to individual risk levels, criminogenic needs, and response capacity (MacKenzie, 1997). Evidence also supports the importance of designing and implementing interventions that meet the specific needs of female prisoners, including mental and physical health, economic self-reliance, and social and workforce reintegration (Faith, 1993; Green et al., 2005; O’Brien, 2001; Freudenberg et al., 2005; Young and Reviere, 2006; Lynch et al., 2012).

2.49 The evidence indicates that the most effective social rehabilitation programs in prison environments are based on cognitive behavioral therapies. In their review of eight meta-analyses concerning prison rehabilitation, Lipsey and Cullen (2007) concluded that the most effective rehabilitation treatments, according to all of the systematic reviews analyzed, were those based on multisystemic, cognitive behavioral, educational, and family therapies, as well as treatment for sex offenders. The least impressive results were observed in technical, professional, and employment training programs. The common factor in cognitive behavioral interventions is their focus on changes in the cognitive processes surrounding right or wrong behavior—thinking, reasoning, and decision-making—as well as on creating alternative solutions (Landenberger and Lipsey, 2005).

In a meta-analysis that reviewed 58 experimental or quasi-experimental studies of cognitive behavioral intervention programs involving adult and juvenile prison populations, recidivism fell by 25% in the targeted population (Lipsey et al., 2007). Lastly, there is evidence that programs focused on vocational education in prisons (completion of primary and secondary studies) have achieved reductions of up to 9.8% in recidivism (Drake et al., 2009). In a meta-analysis of 17 experimental and quasi-experimental studies of prison-based vocational programs, Wilson et al. (2000) found that these were linked to a 39% reduction in recidivism in the treatment group, compared with a 50% recidivism rate in the control group.

2.50 Programs based on punishment and disciplinary control are not particularly effective in reducing recidivism (Lipsey, 2012; Mackensey, 2006). Examples include programs aimed at imposing discipline (e.g., boot camps), or that emphasize supervision for the detection of bad behavior (intensive supervision probation/parole, curfew laws). The United States Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention conducted experimental impact evaluations of three boot camp programs in Ohio, Colorado, and Alabama. Its results do not support this type of intervention, as the recidivism rate for the group of prisoners treated in Ohio was 72%, compared with 50% in the control group. In Colorado and Alabama, recidivism rates were comparable in the experimental and control groups (39% versus 36%, and 28% versus 31%, respectively) (Peters, 1996; Thomas and Peters, 1996). In addition, Zhang (2000) used a quasi-experimental design to evaluate a juvenile boot camp in Los Angeles that, in contrast to most military discipline interventions, includes a component of follow-up care combined with intensive supervision and

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14 Examples include reasoning and rehabilitation; moral recognition therapy; cognitive restructuring; aggression replacement training; thinking for a change; and cognitive intervention programs.
counseling. The author confirmed that recidivism outcomes among camp graduates were almost identical to detainees in the comparison group. However, camp participants were more likely to suffer parole revocations. More recently, Wells et al. (2006) compared recidivism rates among juveniles completing an incarceration program that included a systematic care phase with those of a group of juveniles with identical characteristics that had been released from juvenile detention centers. The authors found no changes in reconvictions or reoffense seriousness at 8- or 12-month follow-ups. Lastly, Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrodsky (2011) have found, based on a natural experiment in Argentina, that mandatory military service increases the likelihood that youths will become involved in criminal activity. Some programs focus on achieving deterrence by using fear of the consequences of bad behavior (prison visits, such as “Scared Straight”). A study showed that recidivism among young participants in the Scared Straight program was higher than among young people of a similar profile that participated in other programs (Lipsey, 1992).

In addition, Petrosino et al. (2003) showed that there was no case in which recidivism declined among juveniles participating in the prison visit program. In fact, participating offenders were up to 28% more likely to reoffend than those in the control groups. Lastly, Aizer and Doyle (2014) found that imprisonment as a punishment for juveniles increases their probability of incarceration as adults.

Reentry programs are an effective approach to reintegration with society. Minimizing obstacles to a gradual transition from prison back into society is essential for effective social reintegration and preventing recidivism (Maruna and Immarigeon, 2004; Morgan and Owers, 2001; Petersilia, 2003; Seiter and Kadela, 2003). For example, most former prisoners in the United States have exhibited difficulties in managing the basic aspects of successful reintegration, such as finding and maintaining employment, finding a place to live, reconnecting with family, and accessing social services that help them to manage substance abuse and mental health problems (Visher and Travis, 2012). Most studies in this area, including those on work transition and prison rehabilitation programs, exhibit methodological weaknesses. Nonetheless, a number of programs studied show promising results. For example, there is promising evidence from the United States concerning halfway houses (which provide vocational and work programs prior to release) and drug treatment programs (Seiter and Kadela, 2003). Similarly, Saylor and Gaes (1997) used propensity score matching to evaluate a post-release employment program, showing that treatment group members were 35% less likely to have reoffended after one year than those in the comparison group. In the same study, the authors provided evidence supporting the effectiveness of halfway houses: members of the treatment group found full-time employment in 86% of cases, compared with 62% in the control group. In addition, the “Boston Reentry Initiative,” which offers comprehensive interventions (social, health, mentoring, and counseling services) to high-risk, violent criminals, reduced recidivism rates by 30% compared with the control group (Braga et al., 2001). Other promising examples in this area are the Offender Notification Forums in Chicago, and “reentry” courts, which focus on collaboration between the individual and the community (Visher and Travis, 2012).

Programs focused solely on work reintegration have not proven as effective in reducing crime and recidivism (Mackenzie, 2006). Although employment is an important aspect of reintegration, programs must adjust to the particular needs of each individual, their motivation for change, their willingness to work and attitude,
and the specific circumstances associated with criminal activities (Tyler and Berk, 2009). At the same time, they must be accompanied by other services to support the restoration of family, social, and community bonds. A number of programs in the U.S. that have combined the creation of job opportunities with training and motivation for individual change—such as Jobstar, the Service and Conservation Corps, the National Job Corps, and the YouthBuild Youth Offender Project—have led to a significant decrease in criminal behaviors and activities (Cave et al., 1993; Jastrzab et al., 1997; Schochet, Burghardt and McConnell, 2008; Attanasio, Kugler and Meghir, 2011). There is also promising evidence concerning transitional employment programs such as the Center for Economic Opportunities in New York, which provide transitional jobs to former prisoners. An experimental evaluation found that prisoners participating in the program upon release were significantly less likely (30%) than the control group (38%) to be tried for a new offense over a two-year reporting period. Similarly, Center for Economic Opportunities participants were more likely to be employed in the first six to nine months of the reporting period (Bloom, Gardenhire-Crooks, and Mandsager, 2009). Another program offering subsidized employment is ComALERT (2004-06) in Brooklyn, New York. A quasi-experimental evaluation of the intervention found significant improvements in employment rates among participants (double those of the control group) and an 18% reduction in detention rates compared with a matched control group with similar demographic data and criminal histories (Jacobs and Western, 2007).

2.53 Private sector participation is an important element in the success of reintegration programs. In LAC in particular, there are innovative and promising experiences that support the rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners, including both public and private initiatives. For example, programs such as “Networking Academy,” “Reintegra” [Reintegrate], “Semilla” [Seed] in Mexico; “League Collegiate Wear Program” in El Salvador; and “Youth Upliftment Through Employment” in Jamaica represent promising private sector-led initiatives that attempt to channel the potential of young people into more productive activities. However, rigorous evaluations are still needed to demonstrate their effectiveness and impact.

F. Citizen security governance

2.54 The science of management of citizen security and for the prevention of crime and violence is a recent field of research (Fixsen et al., 2005), but it is growing rapidly (Homel and Homel, 2012). According to this literature, good sector governance requires (i) a strong apex agency and specialized institutional structures; (ii) management based on quality information and timely evidence; (iii) definition, implementation, and evaluation of the intervention strategy (Mertz, 2014); and (iv) effective mechanisms for horizontal coordination among relevant sector ministries and vertical coordination between levels of government.

2.55 The evidence indicates that citizen security and justice require a specialized management system with strategic vision and leadership. Such systems should be comprehensive (Homel and Homel, 2012) and include a set of established processes that link and coordinate public and private stakeholders both vertically and horizontally to support decision-making (Revesz, 2006; Velásquez, 2006). At this strategic level, several countries in the region have established “national citizen security systems” and are in the process of consolidating these. The systems coordinate multiple institutions and stakeholders, and define structures,
methodologies, and decision-making processes within a regulatory framework. Countries such as Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru, and El Salvador have established national citizen security cabinets or councils encompassing not only traditional security and justice agencies, but also areas related to violence prevention, such as health, education, and social development institutions, for a comprehensive, multisector response to this multifaceted challenge.

2.56 **Integrated citizen security policies that combine preventive action with control have proven more effective in reducing crime.** Violence prevention has become an essential component of comprehensive strategies to reduce crime (Waller, 2006). Several recent studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of different kinds of prevention programs (Sherman et al., 1997; Welsh and Farrington, 2012), while these have also been proven more cost-effective (Drake et al., 2009).

2.57 **Specialized human resources, leadership, and accountability mechanisms are key elements for building legitimacy.** This is also true of specialized technical capabilities, leadership in the definition and implementation of public policies in the sector (Fixsen, 2005; Homel and Homel, 2012), and the new approach to evaluating performance and impact, which involves establishing targets, responsibilities, indicators, and outcomes (Mertz, 2014). Colombia and Chile offer examples of comprehensive citizen security strategies that define targets and mechanisms for monitoring results, using results-based management techniques and policies based on applied knowledge. Security contracts developed under the leadership of local authorities in several European countries (France, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom) and replicated in Colombia and Chile also represent a promising experience in the area of public accountability (ICPC, 2006).

2.58 **The quality of citizen security and justice services, and access to these, depends on the effective allocation of human and financial resources.** Experience in LAC has demonstrated that a lack of sustained investment has increased the difficulty of attracting qualified human resources. Empirical evidence points to a positive correlation between the level of economic incentives on offer (salaries) and the capabilities of personnel selected in the public sector (Dal Bo et al., 2011). Similarly, a lack of adequate funding for scientific research, local-level implementation, and the proactive dissemination of knowledge also prevents effective operations in this sector. However, little is known about the fiscal burden and efficiency of spending in the sector. Given the absence of international standards for comparing public expenditure allocations in the sector, it is still impossible to determine whether a country is spending a lot or little in this area, or how in relative terms (Coelho, 2012). For example, the U.S. has significantly improved knowledge regarding effective preventive interventions in recent years, due to (i) private sector investment in evaluations (Fagan and Eisenberg, 2012); (ii) the creation of local-level financing mechanisms, such as conditional cash transfers to local communities for the implementation of prevention programs; and
(iii) the creation of evidence-based project banks for the dissemination of knowledge.\textsuperscript{15}

2.59 **Effective public policy management in the sector depends on the existence of high-quality information and applied knowledge.** The literature points to a lack of empirical knowledge and insufficient availability, quality, and timeliness of information as the main obstacles to developing effective policies for the sector in the region (Mertz, 2014). Crime statistics are also fragmented and inconsistent, and the main agencies responsible for managing them (police forces, public prosecutors, institutes of forensic medicine) keep separate statistics with different compilation methodologies, leading to largely unreliable data. In several countries, these statistics are not publicly available and lack consistent frequency and detail (Di Tella and Schargosdky, 2010). At the same time, the efficient management of these policies depends on the selective identification of interventions, adaptations based on theoretical models, and rigorous evaluation methodologies (Abad and Gómez, 2008; Frühling, 2012).

2.60 **A number of studies have identified specific factors that support the effective implementation of programs in the sector.**\textsuperscript{16} These include (i) targeted interventions—various research projects have demonstrated that CSJ policies are most effective at the local level, addressing specific problems for specific populations and geographical areas (Bauman, 2003); (ii) adaptation of implementation arrangements to local institutional capacities, ensuring that execution periods and the sequencing of activities are tailored to the institutional context (OVE), 2014); (iii) citizen participation and societal oversight of diagnostic assessments and the identification of actions, helping to improve the relevance and effectiveness of programs and creating conditions for their sustainability. The role of societal oversight in targeted areas can help to inhibit crime in the community (collective efficacy) depending on the different levels of community organization (partnerships) (Sampson, 2006). A mapping of stakeholders, their roles, and interrelationships at the neighborhood level for preventing violence is therefore essential to strengthen and consolidate these partnerships and improve their effectiveness; and (iv) cooperation and partnership between the public and private sectors for the identification and financing of programs. Strategic public-private partnerships, involving chambers of commerce and organized producers’ groups, are among the promising programs in the region.

G. **Notable take-aways of the review of evidence**

2.61 As outlined above, the vast majority of the evidence comes from developed countries and studies on them. This evidence is still rudimentary in LAC, but the region is generating more rigorous evidence, and the IDB is proactively supporting this effort. However, it is important to identify promising citizen security and justice policies validated by empirical evidence, since these can be used to guide and test solutions, tailoring them to the contexts and institutional capacities of each location.

\textsuperscript{15} Examples include the “Blueprints for Violence Prevention” initiative, the Community Guide by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Child Trend LINKS database, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, the “Communities That Care” Prevention Strategies Guide, the National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices, and the Delinquency Prevention Model Program Guide of the Office of Juvenile Justice.

\textsuperscript{16} IDB-OVE 2010-2014.
Based on extensive review of the literature, several interventions regarded as promising are identified below. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine with certainty which ones are most replicable in the context of crime in LAC, as well as whether they are cost-effective enough to scale up.

2.62 In the particular case of interventions for the social prevention of violence, the entire life course of the individual needs to be considered so that timely interventions can be determined at each stage. Evidence suggests that the first years of life (up to five years of age) are critical for development of the cognitive and soft skills that allow criminal alternatives to be avoided at a later stage. Thus, early stimulation programs and integrated programs for children and their parents have shown promise in terms of reducing both early aggression and future criminal behavior, and they have also proven cost-effective. A number of early childhood education programs in LAC have undergone recent evaluation, but it is still too early to gauge their impact on criminal behavior.

2.63 Home visits and mentoring programs for parents have generally been more expensive and difficult to scale up. Some interventions to prevent youth violence have proven effective in changing behavior, attitudes, and thought patterns. For example, the evidence confirms across the board that additional time spent in school reduces crime rates among young people. There is also ample evidence regarding the effectiveness of cognitive behavioral therapies, functional family therapies, and life skills training in reducing criminal behaviors, particularly among adolescents. These have also shown positive results in terms of preventing the consumption of drugs and alcohol. One example is the “Becoming a Man” program in Chicago, which uses these types of therapies combined with academic support interventions. It has been costly, but encouraging results suggest high social returns. Lastly, there is still a need for further research into programs that improve work opportunities for individuals at risk of criminal behavior.

2.64 In the case of situational prevention interventions, the evidence shows that altering the conditions that determine opportunities for crime in specific locations (illumination, public space interventions, cameras) has resulted in short-term declines in criminal activity. As a result, this is a promising component for inclusion in crime reduction strategies such as social prevention and police control interventions.

2.65 In terms of police interventions, the evidence confirms unanimously that increased police presence is effective in reducing levels of criminality. This does not mean that more police officers need to be hired; instead, the cost of avoiding crime needs to be balanced with that of hiring additional officers. In the case of LAC, experience shows that the challenge stems more from police effectiveness; this depends on the quality of policing and trust in police forces, and not on the number of officers. There is ample evidence in this respect, some of which has come recently from LAC, indicating that specific police deployment strategies—such as community policing or problem-oriented policing (including “hot spots”)—have significant effects in reducing different types of crime in the short term. Nonetheless, it should be noted that these interventions depend on the availability of high-quality, disaggregated, and georeferenced statistical information, which is very limited in the region. Capacities and technical skills for information analysis are also required, as well as specific patrolling actions. Policing strategies that do not work include those in which
officers fail to establish ties with communities, where patrolling is haphazard, and where officers arrive at the scene of a crime after it has occurred.

2.66 In the area of criminal justice, there is even scantier empirical evidence in LAC regarding the impact of judicial reform on reductions in criminality. There are gaps in knowledge concerning the effectiveness of interventions to improve access to justice, as well as decongestion of justice services and the training of judges, among other things. Robust evaluations and studies are therefore needed in this area. A number of preliminary findings confirm that increased sentence severity has a very limited impact in terms of deterrence. At the same time, evidence from the United States regarding the effectiveness of alternatives to prison (community service, fines, electronic monitoring, etc.) appears promising, given their positive impact on recidivism. This is a valuable option that urgently needs to be explored and considered given the prison crisis experienced in LAC. Alternative measures include “drug courts” that seek to prevent the use of alcohol and drugs; these have consistently proven effective in reducing the resumption of consumption, and their effects persist over time.

2.67 Lastly, experience has demonstrated that poor conditions in Latin America’s penitentiary facilities limit the effectiveness of rehabilitation or reintegration programs, and also help to build crime-related contacts and networks, turning prisons into “crime universities.” A number of studies, particularly from the United States, confirm that incarceration is not only more criminogenic than rehabilitation programs, but is also much more costly. This is despite the fact that some of the most promising rehabilitation programs for reducing recidivism (such as multisystemic therapies or mentoring) are costly. Understanding challenges in the prison system requires a review of the entire criminal justice system. The most common response to LAC’s prison crisis has been to build more prisons; for this reason, factors within the criminal justice system that give rise to these challenges need to be studied more rigorously, so that the effectiveness of various rehabilitation and reintegration programs can be tested and evaluated. This field of knowledge is highly rudimentary in LAC. It is equally important to carry out cost-benefit analyses, as experience shows that increased prison populations and spending on prisons have not been accompanied by reductions in violence.

III. MAIN CHALLENGES FOR THE REGION

3.1 Although the Latin American and Caribbean region has made socioeconomic progress over the last decade, the incidence of crime remains high. Between 2004 and 2014, most countries experienced annual rates of economic growth of close to 4%, while poverty rates declined and the health and education levels of LAC citizens improved. In contrast, the main indicators concerning crime, victimization, and perceptions of insecurity remained high, with citizens exhibiting a low level of confidence in the institutions responsible for delivering citizen security services.

3.2 LAC remains the most violent region on the planet, with a 2015 homicide rate of 23 per 100,000 inhabitants (four times higher than the world average) (see Figure 2). The region accounts for 33% of world homicides, though it has only 9% of the global population. Similarly, when external causes of death (homicides, suicides, and traffic accidents) are compared, LAC is the only region where homicide is the main cause of death (52%), followed by traffic accidents (37%) and suicide (11%). In the other
regions of the world—East Asia and the Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa—traffic accidents are the main external cause of death. In Europe and Central Asia, suicide is the main external cause of death, followed by traffic accidents.\textsuperscript{17} Firearms drive violence in LAC. Around an estimated 70\% of homicides in the region are committed with firearms, well above the world average of 50\%.\textsuperscript{18}

3.3 \textbf{Crime and violence do not affect all LAC subregions equally.} Although LAC\textsuperscript{19} has the highest rate of homicide in the world, there is a high level of heterogeneity in homicidal violence among the different subregions and countries (see Figure 3). The Bank’s 26 regional borrowing member countries include countries with homicide rates of less than 7 per 100,000 inhabitants (the world average), such as Chile (3), Suriname (5), Argentina (7), Ecuador (6), and Peru (7). Others have rates of more than 50, such as El Salvador (103), Honduras (60), and Venezuela (54)\textsuperscript{20} (see Figure 3). Since 2004, the Central American subregion has had the highest homicide rate in LAC, with an average of 32.8 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2014. Atypical cases within this are Costa Rica and Nicaragua, with homicide rates of approximately 8 (Granguillhome, 2017). In the Caribbean, Andean, and Southern Cone subregions, the countries most affected by homicide are Jamaica, Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil, with rates of 37, 23, 54, and 26 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively. These rates are near and above the threshold for homicides due to armed conflict (30 per 100,000 inhabitants) (rates calculated based on official sources). In Latin America, drug production, trafficking, and distribution explain a significant fraction of the rise in violence in recent years. Estimates from various studies on the relationship between illegal drug markets and violence show that the rise in drug trafficking in recent years has generated a significant and sizeable rise in the levels of violence, driven mainly by interdiction policies and clashes between drug cartels (Castillo et al., 2013).

3.4 \textbf{Even at the national and local levels, there is considerable heterogeneity in crime and violence.} One of the characteristics of the phenomenon of crime and violence is the degree of geographical concentration. In some countries, for example, less than 10\% of municipios account for almost half of all homicides (as in the case of Central America) (Granguillhome, 2017). At a more disaggregated level, crime is concentrated in microspaces commonly known as street segments.\textsuperscript{21} A study analyzing five LAC cities found that 50\% of crimes were concentrated in 3\% to 7.5\% of street segments, with 25\% of crimes occurring in between 0.5\% and 2.9\% of street segments (Ajzenman and Jaitman, 2016).

3.5 \textbf{Homicide is not the only type of violence in LAC.} Other types of violent crimes, such as robberies, are also growing. In 2014, the robbery rate in LAC averaged 321.7 per 100,000 inhabitants, compared with a world rate of approximately 108 (UNODC, 2016). Six out of every 10 robberies in the region are violent (UNDP, 2014). Comparing the LAC subregions, the rate was 334.1 in Central America, 126.3 in the Caribbean, 339.5 in the Andean countries, and 482.8 in the Southern

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} World Health Organization. \textit{Global Health Estimates 2014}.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Small Arms Survey and UNODC.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} The Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region encompasses the Inter-American Development Bank’s 26 borrowing member countries.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Rates calculated based on official sources (2015 or the most recent available year).
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Street segments are defined as both sidewalks of a street between two intersections.
\end{itemize}
Cone. It should be noted that administrative data from police sources for these types of crimes (reports) are usually subject to a high degree of underreporting. The crime of cell phone theft has grown rapidly in Latin America in recent years. In Colombia, for example, 1 million devices are estimated to have been stolen in 2013—2,700 per day—yet only 18,000 were reported. In Argentina, the number of devices stolen stands at 6,500 per day (GSMA, 2015), affecting 3 million users since 2015, according to official figures.

3.6 **Victimization levels in LAC are high.** Victimization surveys\(^{22}\) show an increase in victimization levels from 24% in 1995 to 36% in 2015—\(^{23}\)in other words, one in three people has been the victim of crime in the last 12 months (see Figure 4). Venezuela was the country with the highest victimization rate in 2015 (89.3%), followed by Mexico (57.5%), Peru (50.7%), Brazil (47.8%), and Argentina (47.1%) (see Figure 5 and Figure 6 for country-specific detail). High levels of violence mean that insecurity is ranked by citizens as their top problem (see Figure 7 and Figure 8).

3.7 **Perceptions of insecurity affect confidence in institutions.** High levels of victimization create a sense of insecurity that affects all citizens. A recent study of the factors that create perceptions of vulnerability to crime concluded that an absence of civic culture and confidence in the police force, as well as direct or indirect victimization, are the top factors influencing fear of crime (Vilalta, 2012). According to the Latinobarómetro survey, more than half of the population lacks confidence in the police (62%) and the judiciary (67%) (Latinobarómetro, 2015) (see Figure 9 and Figure 10).

3.8 **Crime is costly and represents an obstacle to sustainable development in the region.** These high levels of crime lead to multiple distortions in public and private resource allocation and affect citizens’ well-being. Accordingly, insecurity has been recognized as one of the main challenges to the competitiveness of businesses in the region (World Economic Forum, 2012). According to the IDB’s most recent study (2017), crime is estimated to cost countries in the region an average of 3.5% of GDP. For the region as a whole, this is equivalent to US$170 billion at 2014 exchange rates, or US$261 billion adjusted for purchasing power parity. These estimates include public spending on security (police, justice, and prison administration services), private sector spending on security, and the social costs of crime (due to victimization and the lost income of prisoners). Analysis of the LAC subregions shows that Central America suffers the highest costs from crime, at 4.22% of GDP, followed by the Caribbean (3.72%), the Andean region (3.08%), and, lastly, the Southern Cone (3.00%) (see Figure 11 and Figure 12). The cost of crime for countries in the region is equivalent to annual spending on infrastructure, and is approximately equal to the annual income of the poorest 30% of the region’s population (Jaitman, 2017).

3.9 **New crimes: Cybersecurity. Is the region prepared?** As the digital economy has expanded in recent years, the risks of other, new types of crime have increased. The advantages of connectivity are undeniable. The region has the fourth largest cellular market in the world, while half of the population uses the internet and regional

\(^{22}\) Victimization surveys supplement administrative records; together, these sources of information provide a more holistic and refined conceptualization of crime, the judicial system, high-risk zones, and public perceptions of certain issues such as the authorities’ performance.

\(^{23}\) Latinobarómetro, 2015. Includes 18 LAC countries.
governments are increasingly using digital media to communicate with citizens and deliver services to them. Nonetheless, according to the 2016 Cybersecurity Report by the IDB and the Organization of American States (OAS), the region has fallen behind in preventing and mitigating cybercrime risks. The study shows that many countries of the region are vulnerable to potentially devastating cyberattacks. Specifically, 80% of countries have no cybersecurity strategy or critical infrastructure protection plans. Two out of three countries have no cybersecurity command and control center, and most public prosecutors lack the ability to pursue cybercrimes. Furthermore, in 56% of countries there is no clear identification of the assets constituting the critical infrastructure, and in 75% there is no mechanism for planning and coordinating a response to an attack on the country’s critical infrastructure. Especially important areas for improvement are developing a specific legal framework and educational infrastructure for cybersecurity and raising public awareness. A number of calculations suggest that LAC faces cybercrime costs of approximately US$90 billion per year (Prandini and Maggiore, 2011). The cost of cybercrime worldwide stands at US$575 billion per year, accounting for 0.5% of world GDP.

3.10 Determining direct causality to help us understand and explain criminal behavior is very challenging. A number of research studies around the world suggest that places with marked income inequality are more likely to have high levels of crime and violence. Yet the evidence is mixed. In LAC, for example, from 2003 to 2012 the region as a whole saw poverty and income inequality fall significantly, along with a simultaneous rise the proportion of people in the middle class, but violence levels increased or held steady in all LAC countries. The experience of this decade demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between economic development and crime and violence. The relationship between criminality and inequality is confounded by poverty. Recent studies at the local level are showing that inequality is important in crime. When poorest of the poor perceive inequality, they are less invested in social norms and regard crime as more acceptable.

3.11 Studies and analyses have also identified certain common factors present in places with a high incidence of crime and violence. Some of the special features of violence in LAC are described below, and several are considered as possible causes associated with criminality and violence in the region.

A. Social prevention. A multiplicity of risk factors in the life course of an individual

3.12 Violence in LAC has a disproportionate impact on young people. The most recent homicide report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2013) indicates that 43% of all murder victims worldwide are young people aged between 15 and 29, while 7.9% of victims are children aged between 0 and 14. In Brazil and El Salvador, for example, youths account for 53.3% and 53.6% of homicide victims, respectively, compared to average population shares of 25% and 28%. A recent World Bank study (Chioda, 2017) showed how the risk of violence evolves over the life cycle, falling disproportionately on young adult males as the

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24 The homicide rate among adolescents aged 10 to 14 is approximately 2.8 per 100,000 inhabitants. This increases tenfold to 31.1 among adolescents aged 15 to 19, reaching a maximum of 48.2 among youths aged 20 to 24.

25 Young men are 10 times more likely to be murdered than women of the same age.
victims and perpetrators of violence. For example, according to the study, young men are at least 10 times more likely to be murdered than women of the same age. In countries such as Mexico, the homicide rate among men aged between 20 and 24 stood at 71.5 in 2010, much higher than the national rate of 18.1 (Executive Secretariat of the National Public Safety System (SESNSP); Chioda, 2017). Homicides mainly take place in cities, and are concentrated in low-income neighborhoods on the outskirts of major metropolises (Gaviria and Pagés, 1999; Briceño-León and Zubillaga, 2002). As a result, young men living in low-income areas in LAC face a 1 in 50 chance of being murdered before reaching the age of 31 (Moestue et al., 2013).

Moreover, an analysis of data broken down by race and ethnic group in some countries reveals an alarming racial disparity in homicides, laying bare the gaps in our knowledge throughout the region. For example, in 2012, 56,325 homicides were recorded in Brazil, representing a homicide rate of 29 per 100,000 inhabitants. Afrodescendents represented over 70% of the victims of these homicides, versus 29% white. Adjusting for the size of the respective population, the homicide rate for Afrodescendents was approximately 42 per 100,000, versus 16 for the white population. In fact, the homicide rate among young Afrodescendents was 82.4 per 100,000, versus 29.2 for young whites. In other words, young Afrodescendents are three times more likely to be murdered than young whites.

3.14 A large proportion of young people in conflict with the law have dropped out of the school system and have low levels of education. Around half of all young people in Latin America continue to leave the school system due to severe poverty, malnutrition, and poor health, a lack of interest in education, and the need to join the workforce early in order to support family finances (IDB Labor Sector Framework Document, 2016). Although graduation rates have increased and dropout rates have declined, the quality of education remains low, with low wage returns, and this acts as a disincentive to continue studying. Recent prison censuses carried out by the IDB have shown, for example, that in Brazil, 82% of all juvenile delinquents in socio-educational centers in the State of Espírito Santo have not completed the basic cycle of education (IASES, 2013). In Jamaica, it was found that 62% had failed to complete secondary education; however, 75% had attended nontraditional schools (of low educational quality) and 38% had been arrested for the first time before the age of 19. In Uruguay, 60% had not completed the initial cycle of secondary school.

3.15 Juvenile unemployment is particularly prejudicial to citizen security. There are 7.1 million unemployed youths in the region. In addition, there are 15.1 million young people neither working nor studying nor seeking jobs ("nininis"), accounting for 22% of the population in this age group (IDB Labor Sector Framework Document, 2016). The more uncertain the socioeconomic circumstances of the household concerned, the worse this situation becomes, increasing the risk of social problems linked to risky behaviors such as crime and violence. Although employment is viewed as an important factor in deterring criminal behavior, employment alone is insufficient. A micro-level analysis in Brazil and Mexico suggests that the quality of employment (informality and job insecurity) is an important factor in the relationship between the job market and criminal behavior (Chioda, 2017).

3.16 Easy access to drugs, alcohol, and weapons may predispose youths to violent behavior (Taylor et al., 2008). Alcohol accounts for more than 60% of drugs
consumed before a crime is committed, well above other psychoactive substances (UNDP, 2013). In addition, 60% of LAC’s school population (young people between 12 and 17 years of age) drink alcohol frequently or have smoked marijuana, becoming the first step towards the consumption of other drugs and in developing other risk factors (OAS, 2012).

3.17 **Homicides of women in the region are double the world average.** The femicide rate in the region stands at 4.3 per 100,000 women—almost double the world average of 2.3 (UNDOC, 2012). Honduras and El Salvador have the highest rates of femicide, at 13 and 6, respectively, per 100,000 women. It is difficult to determine exactly which homicides are committed due to gender bias, as most countries do not provide information on the motivations for crimes (Waiselfisz, 2015). According to recent data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2016), at least 12 women are murdered each day for being women—in other words, at least 4,380 deaths each year.

3.18 **Violence against women is manifest not only in terms of homicides.** According to the World Health Organization (WHO) (2013), 29.8% of women in LAC have experienced physical and/or sexual violence at some point, compared with 23.2% of women in high-income countries. The prevalence of nonpartner sexual violence among LAC women is close to the level seen in Africa (10.7% and 11.9%, respectively) and much lower than in Europe (5.2%) or even South East Asia (4.9%). A recent IDB study estimated the social cost of violence against women in LAC at 0.0112% of GDP, which is higher than in developed countries such as the United States (0.0076%) and the United Kingdom (0.007%) (Jaitman, 2017).

B. **Situational prevention. The characteristics of the urban environment influence criminal behavior**

3.19 **Insecurity is particularly acute in the region’s cities.** LAC’s cities are among the most violent in the world (Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y Justicia Penal [Citizen Council for Public Safety and Criminal Justice], 2016). Homicide rates in the cities very widely compared with the global average of 7.2 (Vilalta et al., 2016). Several cities fall below the average, while there are also cities with rates that are 10 to 20 times higher than the world average. For example, the murder rate in cities such as Caracas, San Pedro Sula, San Salvador, and Acapulco is in excess of 80 per 100,000 inhabitants (see Figure 13). It is worth emphasizing that not all capital cities exhibit the highest numbers and/or rates of homicides. Smaller cities or rural areas can be the focus of violence, particularly where these are close to borders, in areas with limited government presence, or in areas where drug trafficking occurs. Murders tend to occur in specific areas within cities (“hot spots”) and on specific blocks. In a study of five LAC cities, it was found that 50% of crimes occur on between 3% and 7.5% of street segments, and that this concentration is stable over time (Ajzenman and Jaitman, 2016). Cities thus have locations that are chronically violent.

3.20 **Violence is highest in poor urban neighborhoods and on the outskirts of cities** (Briceño-León and Zubillaga, 2002). Crime and violence in LAC’s cities are of a complex and multidimensional nature, affecting citizens in both public places and their own homes. Several types of violence interact: political, gang-related, economic, gender-based, interpersonal, and domestic. Disparities in levels of violence depending on neighborhoods’ income levels are another characteristic of
violence in LAC’s cities. Neighborhoods with higher levels of income are affected mainly by property crime (Gaviria and Pagés, 2002), while violent crime is generally focused in poor urban neighborhoods, to the point that in some cases it is considered a routine part of daily life (Poppovic and Pinheiro, 1995). Living in safer neighborhoods also reduces the likelihood of victimization by approximately 50% compared with unsafe areas (Chioda, 2017). This reinforces feelings of inequality in terms of opportunities and available resources with which to protect oneself against crime, as well as access to security services such as policing and justice (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2010).

C. Preventive policing. Current policing models do not respond effectively to the characteristics of crime, and create public distrust.

3.21 Police forces rank among the institutions in LAC with the lowest levels of public confidence. The Latinobarómetro survey has demonstrated for the last 20 years (1995 to 2011) that police forces are one of the institutions that inspires least confidence among citizens of the region. Less than 40% of respondents have confidence in both the police and the judicial system (Latinobarómetro, 2015). In the case of young people, confidence in the police is lower still. In Central America, Mexico, the Andean region, and the Southern Cone (with the exception of Brazil), levels of confidence stand at less than 20% (Organización Iberoamericana de Juventud [Ibero-American Youth Organization], 2013). At the regional level, 43% of those surveyed believe that police officers collude with criminals. The countries where this perception is strongest are Honduras (63%), Guatemala (61%), and Bolivia (60%) (LAPOP and UNDP, 2012). LAC is also the region with the highest “dark figure,” which stands at more than 95% due to under-recording. For example, according to a recent survey carried out in LAC’s main cities, only 45% of crimes are reported. The reasons for this are associated with a lack of confidence in the ability of the police to solve the problem, as well as a lack of confidence in the police as an institution (Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), 2014).

3.22 Police reform processes in LAC have not focused on police professionalization. Police forces in LAC average around 300 officers for each 100,000 inhabitants, which is very close to the average for the Middle East and much higher than in the United States (222). It should be noted that improved police efficiency and effectiveness is not linked to a higher number of police officers per capita (UNDP, 2013). A variety of police reforms have been carried out in the region, in countries such as Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Barbados, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The success of these reforms has been mixed, owing, among other things, to weaknesses in the selection and training processes for personnel, the lack of a police career path, insufficient financial and technological resources, and uncertain working conditions and remuneration (Arias et al., 2012). For example, in several countries, the basic requirement for entering the police officer career path is primary education, which is supplemented by six months of basic training. In the United States, a number of police departments require a minimum of third-level education, and basic training is 16 months, plus 14 months of field training (Neild, 2009). In addition to all of this, there is a lack of

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26 The percentage of crimes reported in victimization surveys that are not reflected in police administrative data (reports).
effective accountability and transparency mechanisms (Rico and Chinchilla, 2002) and evaluation instruments are absent (Tudela, 2007).

D. **Criminal justice. Operational deficiencies in the criminal justice system hinder the timely and effective investigation and resolution of crime**

3.23 In addition to police forces, the criminal justice system also includes public prosecutors and the courts, which are essential to ensuring the proper and effective administration of justice. Swift and decisive judicial action by these institutions helps to reduce crime and violence by discouraging criminal behavior and incapacitating offenders (through incarceration). As analyzed below, the evidence suggests that it is better for the criminal justice system to act as a preventive and deterrent, and not merely punitively, increasing the prison population. Nonetheless, it does suggest that the impact of incapacitation is greater when applied to the most dangerous criminals.

3.24 Once a crime has been committed, in order for it to be solved in a timely manner there needs to be a report, a detention, a case opened, an indictment, a trial, and, eventually, a sentence. The effectiveness of this process depends on stakeholders in the criminal justice system: the police, public prosecutors, judiciary, and prison system institutions. From the time that a crime is committed, these entities have specific responsibilities throughout the various stages of the criminal justice system, and they are closely interlinked. The police are responsible for preventing and investigating crime; public prosecutors for investigating and indicting; and the prison system for rehabilitating and preventing recidivism. If any of these links weakens, the effectiveness of others is affected. Thus, the challenges that these entities face in carrying out their responsibilities need to be understood.

3.25 The availability, quality, and reliability of information and statistics regarding the efficiency of the region’s criminal justice system is limited. The quality of information varies among countries. Statistics regarding results achieved, management effectiveness, and efficiency of judicial expenditure are not generally available. However, analysis of available indicators and data (while recognizing their limitations) does allow for an approximate understanding of the current panorama, as well as some noteworthy trends in criminal justice systems in the region.

3.26 Judicial independence is low in relation to the other branches of government. According to the World Economic Forum survey, average judicial independence in the region fell from 3.3 in 2008 to 3.1 in 2016 (where 1 is “heavily influenced” and 7 is “fully independent”). Of the 22 LAC countries covered by the survey, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago score above 4.3, while Venezuela and Nicaragua score below 1.9. Compared with other regions, LAC ranks far below the Scandinavian countries, which obtained an average score of 6.2. In the case of LAC, these figures represent the justice sector’s role in the business climate.

3.27 In many cases, justice reform processes have been slow, costly, and complex in their implementation. The majority of the countries of the region have reformed their justice systems with a view to improving their capacity, agility, and independence, as well as to professionalize their staff and expand citizens’ access to justice (UNDP, 2013). These reforms have focused on transforming criminal procedure from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial one (Hammergren, 2007), in which specialized
agencies (such as public prosecutors) head the investigation and enjoy discretionary powers to ensure the efficiency of processes. Accordingly, prosecutors investigate and indict, while judges concentrate on deciding cases (UNDP, 2013). The main changes in criminal procedure have included (i) implementation of oral trials; (ii) emphasis on ensuring due process in the investigation and indictment stages; (iii) strengthening of the agencies responsible for investigation (such as public prosecutors and attorneys general); (iv) creation of alternatives to pretrial detention; and (v) elimination of examining magistrates (Duce et al., 2003; Hambergren, 2007; and Langer, 2007).

3.28 Citizen confidence in the criminal justice system is low, especially compared with other institutions. In 2012, 47.9% of citizens in 18 Latin American countries expressed confidence in the criminal justice system (LAPOP, 2012). (Only the legislative branch and political parties had lower approval levels.) The level of confidence in the system in 2012 reflects a slight increase compared with the previous three periods evaluated (2010, 46.5%; 2008, 45.7%; 2006, 45.9%), but a decline compared to 2004 (49.1%). This perception of impunity also arises due to the inefficiency of the justice system in prosecuting crimes. LAC has the lowest number of case resolutions: only 4 in 100 crimes are solved, compared with 15 in Europe and 10 in the United States.

3.29 The indiscriminate use of pretrial detention contributes to the cycle of violence. Pretrial detention is often used by courts and tribunals, and its excessive use is one of the most serious problems in LAC, given the negative impact of imprisonment and prison overcrowding. Inmates subject to pretrial detention have not been formally tried, yet they are serving a sentence and tend to remain in prison for many years (Carranza, 2009). In 2012, the percentage of inmates in pretrial custody ranged from 30% to 50% of all prisoners, reaching a maximum of 83.3% in Bolivia. According to data from the Open Society Foundation (2013), approximately 4 in 10 women inmates are imprisoned awaiting trial, a fact attributable to explosive growth in the female prison population. This explosive growth can be seen in an increase in the average number of female detainees from 8.4 per 100,000 inhabitants at the beginning of the 2000s to 13.3 over the last four years, representing a 58% rise (Institute for Criminal Policy Research (ICPR), 2015).

3.30 At the same time, laws penalizing gender-based violence are not effectively enforced. According to the UNDP and UN Women, 97% of countries have enacted laws against domestic violence, while eight have codified femicide or feminicide and ten have incorporated the concept of violence against women into their legislation (UNDP, 2013). Nonetheless, according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, there is a problem of systematic impunity in cases of violence against women, in addition to a lack of specialized training for judges and prosecutors (UNDP, 2013). Reports of violence against women are low in number, and sentences are almost inexistent. In Costa Rica, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Peru, for example, women are 10 times more likely to report a robbery than a case of sexual aggression (UN Women, 2011).
E. Social rehabilitation. A lack of effective rehabilitation and reintegration policies, together with a growing prison population, complicates the prevention of recidivism

3.31 Growth in the prison population. According to the most recent data, there are approximately 10.35 million people imprisoned in penal institutions across the world—equivalent to 144 inmates per 100,000 inhabitants (ICPR, 2015). At 247.8 per 100,000 inhabitants, LAC’s incarceration rate is the second highest in the world after North America (346.8, explained by the contribution of the United States, where the rate is 693) (see Figure 14). In terms of detainees awaiting sentencing and the conditions of the prison population, LAC is the region with the worst indicators: (i) 43% of those detained are awaiting trial, and (ii) levels of prison overcrowding average 64%, with 1.6 prisoners per available space (see Figure 15).

3.32 LAC’s prison population increased by 38% from 2000 to 2015 (ICPR, 2016). With the exception of the Caribbean, all subregions saw growth in the prison population over this period: Central America grew 66%, to a rate of 299.2; the Southern Cone grew 81%, reaching 234.6; the Andean countries grew 106%, to 186.6; and, lastly, there was a reduction of 19% in the Caribbean, to 256.8. The Central American subregion is characterized by prison overcrowding of 73%, and share of inmates awaiting sentencing of 39.7%. The Southern Cone has an overcrowding rate of 31.7%, and 53.7% of detainees are awaiting sentencing (ICPR, 2016). The Andean countries have the highest level of overcrowding in the region at 103.7%, while 52.2% of prisoners are awaiting sentencing. In a number of countries in the Caribbean, such as Jamaica and Barbados, there is no overcrowding (around 80% of available spaces are occupied), but the number of prisoners awaiting sentencing is estimated at around 40%. Given the scant information available, it is difficult to determine the reason for this increase; however, a study conducted in Mexico to analyze the increase in the prison population in that country concluded that it was the combined result of higher crime incidence and harsher sentencing (Azaola and Bergman, 2003).

3.33 Overcrowding also hinders the organized, secure, and effective administration of prison systems and observance of the basic rights of inmates, leads to disease transmission, obstructs the work of prison officers and the delivery of services and rehabilitation programs, and prevents the maintenance of adequate prison infrastructure (Espinoza, 2014).

3.34 High spending, low effectiveness. Spending on prison administration has almost doubled in the region, but this has not always led to reductions in crime and violence. Expenditure in LAC rose from US$4.318 billion in 2010 to US$7.832 billion in 2014. As a percentage of GDP, the average for 17 countries in an IDB study increased from 0.19% in 2010 to 0.23% in 2014. There is significant heterogeneity in the region: Brazil has the lowest level of spending on prison administration, at only 0.06% of GDP from 2010 to 2014. Barbados is the country with the highest average level of spending, at 0.47% of GDP, followed by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, at 0.34% and 0.33% of GDP (Jaitman, 2017). Given that these are relatively small economies, these high percentages probably reflect the large fixed costs involved in administering a prison system. To place these expenditure figures in perspective, average prison spending in the region is approximately 0.20%—less than half the level in the United States, which stands at 0.5% of GDP.
3.35 **Provision of rehabilitation and reintegration services is scant.** A large prison population, saturated accommodations, and a low level of public investment have created an environment of scarcity of basic services, including those supporting rehabilitation and reintegration. Only a tiny proportion of inmates are reached by educational, work-related, and recreational activities within prisons or by addiction treatment and psychological support. For example, the proportion of inmates that work or study is only 9.6% in Brazil, 35.2% in El Salvador, 39.4% in Argentina, 41.1% in Chile, and 44.5% in Mexico (UNDP, 2013). Another important issue relates to the targeting of rehabilitation opportunities, as program target populations are not always defined according to clear selection criteria. On the contrary, conditions of overcrowding hinder equal access to the different programs and prevent individualized attention (Mertz et al., 2004).

3.36 **Moreover, limited human resources and meagre budgets hinder effective management.** The number of inmates per officer is three times higher than the world average of 1-3 (Carranza, 2012). For example, the figure in 2011 was estimated at between 6 and 10, with the highest rates in El Salvador and Panama, at 17 and 15, respectively. Weak institutional capacity is linked to weak selection, training, and preparation processes for personnel. In most countries in the region, prison officers are usually required to have some secondary level education, but they are not necessarily required to have completed it (Dammert, 2008). In countries such as Guatemala, only primary education is required, while in other countries, such as Chile and Peru, the requirement is for completed technical or secondary-level schooling (Dammert, 2008). The prison officer career path, which encompasses education, training, professional development, evaluation, and promotion of prison staff, has not been established in many countries in the region. Moreover, few countries in the region have schools or institutes for the professional training of prison officers. Those that do include Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.\(^{27}\) Financing for prison systems is also limited compared with other components of the justice system and security sector. In 2011 in El Salvador, for example, around 45% of total public spending on the security sector was focused on police surveillance and patrols, while penitentiaries and rehabilitation centers received approximately 7% (World Bank, 2012).

F. **Security governance.** Weak institutional capacity at the national and local level for the design, implementation, and evaluation of citizen security and justice policies and programs

3.37 **National crime statistics systems are generally weak.** Periodic, high-quality information is important for the satisfactory management of security. In the region, official statistics on possible criminal acts—i.e., reported crimes—are the most basic unit of crime analysis and the most easily accessed type of data. Practically all bodies responsible for public order keep records of crimes committed in their respective jurisdictions: mainly homicides, assault and battery, robberies, and thefts. However, official data covering other types of criminal acts, such as kidnapping or

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\(^{27}\) Academy of Prison Studies (Argentina), Prison Officers’ Academy (Chile), Academy of Prison Training (Costa Rica), National Prison Academy (Colombia), Prison Academy (Ecuador), National Academy for Prison Administration (Mexico), National Center for Crime and Prison Studies (Peru), National Prison Academy (Dominican Republic), Prison Academy (Uruguay).
drug trafficking/consumption, is scant. In these cases, most estimates come from self-report crime surveys and the databases of international organizations. In terms of designing and implementing interventions, the scarcity of available information limits the ability to effectively quantify crime and guide policies in this sector. For example, in some cases there are no reports by type of crime, identification and characterization of victims and perpetrators, recidivism reports, etc.

3.38 **The lack of uniform and regular crime data limits the design, monitoring, and evaluation of security policies.** Crime statistics systems in LAC fall short of ideal statistical systems in four respects. Firstly, crime statistics systems are not user-oriented. The crime information that they provide is irregular, lacks detail, and is generally not publicly available. Secondly, there is a lack of effective planning and management: the agencies responsible for compiling data are generally attached to different levels of government and different bodies at each level of government. Moreover, in most countries, a lack of resources and training are major obstacles to compiling and analyzing these data. Thirdly, the political neutrality and high public profile of some systems is not maintained—on the contrary, the importance of crime as a problem of concern for potential voters is sometimes manipulated for political purposes. Lastly, the scope and content of statistical systems covering criminal activity are not clearly defined or integrated. The information provided does not reflect the criminal justice system’s reaction to the problem of crime, and the systems do not use common concepts and classifications.

3.39 **Victimization surveys have not been institutionalized and are not produced regularly.** At the end of the 1990s, state agencies in the majority of LAC countries began to coordinate the design and implementation of victimization studies, or to collect victimization information using modules in multipurpose surveys. However, these initiatives have been sporadic, and few countries have established mechanisms to gather standardized and systematic information on victimization surveys. Chile and Mexico are the only countries that have systematically implemented these in the last decade.

3.40 **The formulation of effective citizen security and justice policies is a challenge for most countries in the region.** One of the key challenges is a lack of integrated sector management. This is reflected in institutional fragmentation of sector leadership, the shifting focus of public policies, a changing regulatory framework, a lack of planning and coordination among the different levels government, turnover at the management level, a lack of professionalization, and low levels of funding. In addition, sector economic policy is such that incentives exist to implement short-term, reactive public policies that can meet immediate political needs but do not reduce levels of violence sustainably and effectively in the long term. Although several countries in the region have developed national strategic visions for security, reflected in explicit policies to reduce crime and violence (Frühling, in Nespolo, 2011), implementation has been challenging due to weak communication, coordination, and integration between central and local levels of government, as well as to the limited availability or absence of human resources with enough administrative and technical experience to manage, design, and implement programs (Tudela, 2013b; OAS, 2008; UNDP, 2009; CAF, 2014). Policies and programs also fail to recognize interdependence between the different sections of the security and justice system, and this affects the value chain necessary to ensure effective crime policy. For example, effective crime deterrence depends on the
effectiveness of public prosecutors in investigating crime; prison overcrowding depends on the effectiveness of the justice system in processing cases; and the effective reintegration of prisoners depends on their likelihood of getting a job.

IV. Lessons Learned from IDB Experience in Citizen Security and Justice

A. Reports of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE)

4.1 The latest OVE evaluation for the sector, completed in 2014 with a longer time period and a broader variety of strategic themes, examined the Bank’s response to the specific challenges of (in)security in LAC from 1998 to 2012. It concluded that the Bank has played a pioneering role in responding to these challenges through programs designed with an integrated perspective and multisector approach to preventing and addressing crime and violence. In the report, OVE emphasized the need to (i) improve information and deepen sector knowledge, (ii) develop technical capabilities, and (iii) identify specific mitigation measures to manage reputational risks in areas linked to work with the police and prison systems. OVE also made the following recommendations: (i) select and focus on a targeted range of interventions; (ii) simplify project design, pace interventions, and enhance the supervision and execution of operations; (iii) update risk analysis tools and strengthen mitigation mechanisms; and (iv) define a knowledge agenda for improving project design and policy-making.

4.2 Based on the results of this last evaluation, the Bank has been strengthening its capabilities for operational and analytical work. The most significant progress has been as follows: Consistent with its operational mandate for the sector, the Bank established a theoretical and conceptual framework based on empirical evidence; this was reflected in the 2012 Conceptual Framework Document (document IDB-DP-232). In 2014, in collaboration with other Bank sectors and based on an exhaustive review of available empirical evidence, the first Citizen Security and Justice Sector Framework Document (document GN-2771-3) was prepared and approved. This defined the range and specific types of interventions for each subsector: social prevention, preventive policing, criminal justice, and prison rehabilitation.

4.3 Based on the foregoing, in 2015 the sector redefined its knowledge agenda, which encompasses the main research questions based on client demand, knowledge gaps, and the Bank’s comparative advantages (IDB, 2015). This agenda was validated by international experts at an IDB Crime Prevention Roundtable in April 2015, leading to the preparation of a document: “Closing Knowledge Gaps: Toward Evidence-based Crime Prevention” (IDB-TN-848, also published in 2015).

4.4 Additionally, with a view to improving the design, execution, and evaluation of operations, the area supported the generation and improvement of crime data: for example, by developing DataSeg, an interactive, integrated platform (“one-stop

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DataSeg is an interactive graphic interface that consolidates crime and sociodemographic data at both the country level and at the most disaggregated available administrative level (e.g. states, cantons, municipios). It uses country-level crime data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Regional System of Standardized Indicators for Citizen Security and Violence Prevention, and development indicators from the World Bank. At a more disaggregated level, it uses statistics from police forces or the offices responsible for generating crime data.
shop") of information and official statistics on crime and violence in LAC that enables access to disaggregated statistical data on crime in LAC.

4.5 There was progress in generating knowledge over the 2013-2017 period, with the completion of 10 baseline mappings (country profiles), and more than 20 research outputs (see Publications 2013-2017); eight impact evaluations were also carried out. Strategic partnerships with academic centers and experts, both in the region and beyond, have helped to boost knowledge generation and build capabilities in the Bank and the countries.

4.6 The Bank has also made progress in the operational sphere. From 2013 to 2016, the demand for citizen security and justice projects increased throughout the region, reflected in the approval of 10 projects for a total of US$322 million. From an execution standpoint, there has been an improvement in project performance. For example, from 2013 to 2016, the percentage of portfolio projects meeting envisaged implementation timeframes rose from 60% to 70%. At the same time, of the 20 citizen security and justice projects under execution at the end of 2016, 75% had satisfactory performance—above the average for the IFD portfolio (67%) and for the Bank’s portfolio as a whole.

4.7 The Citizen Security Initiative (CSI) was a tool for catalyzing all the operational and knowledge advances discussed above (document GN-2535-1, in force from 2012 to 2016). This initiative facilitated a proactive response to weaknesses in knowledge and technical capabilities, as well as supporting risky and innovative initiatives, with a view to generating efficient public policies. It represented a substantial financial boost to the sector in three main areas: (i) generating quality data; (ii) building evaluation capabilities; and (iii) promoting spaces for knowledge exchange and dissemination. (See examples in paragraph 4.18).

B. Results of the Development Effectiveness Matrix

4.8 Since 2013, there have been significant improvements in the Development Effectiveness Matrices (DEMs) for citizen security projects. The DEM score for the 10 operations approved between 2013 and 2016 averaged 8.8 across the three key operational design features that ensure evaluability: (i) diagnosis of the problem and its possible solution are based on empirical evidence; (ii) the cost-benefit analysis confirms the advisability of implementing the project; and (iii) monitoring and evaluation activities are appropriately planned and budgeted for.

C. Lessons learned from the experience of Bank operations

4.9 This section summarizes lessons learned from project completion reports, OVE sector evaluations, studies and implementation workshops with the Knowledge and Learning Sector (KNL), and research projects conducted by the citizen security and

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29 Comprehensive analyses of the security sector that include diagnostic assessments and maps of institutions and existing programs in each country.

30 In 2015, a committee was created of academic advisors and technical experts in the field of security and justice; this provides regular strategic and technical orientation to the sector.

31 The following operations were approved: in 2013, BR-L1331; in 2014, JA-L1043, BR-L1343, BR-L1387, PR-L1077, GY-L1042; in 2015, BH-L1033; and in 2016, UR-L1112, GU-L1095, GY-L1044.

32 Over the 2012-2016 period, 81 nonreimbursable technical cooperation operations were approved under the CSI in these three areas, for a total of US$30.1 million.
justice cluster in the Innovation in Citizen Services Division (IFD/ICS). The lessons learned are separated into three categories: strategic, technical, and operational.

1. Strategic lessons

4.10 **IDB strategic focus areas in the sector.** The Bank focuses its work on four main areas: (i) reinforcement of social prevention actions for youth and women, to counter the factors that make them more likely to be victims or perpetrators of violence; (ii) strengthening of police professionalization, to put officers in closer contact with citizens in order to prevent and respond to crime; (iii) lowering of barriers to better administration of criminal justice, rationalization of the use of pretrial detention, and promotion of rehabilitation programs and present alternatives; and (iv) strengthening of national and local institutional capacity, sector governance, and intersector coordination. This focus is aligned with the Bank’s development mandate and comparative advantage as a development institution. The IDB also seeks to complement and coordinate with the efforts of other multilateral and bilateral cooperation agencies and civil society organizations working in this area.

4.11 The Bank has ruled out support for certain areas outside its mandate where human and civil rights abuses or interference in the country’s political affairs may occur. These activities include: (i) support for military operations of the armed forces; (ii) activities to preserve the security of the State or investigate crimes with political motives; (iii) secret or undercover operations; (iv) purchase of lethal weapons such as firearms, ammunition, and tear gas; (v) support for the operations of special units involving highly complex management of force and exposure to violence; (vi) training in the use of firearms or lethal weapons; and (vii) activities to fight transborder organized crime and drug trafficking. The activities listed above are merely illustrative, given the dynamic character of the sector, so others could be hesitant depending on their nature and scope. These areas, other multilateral institutions have the appropriate institutional mandate and greater comparative advantage.

4.12 **Integrated management of citizen security and criminal justice.** Regional experience and the ample available evidence in this field confirm the need to understand the management of violence prevention issues in a systemic manner, approaching it as a value chain encompassing the different stages of management: prevention, control, the administration of justice, and social rehabilitation. This requires mechanisms for coordinating among the multiple institutions participating in the sector, seeking equivalent interventions in each of them and ensuring improved citizen security and the effective administration of justice. Coordination of the citizen security and criminal justice spheres allows the Bank to provide a

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34 Examples include bomb squads, drug eradication brigades, antikidnapping units, and riot control units.

35 The Bank does not finance activities with characteristics or content that could be interpreted as interference in a country’s political or national affairs or subject to other operational risks; nor does it fund activities related to national security, transnational organized crime, or weapons control.

36 The study “What Works in the Criminal Justice System (and What Doesn’t)” (Pousadela, I., Policy Brief IDB-PB-227, 2014) acknowledges the importance of reviewing effective interventions in the justice sphere to address the situation of crime and insecurity experienced in the region.
comprehensive response to the countries of the region in designing and implementing programs.

4.13 **The Bank’s integrated approach is commensurate with country demand.** Operational experience in this area has confirmed the relevance of the IDB’s scope of work, which has allowed it to provide timely support to the countries according to their priorities in security and justice. The emphasis of demand from each country has been different, prioritizing interventions along a spectrum from social prevention to areas of the criminal justice system (police and justice). In general, social prevention operations in recent years have been oriented toward programs with a geographic focus on neighborhoods with high rates of interpersonal violence and a focus on individuals, to change behavior. These operations build upon improvements in the physical environment, community policing, and access to justice. In policing, programs have supported recruitment and training, analysis of crime statistics, patrolling models, and police ethics. In criminal justice, the Bank’s support has targeted more effective criminal investigation, efficient judicial processes (docket digitization), use of alternative sentencing, and support for prisoner rehabilitation and reintegration programs.

4.14 To meet this demand effectively, the Bank has invested in promoting knowledge generation to help inform public policy design in this sector, and will continue doing so. The following knowledge gaps have been identified and given priority: in social prevention, impact analysis of interventions to change behavior in order to reduce violence, including violence against women; in policing, generation of greater knowledge about police officer quality (how officers are recruited, trained, and paid), the effectiveness of different policing strategies, and the use of technology to reduce crime; and studies to better understand prisoner populations in the region, in order to improve penitentiary management. Studies are also being done on the impact of certain prisoner rehabilitation and reintegration programs in the LAC context.

4.15 **Intersector coordination.** There is a need to strengthen horizontal coordination between the different sector institutions of government, which is a challenge for the Bank as well. Improved security standards—previously just the undertaking of one government agency—have become a State priority and a responsibility shared by several agencies. This type of coordination is also needed on a vertical level—i.e., between the national and local levels—to improve the design and implementation of targeted programs adapted to local contexts. Lastly, coordination with other, nonstate participants such as the private sector, civil society, academia, and other international organizations needs to be emphasized in order to build collaboration and trust among all stakeholders.

4.16 **Human capital development.** The experience accumulated in supervising Bank citizen security and justice programs in recent years has underlined the importance of strengthening human resource management in the sector. Investment in well-trained, motivated human resources with adequate incentives is key. In the majority of LAC countries, these employees lack satisfactory professional standards, training, and wages. Accordingly, effective citizen security management requires the

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37 The document “Making cities safer places,” points out that the good practices studied involved programs to coordinate between the different stakeholders. Muggah, R., Alvarado, N., Making Cities Safer: Citizen Security Innovations from Latin America, IDB and the World Economic Forum.
development of human resources and improved employment conditions. For example, an experimental evaluation of the effectiveness of police management using information technology in Uruguay showed that police officers specialized in crime data analysis were as effective in reducing robberies as crime prediction software. As a consequence, it was more cost-effective in Montevideo to strengthen this local capacity than to purchase new IT systems (UR-L1062). Police reforms launched in Honduras in 2012 placed priority on altering the profile of basic grade officers, including profound changes in their training, salary increases, and improvements in training and operating conditions. Systematization of this reform process highlights the fact that improving employment conditions for officers on lower pay scales has not only improved the status of the police career, elevating it from a trade to a profession, but it has also created a demonstration effect in the institution. As a result, modernization of the curriculum for mid- and high-ranking officers is currently under consideration (HO-L1063) (see https://vimeo.com/133496789).

4.17 Importance of strategic partnerships with the private sector. Through different programs, the Bank has witnessed the added value that comes from working together with the private sector to foster the integration of vulnerable populations, create sustainability in investments, and exchange knowledge in the area of citizen security and justice. In the case of Panama, for example, business sectors were brought in to assist in the rehabilitation and economic reintegration of young people in conflict with criminal laws and those who had completed prison sentences, with extremely positive outcomes (PN-X1011). In the case of Colombia, the Bank has supported the financing of public-private initiatives to invest in social infrastructure, including prison infrastructure for social rehabilitation programs for prisoners or victim support units (CO-L1131).

4.18 Knowledge generation. The Bank has significantly increased its investment in knowledge generation in the sector. Numerous research projects have been developed in recent years, and these have contributed to improvements in the design and implementation of operations. With the support of both the CSI from 2012 to 2016 and economic and sector work, analytical studies and impact evaluations have been carried out and experiences have been systematized. For example, in Uruguay it was concluded, based on two randomized controlled patrolling experiments, that crime analysts with suitable training were as effective as software in reducing crime. It was also concluded that there was room to improve the distribution of police personnel in terms of both timing and location, and that when specialized forces were focused on areas and during hours with a higher incidence of crime, these had greater potential for success. As a result of these evaluations in Uruguay, strengthening of the criminal analysis unit was included in a loan, together with deployment of a specialized force with flexible work shifts to patrol locations identified by the criminal analysis unit as having a high concentration of crime.

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38 Empirical evidence points to a positive correlation between the level of economic incentives on offer (salaries) and the capabilities of selected personnel in the public sector (Dal Bo, Finan, and Rossi, 2011).

39 From 2011 to 2016, wages for basic grade police officers in Honduras increased by 66%.


crime (UR-L1062). Similarly, a quasi-experimental evaluation of the Fundación Rafa Márquez “Fútbol y Corazón, A.C.” program “Fútbol Net [Football Net]” in Mexico provided the first robust analysis of the impact of sport on aggressive behavior by at-risk youth aged 8 to 15. This program succeeded in reducing the youths’ propensity towards violent attitudes, as well as the chances of them wanting to belong to a gang. These findings support the inclusion of this type of intervention in programs for the social prevention of violence (ME-T1232). Similarly, two recent Bank studies have quantified the costs of crime and its different components in the countries and outside their capital cities, with a view to better estimating their economic, social, and fiscal impact, evaluating spending efficiency, and improving public and private resource allocation.

4.19 **South-South and North-South Cooperation.** The Bank’s experience has demonstrated the importance of creating venues for facilitating the exchange of ideas, experiences, and knowledge among decision-makers, academic researchers, and civil society activists, with a view to seeking common solutions to prevent and tackle crime and violence in the region. The Bank has succeeded in consolidating a single space for policy dialogue in LAC that brings together high-level officials from the region and academic experts to engage in dialogue and exchange experiences. Security Week—launched eight years ago with the support of CSI, KNL, and the Bank’s Regional Dialogue Program—has become a leading forum for exchange in the sector. Since 2008, Security Week has been held annually in different countries in the region, and it has highlighted key sector challenges and allowed the dissemination of good practices implemented in the region. Since 2012, this activity has been combined with the Regional Policy Dialogue in Citizen Security, which is aimed at ministers and vice ministers in the area of security. Both events have facilitated the training in security and justice management of more than 2,000 Latin American and Caribbean delegates, becoming the Bank’s main dialogue event in the citizen security sector [see the documentation of this intervention at https://vimeo.com/171943314].

4.20 **Formulation of more specific safeguards for policing and prison system interventions.** Consistent with the recommendation contained in OVE’s 2014 evaluation, the risk analysis tools used in program design were completed and updated, such as the IDB Risk Mitigation Guidelines for Engaging with Police and

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42 The final report is entitled “Evaluación de impacto de los programas “Fútbol Net” y “Programa de Empleabilidad Juvenil” de la Fundación Rafa Márquez “Fútbol y Corazón, A.C.” [Impact evaluation of the Rafa Márquez Fútbol y Corazón Foundation programs “Football Net” and “Youth Employability Program”]; prepared by the Centro de Estudios Educativos y Sociales [Center for Educational and Social Studies] in June 2016. The study is awaiting publication.


44 For example, the following experiences and management models have been analyzed: in Brazil, Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora [Police Pacification Units]; in Colombia, the Centro de Estudios y Análisis de Convivencia [Center for Coexistence Study and Analysis], Plan Cuadrante [Quadrant Plan], and intervention in critical areas; in Jamaica, the juvenile violence prevention model; in Mexico, Plataforma México; in El Salvador, the Sistema de Información Penitenciaria [Prison Information System] for statistical data gathering; in Guatemala, the International Commission against Impunity; in Chile, the implementation of public-private partnerships in the prison system, the Integrated Citizen Security Policy, and the Carabinero policing model.
Corrections Services, which allows the identification, classification, and mitigation of risks that can arise when interventions take place in highly sensitive areas, such as the strengthening of police forces and prisons. They also provide guidance for specialists in determining which mitigation mechanisms are most suitable under the different scenarios.

2. Technical lessons

4.21 Sophistication of diagnostic assessments. To strengthen crime analysis and the institutional context, the Bank has prepared baseline mappings (country profiles) that are helping to improve the targeting of locations for intervention and to identify beneficiary populations. For example, these country profiles have helped to develop inputs for “Country Development Challenges” sections in project documents, and to prepare operations in Jamaica, The Bahamas, Peru, and Guatemala. They have also helped improve understanding of institutional contexts to better guide effective implementation. Improvements in data analysis and more extensive evidence regarding the “law of crime concentration” (see paragraph 3.4)—not only with respect to crimes, but also victims and perpetrators—are allowing operations to be designed based on better diagnostic assessments, and interventions to be better targeted (both geographically and in terms of population); this is also having a positive impact on DEM scores. This allows technical and budgetary efforts to be focused, progress monitored, results evaluated, the necessary adjustments made, and efforts scaled up in an appropriate manner. The analysis of information disaggregated by municipio, neighborhood, and block facilitates better targeting of interventions under projects (ES-L1025, PE-L1224, BR-L1343, AR-L1225, JA-L1043).

4.22 Characteristics of target populations. To improve the implementation of interventions, the profile of targeted populations needs to be understood as well as possible, with a view to identifying possible correlations between different variables such as age ranges, education levels, race, ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, consumption background, experience of violence, crime incidence, etc. This allows the design and implementation of public policies that are as tailored as possible to the needs of the different target populations. For example, in Central America and the Caribbean, the Bank is implementing surveys to establish the profile of women and men in conflict with the law, and to use this in the design and implementation of prevention, rehabilitation, and social reintegration programs. At the same time, victimization surveys are being conducted for the first time in the Caribbean to determine the magnitude of the problem of violence against women and the profile of female victims. A study of the profile of female users and nonusers of public transportation in different cities has also been carried out to investigate the distortions created by the fear of victimization and of engaging in specific activities. Lastly, different evaluations and selection tools help to ensure that programs serve target populations in an effective manner.

45 A tool to support technical teams for operational work in this area (IDB Risk Mitigation Guidelines for Engaging with Police and Corrections Services).

4.23 **Importance of social communication.** One of the most significant challenges faced by governments and the Bank in implementing programs in the sector is being able to effectively communicate achievements and progress to citizens and other stakeholders. Existing evidence indicates that citizens’ level of confidence in institutions is critical for sustaining reform processes and implementing the public policies undertaken by governments (Ardanaz et al. 2014). Similarly, improving perceptions of safety depends on effective presentation of progress in the area of security. In fact, one of the most frequent problems is a lack of alignment between citizens’ perceptions of insecurity and the real status of crime in the region (Dammert and Lagos 2012); this can be seen in a number of countries in the region in which crime rates have been falling (Ardanaz 2012) but the sense of insecurity has been rising. To address this problem, and to improve citizens’ confidence, the Bank’s security programs have sought to strengthen social communication units in security institutions, including national police forces and public prosecutors’ offices. For example, a training course has recently been developed for communicators in the region’s policing institutions, to develop mechanisms for external communication with citizens.

4.24 **Timely tailoring of programs to the country context.** The experience of executing citizen security and justice programs has confirmed the need for a degree of flexibility in making the adjustments needed in a dynamic environment such as the security sector. The Bank’s proactive support and advice has allowed the necessary adjustments to be made while ensuring technical quality and financial sustainability. In Honduras, minimal police presence in certain areas of the country meant that resources were reallocated from other components to expand the number of police stations in the country.

4.25 **Importance of determining intervention models before developing infrastructure.** Bank experience in the sector has shown that strengthening results-based planning at the beginning of program implementation is key to ensuring the attainment of planned objectives. The effective implementation of programs to prevent violence and assist the victims and perpetrators of violence requires intervention models and infrastructural development to be planned in a sequential manner. Promising results have been obtained where the support model is determined prior to launching infrastructure bidding processes. This ensures that infrastructure spaces are designed based on the support needs or services that are required for the prevention, rehabilitation, or training program that is planned. In Panama, for example, a rehabilitation and social reintegration model was introduced in 2011 for young people in conflict with the law; this was characterized by different phases of operation, leading to the subsequent design of infrastructure compatible

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47 Ardanaz et al. (2014) have found that communicating real reductions in crime can improve citizens’ perceptions of security and police effectiveness, as well as reducing mistrust.


49 Ardanaz, M., Mind the gap: bridging the perception and reality of crime rates with information, IDB-WP-530, 2014. Corbacho et al. (2012) study the relationship between individual victimization and confidence, finding that being the victim of a crime is strongly correlated with a reduction in trust in formal public institutions.

with the model. In Costa Rica, to support the design of Unidades de Atención Integral [Integrated Support Units] for detainees, a support model was designed for the beneficiaries of these units that included psychosocial interventions, a therapeutic approach to addictions, and proposals for management processes and productive chains. The experience of an intervention to support professional police training under the operation in Honduras demonstrated the importance of formulating and defining the police curriculum beforehand, so as to guide the architectural designs for academy facilities. The Police Technical Institute’s new facilities were inaugurated in 2016, completely tailored to the new model and with effective use of all facilities from the beginning. Lastly, the region’s experience shows that PPP arrangements for penitentiary facilities need to be carefully reviewed and structured to achieve, principally, reduction of recidivism and effective reintegration of prisoners into society.

3. Operational lessons

4.26 Documenting experiences and disseminating operational knowledge. One of the recommendations in the 2014 OVE evaluation was to determine a knowledge agenda that would provide a more robust empirical basis for improving project design and policy formulation. In response to this recommendation, a plan has been developed to generate useful information that can be used as a reference point for facilitating execution and improving results under future operations. The Bank will seek to document work in the field, mainly to determine the extent to which operating plans are being followed. It also aims to systematize the application of intervention models with the aim of disseminating achievements, identifying challenges, and deriving lessons learned, as well as to monitor results indicators to verify whether targets are being met or if adjustments need to be made, and, lastly, to implement impact evaluations for the interventions. Another lesson learned is the need to create venues and mechanisms for experiences to be shared among the different executing agencies. These types of meetings are useful for identifying common problems and seeking innovative solutions when implementing Bank loans and technical cooperation projects.51

4.27 Leveraging program implementation with other technical and financial instruments. Implementation of Bank citizen security and criminal justice programs has demonstrated that two types of support in particular are needed in the initial stages of execution. Firstly, it is essential to provide close technical support to the executing agency at the beginning of the program so that it can rapidly assimilate Bank rules and regulations (in the area of procurement specifically). This helps to reduce the time required for an operation to get fully underway. Secondly, the project team leader’s financing capabilities, through technical cooperation projects to provide strategic and timely advisory support in specific cases, are critical for providing an efficient response to governments in their efforts to effectively implement programs. For example, good designs in the case of specialized prison and police infrastructure in Costa Rica (CR-L1031) and Honduras (HO-L1063) benefited from the ability to provide guidance to the governments through the rapid

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51 The last meeting of this kind took place in Washington D.C. on 20 and 21 June 2016. All specialists in headquarters and in the field participated, as well as the directors of the executing units. It was organized into regional and thematic blocks.
and timely mobilization of expert advisory services and financing for field visits to observe models in other countries.

4.28 **Strengthening of human resources for project administration.** A central factor in good project execution is the availability of quality human resources that can support attainment of the targets set for each program based on technical judgment and ownership of objectives and timeframes. This is not always possible, however. Several countries in the region encounter difficulties in forming teams for executing units—sometimes due to a lack of sufficient human resources, other times due to salary levels—and this suggests a need to encourage the training of specialists in the formulation and management of security programs, as well as to conduct a thorough review of the salary systems of professionals active in these areas.

4.29 **Planning of investments to ensure compliance with key benchmarks.** The implementation of sector programs has demonstrated the importance of prioritizing planning workshops with executing units when programs begin, with identification of the most significant procurement milestones in terms of both the magnitude of investments and their impact upon credibility and confidence in the programs. This process has been key to accelerating program execution, as was the case in El Salvador (ES-L1025), Costa Rica (CR-L1031), and Honduras (HO-L1063). In the latter case, implementation will be concluded this year, within the timeframe originally established under the loan and in compliance with the stipulated benchmarks. In this respect, the program is establishing itself as an example for the region.

4.30 **Institutional capacity of agencies and executing units.** The capacities of agencies and executing units have been affected by the absence of technical personnel, a lack of experience in managing internationally funded loan or technical assistance operations, and high turnover. Experience has confirmed the need for institutional assessments that allow adjustment of the scope of operations, capacity-building, and strengthening of executing agencies. These capacities will allow them to respond more effectively to the required operational, financial, and accounting responsibilities, as well as to improve management of integrity risks (in terms of systems for managing conflicts of interest, verifying information submitted by suppliers and/or consulting firms as part of bidding processes, and executing works). The strengthening of project operational and financial planning capabilities has been effective in improving implementation and achieving outcomes.

D. **The Bank’s comparative advantages in the citizen security and justice sector**

4.31 **The Bank is a pioneer among multilaterals in providing support for the sector in the region.** Since 1998, the Bank has acknowledged that the phenomenon of crime and violence has generated significant economic and social costs for the region, and that it therefore represents an obstacle to growth and development in the countries of the region. Since that year, the Bank has promoted a preventive approach to violence as a part of government agendas in the region. Since 2009, the Bank has consolidated its strategic position in a sector where the countries’ demands for support have risen significantly. From 2013 to 2016, 10 loan operations were approved for a total value of US$322 million. Expansion of the Bank’s portfolio in this area reflects growing concern and demand for support among governments in the region, as well as the Bank’s positioning to address it.
4.32 **Not just financing, but the quality of technical support.** The countries seek not only financial assistance from the Bank, but also high-quality technical assistance and support in the policy dialogue, with a view to improving sector management. Undertaking structural reforms in the citizen security sector requires the ability to establish contacts and exchanges that provide a technical foundation for these processes. In addition to the ongoing technical support that it provides to government through its specialists, the Bank places its capabilities as an interlocutor at the service of the countries, together with its ability to identify the best international experts in multiple disciplines within the area of citizen security and criminal justice.

4.33 **The Citizen Security and Justice Cluster.** Unlike other multilateral institutions, the Bank has an operational unit devoted to the sector. This team is divided into teams of specialists according to region and at the local level in each country. This facilitates technical dialogue with borrowing member countries and strategic partners. The Bank also supplements its technical support to the countries with advisory services by international experts in specialized fields.

4.34 **Multisector synergies.** The Bank provides the opportunity for collaboration between multiple areas and sectors relevant to crime and violence prevention (e.g. education, health, social protection, labor markets, transportation, private sector, urban development, gender). This has allowed operational work to be coordinated with other Bank sectors, with 7 out of 10 operations “double-booked” between 2013 and 2016. The sector has also been responsible for components in projects led by other areas of the Bank. Moreover, IFD/ICS has conducted several studies and knowledge activities with other sectors. For example, we have established a collaborative dynamic in operational and knowledge generation activities in the following areas, among others: interventions under operations to prevent violence against women; improving crime data gathering and analysis by gender and race; implementing surveys of violence against women in the Caribbean; and promoting female leaders in the area of security with a view to incorporating them into “Red Prolid [Prolid Network]”.

4.35 **The Bank as a strategic partner in the sector.** These characteristics help to create value added, and have allowed the Bank to position itself as a multilateral institution of great value in the process of coordinating and leveraging additional technical and financial support for the region. As a result, the role of the Bank in the sector is being regarded positively by the international community, and this has helped to attract additional nonreimbursable financial resources through cofinancing for the citizen security programs that the Bank is implementing in the region. To stimulate dissemination of acquired knowledge in the region, we have built partnerships with institutions such as the Inter-American Dialogue; Woodrow Wilson Center, John Jay College, George Mason University, University of West Indies, College of The

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52 Particularly with the MIF, to leverage innovative mechanisms and its experience with social impact bonds.

53 The Bank, through the citizen security and justice cluster, has become a multilateral conduit for bilateral cooperation over the last four years. For example, through the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Switzerland has provided cofinancing of US$6.6 million for the Citizen Security Program in Honduras, as well as an additional contribution of US$5.4 million. Canada and the United Kingdom have provided cofinancing of US$35 million in Jamaica. The European Union is providing funding of US$28 million in Panama. Other nonreimbursable cofinancing opportunities are currently being analyzed in the citizen security and justice sector in Central America.
Bahamas, Universidad de los Andes (Colombia), Universidad la Universidad Católica (Chile), United Nations Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, UNODC, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas [Center for Economic Research and Teaching] (Mexico), the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association’s ALCAPONE network, London School of Economics, Universidad Di Tella (Argentina), World Economic Forum, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. We will continue to deepen integration with academic institutions, multilaterals, think tanks, and other civil society organizations.

V. GOAL, PRINCIPLES, AND DIMENSIONS OF SUCCESS TO GUIDE THE BANK’S OPERATIONAL AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

A. Goal and principles of work in the Citizen Security and Justice Sector

5.1 **Goal.** This SFD proposes that the fundamental goal of the Bank’s Citizen Security and Justice (CSJ) activities over the next three years be to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of CSJ public policies in the region, in order to contribute to the reduction of crime and violence.

5.2 To help achieve the proposed goal and guide the Bank’s operational and analytical work, four Dimensions of Success are proposed that are interrelated with the IDB’s areas of activity in CSJ. These dimensions were based on a review of the evidence relating to the Bank’s operational framework in the sector, operational experience from programs in the sector, and lessons learned identified by the Knowledge and Learning Sector (KNL), as well as the evaluations conducted by the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE), which point to the need for targeted, evidence-based interventions that generate quality information and promote evaluation.

5.3 As crosscutting areas in each of the four Dimensions of Success, emphasis will continue to be put on the generation of quantitative and qualitative information that is relevant, comparable, disaggregated (in the areas of crime statistics, victimization surveys, community surveys, and crime observatories) and specific (by gender, race, and ethnicity), while proactively fostering methodological rigor and the periodic generation and dissemination of statistics.

5.4 Likewise, the generation and dissemination of knowledge based on empirical evidence and robust evaluations will be continued in the region. This requires the generation of reliable statistics to enable monitoring and evaluation of the different

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55 Given the diverse nature of CSJ within the region and, therefore, the specific features of the countries in this sector, the Bank’s actions will be tailored to the context and needs of each country. Accordingly, the diagnostic assessments prepared on the basis of sector technical notes, analytical work, and analyses prepared jointly with other Bank sectors involved in these issues will be taken into consideration, to facilitate a deeper understanding of the problems in each country.


interventions, facilitating an understanding of the programs’ quantitative and qualitative impacts. Lastly, the Bank plans to become involved in the introduction of digital innovations and solutions in the CSJ sector.

5.5 Principles. To meet this goal and achieve the Dimensions of Success, the Bank’s operational and analytical work in the sector will be guided by the following principles:

a. Targeted and contextualized interventions. The Bank will seek to design projects and actions targeted both geographically and in terms of populations, with bounded interventions that emphasize the critical risk factors to be addressed. Additionally, given the diversity of conditions in the region, projects will address the regional, national, and local contexts and requirements, and promote the adaptation of solutions for reasons of ethnicity or gender.

b. Expansion of knowledge and empirical evidence. Given that the empirical evidence in large part stems from evaluations carried out in countries outside the region, projects must be based on the available quantitative and qualitative evidence, and take into account the global and regional experience with the design and implementation of policies and programs in the sector. Emphasis will be put not only on the “what,” i.e., the identification of interventions of proven cost-effectiveness, but also on the “how,” i.e., the most effective execution mechanisms that help to simplify execution arrangements and improve implementation of these interventions.

c. Strengthening of evaluation. Given the pressing need to generate knowledge and evidence in the sector, projects must lay the groundwork for conducting rigorous impact evaluations. These efforts will be made through the inclusion of components to strengthen information management systems; improve capabilities for data collection and analysis; and identify indicators and targets tailored to program objectives.

d. Promote gender equality and special attention to vulnerable groups. This is particularly applicable to activities supporting crosscutting improvements to criminal statistics across the four dimensions of the SFD. This will ensure the availability of improved, high-quality data disaggregated by type of crime, gender, and ethnicity, to improve the design and implementation of interventions. Similarly, there are plans to analyze the specific needs of vulnerable groups with a view to adapting interventions: for example, programs to support young or female prisoners, work reintegration, and access to justice and police assistance for victims of crime and violence against women that take into account age, ethnicity, and gender, as well as promoting gender balance at security and justice entities.

e. Strengthening of risk identification and mitigation. In programs that include interventions in sensitive areas such as policing or the penitentiary system, the potential risks need to be evaluated, mitigated, and managed, justifying the Bank’s value-added and comparative advantage from a technical and financial standpoint. Where the intervention can be justified, the parameters and limits of Bank intervention will be established, including appropriate mitigation measures.
f. **Interagency collaboration and intersector coordination.** Projects will be undertaken in close collaboration with the key players in CSJ policy-making: governments, sector ministries, subnational governments, and local authorities. The Bank will also promote active participation by the private sector, civil society, research institutes, and other international cooperation institutions, which can all contribute to the effective implementation and monitoring of these policies. Such collaboration will help to address the issue in a comprehensive manner. Where relevant and effective, the Bank will promote intersector collaboration with a view to coordinating solutions.

g. **Promotion of regional dialogue and horizontal cooperation.** Support will be provided for knowledge sharing, sector dialogue, and technical cooperation among countries of the region in the CSJ area. The Bank will act as a knowledge generator and broker, and will continue to disseminate knowledge through regional policy dialogues, knowledge seminars, and training workshops, as well as through networks of experts and strategic partnerships with other institutions. The purpose of these activities is to provide strategic support to the countries, as well use new information technologies to facilitate the exchange of applied knowledge.

5.6 The following sections summarize the rationale for the Dimensions of Success, their corresponding priority lines of action, and activities where the Bank proposes to focus its efforts over the next three years.

**B. Dimensions of Success**

1. **Dimension of Success 1. Children, youth, and women at risk have access to effective, comprehensive social service and prevention programs for crime and violence.**

5.7 This dimension seeks to improve the quality and coverage of programs to prevent and address violence in a targeted and selective manner, by addressing specific risk factors. It will take gender, diversity, and ethnic/cultural perspectives into account. The following lines of action are proposed to achieve this:

5.8 **Lines of action:** (i) improve the coverage, sustainability, and coordination of programs for the social prevention of crime and violence; (ii) promote the development of evidence-based models of response specific to the level of risk in the relevant population; and (iii) improve beneficiary monitoring and supervision mechanisms. To pursue these, financing is proposed for the following operational and knowledge activities:

a. **Operational activities** will include selective interventions for children, youth, and women at medium or high risk, through programs such as (i) education and the development of parenting skills, to promote and instill respect for, and adherence to, social norms in children from an early age; (ii) early childhood care and stimulation programs; (iii) extracurricular services and positive use of free time; (iv) mentoring, tutoring, and peaceful dispute resolution programs; (v) improvement of sociocognitive abilities, soft skills, and psychological capabilities; (vi) vocational training and education and support for productive enterprises for social integration and workforce reintegration; (vii) awareness-raising among parents, students, and teachers regarding ethical values and coexistence; (viii) social and cultural inclusion through sports; (ix) addiction
treatment programs; (x) substance abuse prevention; and others. Programs to support women that have been victims of violence will help to (i) provide comprehensive assistance (medical, legal, police, and psychological) through programs such as integrated service centers (the Ciudad Mujer [City of Women] project in El Salvador); (ii) promote women’s participation in economic life through their economic empowerment, with programs such as IMAGE; (iii) prevent violence against women in public spaces (streets, public transport, schools and surrounding areas); and (iv) transform social and cultural norms in the community (such as the model of violent masculinity), through interventions such as the H and M Program.

b. **Knowledge and dissemination activities** will include: (i) analytical studies to assess the effectiveness of social service and prevention programs for violence;\(^{58}\) (ii) further improvements in data generation and analysis concerning violence against women; (iii) the introduction of technological innovations for social prevention;\(^{59}\) (iv) evaluations of the effectiveness of work training programs for young people at risk of criminal behavior; (v) evaluations of the impact of drug treatment on crime; (vi) targeted studies to determine the effectiveness of programs focused on perpetrators of violence against women; (vii) design and development of victimization surveys and studies of risk factors; and (viii) design and development of surveys concerning violence against women.

2. **Dimension of Success 2.** Police work is results-based and involves close collaboration with the community with the aim of preventing, addressing, and solving crime.

5.9 This dimension will emphasize activities to strengthen police management capabilities, including training, education, and professionalization, as well as promoting closer relations with communities and accountability mechanisms to improve citizen perceptions and confidence. The following lines of action are proposed:

5.10 **Lines of action:** (i) strengthen institutional capacity for strategic planning, performance monitoring, and human resource management and professionalization; (ii) support development and deployment of community policing models; (iii) strengthen criminal investigation capabilities; and (iv) improve oversight and accountability mechanisms (internal and external). To pursue these, financing is proposed for the following operational and knowledge activities:

a. **Operational activities** will include: (i) strengthening sector stewardship capacities and modernize both information management systems and crime

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\(^{58}\) For example, evaluations of the “CeaseFire” programs in Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago will make it possible to measure the effectiveness of dispute resolution interventions for young gang members. Additionally, evaluations of the “YouthBuild” programs in El Salvador, The Bahamas, Brazil, and Jamaica will provide evidence regarding the effectiveness of this intervention in improving work and life skills of at-risk youth. An evaluation is also planned in Jamaica on the effectiveness of programs for parents in reducing violent attitudes towards their children.

\(^{59}\) For example, the “E-Responder” program in New York. See paragraph 2.18.
analysis,\textsuperscript{60} leveraging “big data” analysis at the national and local levels,\textsuperscript{61} to improve crime prevention and response; (ii) modernizing the police officer career path, including recruitment, selection, and training processes, while promoting the use of technology; (iii) promoting strategies for community policing, including specialization for victims of violence against women and for sociodemographic characteristics (age, ethnicity, and gender); (iv) improving criminal and forensic investigation capabilities; (v) improving transparency, oversight, and accountability mechanisms for police forces (for example, performance evaluations and disciplinary procedures); and (vi) facilitating data analysis and the evaluation of technological innovations for crime prevention.

b. Knowledge activities will include: (i) comprehensive diagnostic assessment to analyze the risks of providing support to police forces, and identify mitigation mechanisms; (ii) development of criminal investigation protocols; (iii) evaluations to determine the effect of police education and training on citizen trust and police effectiveness;\textsuperscript{62} (iv) evaluations to analyze the impact of strategies involving community policing and the spatial concentration of crime (for example, “hot spot” strategies in Uruguay and Colombia); (v) studies of the use and analysis of alternative data sources for crime prevention and response; (vi) a study of the effects of police decentralization strategies (for example, in Ecuador); and (vii) a publication on police reforms in the region that includes the knowledge generated by the aforementioned assessments, as well as other studies and outcomes of Bank support in this subsector.

3. Dimension of Success 3. Citizens have efficient and timely access to criminal justice services, ensuring that their rights are protected.

5.11 This dimension seeks to increase the offerings of criminal justice services by improving the analytical, technical, and operational capabilities of criminal justice system actors at each stage of the process. The following lines of action are proposed:

5.12 Lines of action: (i) improve efficiency in the management and administration of criminal justice services in a coordinated manner; (ii) increase offerings and access to basic criminal justice services, taking into account demand based on sociodemographic characteristics (age, ethnicity, and gender), among other factors; (iii) improve access to, and the effectiveness of, criminal investigations by public prosecutors; (iv) expand the offerings of alternatives to imprisonment, both before and after trial; (v) promote rationalization of the use of pretrial detention; (vi) support prison rehabilitation programs to prevent recidivism; (vii) facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into society; (viii) promote design of differential response programs with a gender perspective; and (ix) promote results-based prison management based on

\textsuperscript{60} For example, crime prediction using demographic and cell phone data in London and Bogotá (Bogomolov et al., 2014; Nadai et al., 2016).

\textsuperscript{61} Support will be included for the disaggregation of information on crime and violence by race, ethnicity, social status, and gender, whenever possible.

\textsuperscript{62} For example, two randomized controlled trials in Uruguay in 2015 confirmed that specialized training led to reductions in crime. Galiani, S. and L. Jaitman (2017). “Predictive Policing in Latin America: Evidence from Two Randomized Control Trials in Uruguay.” In addition, evaluations in Ecuador, Honduras, Peru, and Argentina will allow validation of the impact of training on crime and citizen perceptions.
rehabilitation outcomes. To pursue these, financing is proposed for the following operational and knowledge activities:

a. **Operational activities** will include: (i) improving the effectiveness of judicial processes through the generation and use of quality information, timely processing of cases leveraging digital innovations (for example, electronic case files, unique case file numbers, “eCourts” or online justice); (ii) strengthening the quality of criminal investigation, the handling of evidence, and the use of technology by public prosecutors; (iii) strengthening training programs for judges, magistrates, and criminal justice professionals to facilitate an effective transition to the new mechanisms; (iv) supporting pretrial services that take into account the risk profile and needs of each individual, as well as specific protocols for pretrial detention; (v) supporting programs that offer alternatives to imprisonment based on the criminological characteristics and needs of the accused, to strengthen the preventive and rehabilitative functions of justice;\(^63\) (vi) facilitating access to formal and alternative criminal justice services, particularly among vulnerable groups (minors, women, minorities, and disadvantaged communities);\(^64\) (vii) promoting new approaches involving restorative justice and specialized courts that help to decongest the traditional system and facilitate resolution of less serious conflicts or disputes;\(^65\) and (viii) supporting prison rehabilitation programs, as well as reintegration into society.

b. **Knowledge activities** will include: (i) evaluation of the efficiency of justice through oral and written processes;\(^66\) (ii) evaluations of the effectiveness of alternative justice in preventing recidivism (for example, “casas de justicia” [legal advice centers] for women in Mexico); (iii) evaluation of the effectiveness of cognitive therapy in reducing youth recidivism;\(^67\) (iv) studies on the impact of technology on the effectiveness of justice (programs to digitize case files in Peru and El Salvador); (v) tools to analyze the risk profile and needs of the accused, and specific protocols to determine the grounds for pretrial detention and its duration; (vi) systems for monitoring and expediting cases to facilitate individualized tracking; (vii) design of prison surveys and tools to evaluate management capabilities of penitentiary institutions (in Central American and Caribbean countries); (viii) case studies and evaluations of rehabilitation and reintegration programs (for example, in Paraguay, El Salvador, and Brazil); (ix) evaluations of the effectiveness of addiction treatment programs in prisons; and (x) case studies of the quality of prison infrastructure in the region.

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\(^{63}\) These programs include drug treatment courts, house arrest, electronic monitoring, community service, and conditional parole.

\(^{64}\) These services include “casas de justicia” [legal advice centers], family police services, women’s police services, and conciliation centers.

\(^{65}\) These programs include restorative justice and specialized courts for domestic violence or drug courts.

\(^{66}\) An evaluation is expected to be completed in this area in Ecuador in 2017.

\(^{67}\) A randomized controlled trial is expected to be completed in this area in Brazil in 2018.
4. Dimension of Success 4. The institutions responsible for citizen security and criminal justice administer integrated policies in an effective and coordinated manner at the national and local levels.

5.13 The evidence emphasizes the importance of sector leadership, coordination, and management by national and local authorities as a determining factor for the effective implementation of CSJ public policies. The following lines of action are proposed:

5.14 **Lines of action:** (i) strengthen the institutional and coordination capabilities of agencies involved in CSJ sector leadership and management at the national and local levels, as well as between the two, for the planning, design, management, execution, and evaluation of their public policies; and (ii) address urban crime, particularly in urban informal neighborhoods, as a complement to the proposals contained in the Urban Development and Housing SFD. To pursue these, financing is proposed for the following operational and knowledge activities:

a. **Operational activities** will include: (i) improving central government capabilities for sector stewardship and strategic planning, management, information, monitoring, evaluation, and horizontal coordination among ministries and sectors; (ii) strengthening the institutional capacity for security management at the subnational level, including vertical coordination between levels of government, financing mechanisms, planning, information, monitoring, and evaluation; (iii) strengthening the institutional capacity for security management at the municipal level, particularly urban municipios (cities), including vertical coordination between levels of government, financing mechanisms, planning, information, monitoring, and evaluation; and (iv) supporting comprehensive CSJ programs in urban areas that promote management of the physical environment, with social and local governance interventions involving the local authorities, police, civil society, and the private sector.

b. **Knowledge and dissemination activities** will include: (i) preparing training programs in CSJ management for senior national, subnational, and local government officials; 68 (ii) generating, disseminating, and analyzing comparable statistical information at the national and local levels, through victimization surveys and local violence observatories in particular; 69 (iii) conducting studies on the efficiency of public security spending and the impact of crime on productivity and economic activity; 70 (iv) supporting methodologies for the comprehensive and participatory analysis of CSJ at both the national and local levels; (v) supporting the Regional Policy Dialogues on Citizen Security and Justice; (vi) strengthening training for counterparts implementing security programs through the Bank’s Citizen Security Training

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68 By working in partnership with innovation laboratories using design thinking methodologies, responses to security challenges are expected to be developed. For example, prototype solutions will be tested through the Government of Chile’s laboratory to allow the identification of factors affecting perceptions of insecurity, with a view to guiding public policy.


70 A study of the effectiveness of security spending has been planned for 2018, as an input for Development in the Americas (DIA), 2018.
Clinics; and (vii) supporting knowledge dissemination through the implementation of networks of advisors and experts to provide strategic support to the countries (South-South and North-South cooperation), including the Visiting Scholars program initiated in 2012.
FIGURES

Figure 1. Total number of academic publications on the economics of crime in leading academic journals

Source: Jaitman 2015.

Figure 2. Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants by region of the world, 2000-2014

Source: UNODC.
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Figure 3. Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants by Latin American and Caribbean country, 2015 or most recent year

Source: Official sources in each country.

Figure 4. Trends in Latin American victimization rate, 1995-2015

Source: Latinobarómetro, 2015.
Note: Q.: Have you or any of your relatives been assaulted or the victim of crime in the last 12 months?
* Figure reflects only the following answers: ‘Yes’, ‘Relative’, ‘Both’.
Figure 5. Victimization rate by country, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Victimization Rate (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>57.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>50.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>47.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>47.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>45.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>43.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>38.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Latinobarómetro, 2015.
Note: Q.: Have you or any of your relatives been assaulted or the victim of crime in the last 12 months?
* Figure reflects the following answers: ‘Yes’, ‘Relative’, ‘Both’.
Figure 6.
Trends in victimization rates by country, 1995-2015

Source: Latinobarómetro, 2015.
Note: Q.: Have you or any of your relatives been assaulted or the victim of crime in the last 12 months?
* Figure reflects the following answers: ‘Yes’, ‘Relative’, ‘Both’.
Figure 7. Trends in citizen perceptions of crime problems in Latin America, 1995-2015

Source: Latinobarómetro 2015.

Figure 8. Citizen perceptions of crime and public safety

Source: Latinobarómetro, 2015.
* Countries where crime and public safety were the number one concern among those surveyed in 2015.
Figure 9. Trends in trust in the judicial system and police in Latin America, 1995-2015

Source: Latinobarómetro, 2015.
Note: Q.: Please look at this card and tell me how much confidence you have in each one of the groups/institutions or persons mentioned in the list: A Lot, Some, Little, or None?
* Figure reflects the following answers: ‘A Lot’, ‘Some’.

Figure 10. Trends in confidence in the judicial system and police by country, 1995-2015

Source: Latinobarómetro, 2015.
Note: Q.: Please look at this card and tell me how much confidence you have in each one of the groups/institutions or persons mentioned in the list: A Lot, Some, Little, or None?
* Figure reflects the following answers: ‘A Lot’, ‘Some’, ‘Both’.
Figure 11. Cost of crime by region, 2014

Source: Jaitman, 2017.

Figure 12. Cost of crime by country, 2014

Source: Jaitman, 2017.
Figure 13. Homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants in the world’s most violent cities


Figure 14. Trends in prison population rates, by region

Figure 15. Comparison of rates of overcrowding and pretrial/remand imprisonment, by region

a. Overcrowding rates (%)

b. Pretrial/remand imprisonment rates (%)

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